Darla A. Wilson

The appellant failed to close on a residential real estate transaction, prompting the respondent to seek damages and move for summary judgment.

After repeatedly breaching court-ordered timetables and failing to pay previously ordered costs, the appellant requested a further adjournment on a peremptory return date, which the motion judge refused.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the refusal, holding that the motion judge exercised her discretion properly in light of the appellant's contumelious delay and failure to comply with court orders, and that there was no denial of procedural fairness.

The appellant vendor entered into an agreement to sell 208 developed building lots to the respondent purchasers.

The vendor chose to build private drinking and wastewater systems and entered into municipal responsibility agreements with the township.

The purchasers refused to pay the capital costs for these private systems, arguing they were not party to the agreements and the purchase price included water services.

The application judge ruled the purchasers were not obliged to pay these costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the agreement of purchase and sale.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision granting summary judgment in favour of the respondent and finding the action was statute-barred.

The damage to the appellant's building was discovered on October 4, 2019, by the property manager.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the presumption under s. 5(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002 was not rebutted and that the claim was discoverable on October 4, 2019.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's determination that the parties separated on June 20, 2022, rather than December 31, 2014.

The trial judge found the respondent more credible and the appellant's assertion that they separated months after marriage but continued to cohabit and maintain joint accounts for eight years implausible.

The Court of Appeal found no errors of fact or law, noting the determination of the date of separation rests on findings of fact and credibility, which are entitled to great deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant's claims to set aside a separation agreement and for support were dismissed after she failed to attend the in-person trial, despite multiple warnings.

She appealed on grounds of procedural fairness and failure to adjudicate her claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that she should have appealed the order requiring an in-person trial rather than defying it.

The trial judge made no error in proceeding with the trial and resolving the claims based on the evidence before him.

The appellant appealed the application judge's interpretation of a clause in his mother's Will regarding the disposition of a family cottage.

The clause bequeathed the cottage to the appellant provided its value was deducted from his share of the estate residue.

The cottage's appraised value exceeded his share of the residue, and the application judge held he had to pay the shortfall to the estate to receive title, to preserve the deceased's intent to treat her children equally.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable or overriding error in this interpretation and dismissed the appeal.

Leave to appeal the costs order below was denied, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant wife appealed a trial decision ordering the respondent husband to pay a $55,000 lump sum for spousal support, which she argued fell outside the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's discretionary determination, finding no error in principle or misapprehension of evidence regarding the duration, form, or quantum of the non-compensatory support awarded.

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's decision granting a vesting order in an action for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The moving party argued the responding party delayed in renewing the motion and that the moving party was prejudiced by the denial of rent or use of the purchase money.

The Court of Appeal found the responding party had not breached court orders regarding rent, and that the moving party had repeatedly breached its contractual obligations.

The motion to set aside the motion judge's order was dismissed.

The moving party sought a panel review of an order requiring him to post security for costs and staying his appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no reviewable errors.

The Court noted the moving party's admission that he resides outside the province and lacks assets within it provided sufficient grounds for the order.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault convictions, arguing the trial judge committed legal errors by improperly bolstering the complainant's credibility based on her lack of embellishment and willingness to testify about intimate moments.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law, concluding the trial judge was merely assessing the plausibility of the complainant's narrative in response to suggestions of fabrication.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant doctor appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for negligently administering a tetanus vaccine, which caused the respondent to develop a frozen shoulder and prevented her from working.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applying the 'but for' causation test, and addressing mitigation of damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable errors in the trial judge's credibility findings, causation analysis, or conclusion that the appellant failed to prove mitigation was possible.

The appellant was found in the driver's seat of an inoperable vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

He was acquitted at trial on the basis that the vehicle's inoperability rebutted the presumption of operation under s. 320.35 of the Criminal Code.

The summary conviction appeal judge overturned the acquittal, holding that the presumption could only be rebutted by proving the accused did not occupy the seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the plain text of s. 320.35 provides only one method of rebutting the presumption, and inoperability or lack of realistic risk of danger does not suffice.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs decision following an appeal where success was divided.

The appellant succeeded in setting aside a permanent stay of proceedings due to a change in the law, but the court remitted the stay motion for reconsideration rather than finding no abuse of process.

The respondents successfully resisted an order relating to disclosure and an Anton Piller issue.

Consequently, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs of the appeal.

The costs of the original stay motion were reserved to the judge rehearing the motion, or to be resolved under r. 37.09(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure if the motion is abandoned.

The appellants defaulted on a commercial loan secured by a collateral mortgage.

The respondent lender invoked an acceleration clause to demand the outstanding principal and unaccrued future interest.

The appellants argued the contract did not permit accelerating future interest and that section 17 of the Mortgages Act capped their liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the contract's plain language included future interest in the accelerated indebtedness.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that section 17 of the Mortgages Act only applies to defaults in the payment of principal occurring after the contractual maturity date, not to defaults during the term of the mortgage.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to 4.5 years' imprisonment.

She appealed the sentence, seeking a conditional sentence based on fresh evidence of changed family circumstances, including the birth of a new child and her older daughter's mental health struggles.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and allowed the appeal.

While a conditional sentence was disproportionate to the gravity of fentanyl trafficking, the Court reduced the sentence by 10 months to 36 months' imprisonment to mitigate the severe collateral consequences of incarceration on the appellant's family.

The Ontario Association of Architects (OAA) appealed a motion judge's order finding it in civil contempt of a 2023 consent order and imposing a $30,000 fine.

The consent order prohibited the OAA from issuing licences to architectural technologists based on an internal policy.

The motion judge found the OAA breached the order when its Registration Committee directed the issuance of limited licences under section 25 of the Architects Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the contempt finding, holding that the motion judge failed to establish that the consent order clearly and unambiguously prohibited the statutory exemption process, failed to find intentional disobedience, and failed to properly exercise discretion regarding the appropriateness of a contempt finding.

The offender pleaded guilty to multiple child sexual offences, including sexual interference, sexual assault, possession of CSAEM, making CSAEM, and making CSAEM available, arising from abuse of children known to him and his role administering a dark web CSAEM website.

The Court of Appeal rejected the offender’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim and upheld the dangerous offender designation, finding no reversible error in the sentencing judge’s treatment of intractability, burden of proof, or the expert evidence.

The court held, however, that the sentencing judge erred in principle in sentencing by failing to meaningfully account for the offender’s administrator role in a global CSAEM enterprise, by treating a prior comparator case as a sentencing ceiling, and by failing to impose some statutorily required consecutive sentences.

Re-sentencing afresh under the Bertrand Marchand approach and subject to totality, the court increased the global determinate sentence from 17 years to 25 years, with a net sentence of 20 years after presentence credit.

The accused appealed convictions for sexual assault and assault arising from a coercive sexual encounter, arguing that the jury was inadequately instructed on the use of discreditable conduct evidence.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, contending that a 20-month conditional sentence for sexual assault involving penetration was demonstrably unfit.

The court held that the jury charge, read functionally and as a whole, sufficiently guarded against impermissible propensity reasoning and punishment for bad character.

However, the sentencing judge failed to justify a major departure from the usual three-to-five-year range for serious sexual assault, and a penitentiary sentence of three years was substituted.

Because the offender had completed the conditional sentence and reincarceration would not serve the interests of justice, execution of the substituted sentence was stayed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and nine-year sentence for impaired driving causing death, criminal negligence causing death, and related offences.

The collision occurred after the appellant drove at excessive speeds and struck oncoming traffic.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in identifying him as the driver based on seatbelt marks, and in dismissing his Charter challenges regarding his arrest and right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly inferred the appellant was the driver and correctly held that police had reasonable grounds to arrest both occupants when they blamed each other.

The court also upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis and found the nine-year sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the high moral blameworthiness of the conduct.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against a child complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, misapplied the W.(D.) framework, and relied on facts not in evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable errors, holding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, did not shift the burden of proof, and grounded his findings in the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.