Lorne Sossin

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application to set aside an international arbitral award under NAFTA.

The arbitral tribunal had ordered the appellant to pay over $80 million in damages for revoking the respondents' gambling permit and shutting down their casinos without a valid regulatory reason.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge applied the correct standard of review and properly concluded that there was no breach of procedural fairness in the tribunal's proceedings.

The appellants challenged an order refusing leave to amend their amended statement of defence in an insurance indemnity proceeding under s. 132(1) of the Insurance Act.

They sought to characterize alleged lies by the insureds about the mechanism of injury as civil fraud.

The court held that, regardless of whether civil fraud was legally available in such a proceeding, the existing pleading already allowed the appellants to advance the factual allegations necessary to defend the indemnity claim and oppose relief from forfeiture.

The proposed amendment was therefore irrelevant in the circumstances, and the motion judge made no reversible error in finding non-compensable prejudice on the eve of trial.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs to the respondent.

Appeal from an order dismissing a corporation’s action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and imposing a tailored vexatious litigant order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act on two non-party individuals associated with the corporation.

The court held that s. 140 applies to non-parties who institute or conduct vexatious litigation through a party, and upheld findings that one appellant directed the litigation from behind the scenes while the other conducted it vexatiously through an inaccurate and unsupported affidavit.

The court found the order proportionate because it was confined to receivership-related proceedings and necessary given repeated abusive relitigation and unpaid costs awards.

Leave to appeal the personal costs order was denied, and appeal costs were fixed at $50,000 all-inclusive.

The appellant vendor breached agreements of purchase and sale for two development properties.

The trial judge awarded the respondent purchaser $15.5 million in damages based on lost development profits, rejecting the appellant's argument that damages should be limited to the difference between the contract price and the resale price to a third party.

The trial judge also found the respondent did not fail to mitigate its damages when its affiliates purchased other properties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in accepting the lost development profits approach endorsed by both parties' experts, as it appropriately measured the specific economic opportunity lost.

The Court also upheld the finding that the affiliates' purchases were independent transactions that did not mitigate the loss.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and obstruction of justice, as well as her 14-month sentence.

She argued the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework regarding her alibi evidence and failed to consider Gladue factors on sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge misstated the second branch of the W.(D.) test, the error had no impact because the trial judge completely rejected the appellant's exculpatory evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge appropriately considered the appellant's difficult upbringing despite being unable to formally substantiate her Indigenous ancestry for Gladue purposes.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that an assignment of an agreement of purchase and sale was null and void.

The assignment was subject to a true condition precedent requiring vendor approval.

The motion judge found that the vendor insisted on unreasonable terms for its approval, which constituted a 'deal breaker', and that the respondents' subsequent attempt to negotiate an abatement was not an anticipatory breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions, and affirmed that the failure of the condition precedent rendered the agreement null and void, entitling the respondents to the return of their deposit.

The appellant appealed an order staying the proceedings below.

The motion judge had found an abuse of process based on the appellant's failure to immediately disclose settlement agreements, relying on the Handley Estate doctrine.

However, this doctrine was overruled by the Court of Appeal in 1086289 Ontario Inc. (Urban Electrical Contractors) v. Welland (City), 2026 ONCA 352, after the motion judge's order.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's decision was based on an unduly rigid inquiry that did not consider actual prejudice, as is now required.

The appeal was allowed, the stay was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the motion judge for re-determination under the current law.

The appellant brought a motion under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act for a panel review of a single judge's case management decision requiring him to order full transcripts for his family law appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no basis to interfere with the discretionary case management decision.

The respondent's cross-motion to dismiss the appeal for delay was referred to the Registrar.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court of Justice decision that dismissed an appeal from a child protection order made in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the appeal judge's conclusions regarding the inapplicability of the federal Conflict of Interest Act, the absence of a reasonable apprehension of judicial bias, and the delay in releasing the initial decision.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain arguments or fresh evidence relating to the merits of the initial decision, as those issues were not pursued before the appeal judge.

The appeal and fresh evidence application were dismissed.

The moving party children's aid society brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant sought to appeal a final order of the Superior Court of Justice – Family Branch placing the children in the care and custody of their maternal aunts under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the appeal properly lies with the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellants, a real estate brokerage and its realtor, appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for a $650,000 commission from the respondent purchaser after a commercial real estate transaction failed to close.

The motion judge found that the Buyer Representation Agreement, which listed the commission as 'TBD', did not contractually bind the purchaser to pay the commission amount set out in a separate agreement between the brokerage and the seller.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no reviewable error in his contractual interpretation and that his conclusion was open to him based on the highly fact-specific circumstances.

The Crown appealed a verdict finding the respondent not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for first-degree murder and other offences.

The respondent had killed his brother-in-law and assaulted his mother and sister while experiencing command delusions.

The Crown argued the trial judge misapplied the legal test for expert evidence and failed to properly assess the respondent's capacity to know his actions were morally wrong.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly weighed the expert evidence and correctly concluded the respondent's major mental illness rendered him incapable of appreciating the moral wrongfulness of his actions.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking after police found drugs in the trunk of a vehicle he had rented and was driving.

On appeal, he argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence was circumstantial and did not conclusively tie him to the drugs, and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the absence of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's control over the rental vehicle and the location of the drugs supported a reasonable inference of constructive possession.

The Court also held that the jury charge, read as a whole, adequately instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence.

The Law Society of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision that remitted a costs decision back to the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division.

The respondent, a lawyer, had successfully defended against professional misconduct charges and sought costs against the Law Society under Rule 25.01 for 'wasted costs'.

The Hearing Division denied costs, but the Divisional Court found the investigation was procedurally unfair and one-sided.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Law Society's appeal, holding that while the Divisional Court erred in applying a procedural fairness framework, the Hearing Division erred in principle by taking a piecemeal approach to the Law Society's conduct and applying an overly rigid standard for wasted costs.

The matter was properly remitted for a holistic assessment of whether the Law Society's conduct caused wasted costs.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for historical sexual offences against a family member, alleging errors in the jury charge concerning the W.(D.) framework, eyewitness identification, and defence submissions about recovered memory.

He also sought to file fresh evidence consisting of a post-verdict juror Facebook message and a foreperson's note to argue a reasonable apprehension of jury bias.

The court held that the charge, read as a whole, adequately instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and the frailties of identification evidence, and that the trial judge's narrow corrective instruction on recovered memory was proper.

Although the fresh evidence was admitted because it bore on trial fairness, it did not rebut the presumption of juror impartiality.

The appeal was dismissed.

This five-judge appeal reconsidered the common law governing non-disclosure of partial settlement agreements in multi-party civil litigation.

The court held that the prior rule mandating an automatic finding of abuse of process and an automatic stay, without proof of prejudice or regard to proportionality, was wrongly decided and should be overruled.

The proper approach requires a contextual and discretionary abuse of process analysis focused on unfairness, prejudice, oppression, harm to the administration of justice, and a proportionate remedy, with r. 49.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure reinforcing that framework.

Applying that approach, the court allowed two appeals and remitted those matters, while dismissing two others where the record was sufficient to determine the result.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against children, which arose from guilty pleas.

He argued the pleas were involuntary due to pressure after his trial counsel was released and his adjournment request was denied, leaving him to face self-representation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to overcome the strong presumption that guilty pleas made in open court are voluntary.

The court held that emotional pressure and fear of self-representation did not impair his ability to make a conscious volitional choice.

The appellant was subpoenaed to testify at a preliminary inquiry but refused to answer substantive questions.

He was subsequently charged with attempting to obstruct justice.

At trial, the judge admitted transcripts of his refusal to testify, finding they were not protected by s. 13 of the Charter, relying on the appellate decision in Schertzer rather than the coordinate decision in Seecharran.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the judge erred in her application of stare decisis and s. 13.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that vertical stare decisis bound the trial judge to follow Schertzer, and that s. 13 does not protect testimony that constitutes the actus reus of a new offence.

The appellant, convicted of 12 counts of fraud, brought a motion seeking directions and assistance in cross-examining police and civilian witnesses regarding the late disclosure of police emails.

The appellant sought production of redacted portions of emails generated between 2021 and 2024 concerning the disclosure process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding it was a request for production governed by the Trotta test.

The court concluded there was no reasonable possibility that ordering production would result in admissible fresh evidence or assist in developing a successful ground of appeal, as there was no air of reality to the underlying abuse of process claim.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon after the complainant was stabbed in the torso.

The sole trial issue was identity of the assailant.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the trial judge erred in treating a post-offence apology as consciousness of guilt.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasons, though brief, were adequate when read in light of the whole record and counsel's submissions.

The court further held that the trial judge did not err in using the apology as confirmatory evidence, as no alternative explanation for it appeared on the record.

Appeal dismissed.