Gary T. Trotter

The appellant, who suffered from treatment-resistant schizophrenia, was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for attempted murder after a vicious, unprovoked attack on his neighbour.

The trial judge subsequently designated the appellant a high-risk accused (HRA) under ss. 672.64(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied the wrong legal standards and that the findings were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying the distinct risk thresholds under the two subsections and finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk of grave harm.

The appellant challenged summary judgment dismissing his claim.

The court rejected both appellate arguments, upheld the motion judge’s credibility and documentary-evidence assessments, and found no palpable and overriding error.

The appellants challenged an order striking their contempt motion without leave to amend.

The court held the motion judge made no legal or principled error, upheld the costs framework used below, and dismissed both merits and costs-related challenges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the Divisional Court and awarded fixed costs to the respondent.

On a motion to quash, the court considered whether an appeal from dismissal of a contempt motion was interlocutory.

Applying established principles, it held the order was interlocutory because underlying proceedings remained ongoing and other procedural avenues were available.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

On panel review under s. 7(5) CJA, the appellant challenged dismissal of a motion to extend time to perfect an appeal.

The panel found justice required an extension because perfection materials had been tendered before dismissal notice and defects were largely technical with no demonstrated prejudice.

The review motion was granted and timelines reset.

Following a joint trial, both appellants challenged convictions for possession of cocaine for trafficking and related proceeds offences, largely on factual grounds.

The court found no basis to interfere with the trial findings.

Leave to appeal sentence for one appellant was granted but dismissed on the merits.

Two defendants appealed a trial judgment awarding substantial damages for breach of fuel-delivery contracts and for inducing breach.

The court upheld findings that Remote breached contract and good faith duties, that Wasaya induced the breach, and that mitigation findings were available on the record.

However, it held the trial judge erred by not applying the contractual limitation clause, reducing Remote’s liability to $50,000 while leaving Wasaya liable for $856,458.

The Minister of Justice referred the appellant's 1990 second-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeal after it was discovered that police failed to disclose an audio recording of an interview with an alternate suspect.

The Crown conceded the non-disclosure constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring the conviction to be quashed.

The appellant sought an acquittal, arguing a police conspiracy to frame him and that his confession was false.

The Court of Appeal declined to enter an acquittal, finding that a properly instructed jury could still convict based on the appellant's voluntary confession and new DNA evidence linking him to the victim's clothing.

The Court ordered a new trial rather than a judicial stay of proceedings.

The appellant, a 58-year-old family friend, was convicted of sexually assaulting the 17-year-old daughter of his close friend and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applying the W.(D.) principles, and finding a lack of consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year term was not demonstrably unfit given the significant breach of trust, the vulnerability of the adolescent victim, and the severe impact of the offences.

An appellant found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision refusing his transfer from the Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre back to Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences.

The appellant, aged 69 with schizoaffective disorder, pedophilic disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning, had been under the Board's jurisdiction since 1998.

After transferring to the Royal Ottawa in November 2024, he faced significantly enhanced liberty restrictions, including confinement to his ward and a pureed food diet due to choking risk.

The Board refused the transfer request, citing the brief duration of his stay and concerns about therapeutic alliance.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's decision unreasonable, holding that it improperly focused on the appellant's best interests rather than the statutory "least onerous and least restrictive" standard.

The court ordered the transfer to Ontario Shores.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation of his daughter.

The trial judge was Justice Fletcher Dawson, sitting with a jury.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the trial judge erred in permitting cross-examination of the complainant's mother and sisters regarding uncharged abusive conduct; (2) that the trial judge made a section 276 error regarding evidence of the complainant's sexual activity; and (3) that the trial judge made a Browne v. Dunn error by failing to ensure that contradictory evidence was put to the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) verdict entered on February 24, 2017, following a psychiatric assessment that concluded the appellant did not know his actions were wrong due to untreated schizophrenia.

The appeal was based on serious procedural defects at the hearing, including failure to arraign the appellant, failure to take a plea, failure to make elections on four of five charges, failure to read facts into the record, absence of viva voce evidence, and failure to address the appellant or allow him to speak.

The Crown conceded the procedural flaws warranted setting aside the verdict.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the NCRMD verdict, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, a civilian dependant of a Canadian Armed Forces member stationed in Belgium, was convicted by a Standing Court Martial of operating a conveyance while impaired.

He appealed, arguing that trying him in the military justice system rather than the civilian system was arbitrary and infringed section 7 of the Charter.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory provisions explicitly apply Canadian law to his conduct abroad.

The Court further held that the decision to prosecute falls squarely within prosecutorial discretion, which can only be interfered with in cases of abuse of process, none of which was established here.

The appellant was convicted of one count of assault and one count of sexual assault relating to the same complainant and was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant raised two related grounds: first, that the trial was rendered unfair because he lacked testimonial capacity due to mental illness; and second, that the trial was unfair because the counts in the indictment were vague and failed to identify specific instances of assault and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application regarding the appellant's psychiatric condition, finding that the evidence lacked cogency without expert opinion linking the mental illness to testimonial capacity.

The court also rejected the indictment vagueness argument, finding that the counts did not violate the single transaction rule and that the appellant received full disclosure and knew the case he had to meet.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed from a conviction for sexual assault on multiple grounds, including alleged errors in the trial judge's application of the burden and standard of proof, an adverse inference from silence, the admission of testimony regarding the complainant's demeanour, and improper reliance on the complainant's testimonial demeanour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of law or consideration of evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and sexual assault against his wife.

The appellant alleged that the trial judge erred by reversing the onus of proof, failing to adequately explain credibility findings, engaging in propensity reasoning, and improperly applying the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for intervention and dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's credibility assessments and acceptance of the complainant's testimony as confirmed by a recorded conversation.

The appellant was convicted of one count of sexual assault, three counts of assault, and one count of uttering threats against his common law spouse.

He was acquitted of one count of assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred by artificially compartmentalizing the complainant's testimony and by relying on the complainant's lack of embellishment to bolster her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to assessing credibility and the weight of evidence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and assault against his former wife.

He appealed on the narrow ground that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the defence to pursue additional electronic messages during cross-examination of the complainant.

The trial judge required that any application for third-party disclosure of such messages be brought under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code prior to trial, not mid-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the trial judge made some factual errors in his ruling, his ultimate decision to foreclose the mid-trial application was justified as a proper exercise of trial-management powers.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault, challenging the trial judge's credibility assessments on multiple grounds: failure to consider the complainant's motive to fabricate, failure to address inconsistencies in testimony, failure to consider evidence of collusion and tainting between the complainant and her daughter, and erroneous assessment of the appellant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's comprehensive credibility analysis and dismissed the appeal.