Zohar R. Levy

The court approved a proposed settlement and certified the action for settlement purposes under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The class consists of approximately 100 investors in a failed real estate limited partnership project.

The settlement restores the class members’ proportionate interest in the property, now with greater development density and less debt, and is considered generous.

The court found the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, and approved class counsel’s fees.

The action will continue only as between the defendants for unresolved crossclaims.

The plaintiffs sought to amend their claim to include Cara Vaccarino as a defendant and requested an order for the mirroring of her electronic devices and email account to preserve confidential and proprietary information.

This request arose after it was discovered that another defendant, Ms. Anderson, had forwarded confidential information to Ms. Vaccarino.

Despite Ms. Vaccarino's assertion that she did not recall opening or using the email, the court found it appropriate to order the mirroring to preserve evidence and determine the use of the information.

The court ordered the mirroring to cover the period from June 1, 2023, to the present, with counsel to coordinate the least disruptive process.

The Plaintiffs, Evertz Technologies Inc. et al., brought a motion seeking to continue confidentiality provisions regarding settlement agreements (Pierringer Agreements) reached with the Lawo Defendants, who had settled out of the multi-party litigation.

The Providius Defendants, non-settling parties, opposed the continuation of confidentiality, arguing that the terms of the settlement agreements directly impacted them and were necessary for a new action they intended to bring against Evertz and Lawo.

The court dismissed the Plaintiffs' request, finding that Evertz failed to meet the high burden for a confidentiality order under the Sierra Club and Sherman Estate tests, as the commercial interest in confidentiality did not transcend the parties' specific interests and maintaining confidentiality would significantly prejudice the Providius Defendants' ability to plead and obtain a fair trial in their intended action.

This is a motion for leave to intervene brought by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) in an appeal concerning the dismissal of an anti-SLAPP motion.

The underlying dispute involves a defamation and harassment action by 40 Days for Life against Brooke Dietrich for online protest activities.

The CCLA sought to intervene to make submissions on the application of protest jurisprudence to online expressive activity and the development of the tort of internet harassment in light of freedom of expression.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the CCLA leave to intervene, finding that it could make a useful contribution on public policy issues without causing injustice or undue prejudice to the parties, despite the motion being brought at a late stage.

The applicant estate sought a preservation order to prevent the respondent mining company from dealing with a 1.5% net smelter return royalty interest.

The interest had escheated to the Crown after the corporate owner was dissolved in 1989, and was recently sold by the Public Guardian and Trustee to the respondent.

The applicant acknowledged lacking standing to challenge the sale without a special statute to revive the dissolved corporation, which the Legislature had already refused to pass.

The court dismissed the application, holding that Rule 45.01 does not permit a standalone application for a preservation order in contemplation of a future, possible lawsuit by a party that currently lacks standing.

The appellant, Detour Gold Corporation, appealed a summary judgment declaring that the respondent, Prism Resources Inc., held a valid and enforceable royalty interest in Detour's mining claims as an interest in land.

The appeal concerned the interpretation of a 2004 letter agreement between Prism and Conquest Resources Inc., Detour's predecessor, and the application of principles from Bank of Montreal v. Dynex Petroleum Ltd. and Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the motion judge correctly found Prism's royalty to be an interest in land, based on the parties' intention inferred from the agreement, surrounding circumstances, and admissible subsequent conduct.

The appellant, Detour Gold Corporation, brought an unopposed motion for leave to file a five-page reply factum.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, using the opportunity to critique the current appellate rules that necessitate such motions.

The judge advocated for an automatic right to file brief reply factums to enhance written advocacy, improve judicial preparation, and reduce unnecessary litigation costs, highlighting a procedural gap in both civil and criminal appellate rules.

Following a declaration that the respondents were vexatious litigants, the applicants sought costs on a full or substantial indemnity basis.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to the respondents' abusive conduct.

However, the court reduced the costs claimed by one applicant because their counsel was located in Toronto, finding it unreasonable to expect the unsuccessful party to pay higher Toronto rates for a matter heard in the Ottawa region.

The applicant sought a stay of enforcement of an arbitral award and a stay of the ongoing arbitration proceedings pending its application for leave to appeal or set aside the award.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The court also declined to stay the ongoing arbitration proceedings, citing the kompetenz-kompetenz principle, noting that such a request should be directed to the arbitrator.

The motion was dismissed.

Prism Resources Inc. brought a summary judgment motion seeking a declaration that it holds a valid and enforceable royalty interest in mining claims and leases owned by Detour Gold Corporation.

Detour denied the existence of such a property interest, asserting Prism's rights were merely contractual against a previous owner.

The court applied the Dynex test for royalty interests as interests in land, finding that the language of the agreements, particularly the "carried interest in the project" phrase, combined with surrounding commercial circumstances and the previous owner's (Conquest) consistent acknowledgment of Prism's property rights in subsequent agreements with Detour, demonstrated an intention to create an interest in land.

The motion for summary judgment was granted in favour of Prism, declaring its 7.5% net profit royalty as a property interest running with the land.

The applicants sought a declaration that the respondents were vexatious litigants and an order requiring them to seek leave before instituting further legal proceedings.

The court reviewed the respondents' extensive litigation history, including repetitive claims, collateral attacks on previous orders, and persistent failure to pay costs.

The court found the respondents to be vexatious litigants under section 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and granted the applications, imposing a standard leave requirement and a "Chavali Order" to prevent serial applications for leave.

This is a supplementary decision to the Court of Appeal's judgment allowing the appeal in part.

Following the release of the main decision, the respondent requested that funds paid into court by the appellants as security for costs be paid out to the respondent.

The appellants did not oppose this request.

The court ordered that the funds held by the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice be paid out to the respondent.

On appeal from a trial judgment dismissing the appellants' action for breach of contract and repudiation.

The appellants, who operated methadone treatment clinics, hired the respondent physician under a contract requiring her to remit 45% of OHIP billings and containing a non-competition clause.

Following the dissolution of the appellants' joint venture with another clinic operator, the respondent continued working at the jointly-operated clinics.

The trial judge found the contract frustrated by intervening events and that the non-competition provision was not breached.

The appellants appealed, arguing errors in the frustration analysis and interpretation of the non-competition clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on frustration and contractual interpretation but allowed the appeal in part, awarding the appellants $8,194.59 for underpayment during the period prior to the alleged repudiation.

This decision addresses several procedural and evidentiary motions within a proposed class action.

M.M. sought to discontinue her action against Ms. Denham.

The Society sought to convert its crossclaim against Ms. Denham into a third-party claim, convert Ms. Denham's crossclaim into a counterclaim, have the third-party action case managed in Toronto with the class action, and obtain a sealing order.

Ms. Denham opposed the Toronto case management and requested a transfer to Perth/East Region.

The court granted the sealing order, M.M.'s discontinuance, the conversion of claims, and the joint case management/trial.

Crucially, the court conditionally transferred the class action and third-party proceedings to the East Region, finding no advantage to Toronto management beyond counsel convenience and significant inconvenience to Ms. Denham.

The moving parties (respondents in the main application) brought a motion to vary a prior order that required them to indemnify the responding party for the costs of a court-appointed Monitor.

The Monitor's final report vindicated the moving parties from allegations of ongoing defalcation, which had been the primary basis for expanding the Monitor's powers and imposing the indemnity.

The court applied Rule 59.06(2)(a) to vary the order based on these newly discovered facts, finding it unfair for the moving parties to bear the entire cost of the enhanced monitoring.

The court also declined to enforce the underlying arbitral award pending the moving parties' appeal.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal decision.

The appellant achieved only partial success on appeal.

The court reduced the respondent's costs award from $180,000 to $135,000 (a 25% reduction), finding that while the respondent remained entitled to costs of the application, some reduction was appropriate given the appellant's partial success and the disputed issues on appeal.

The court also declined to award costs to the appellant for his motion for a stay of the application judge's decision, finding the claimed costs excessive and the motion inappropriate as it sought multiple forms of relief beyond the stay order.

Appeal from an application judge's decision regarding the division of property following the breakdown of a common law relationship.

The appellant sought sole beneficial ownership of a jointly-titled residential property (Brookdale Avenue) or, alternatively, a credit for his repayment of a joint line of credit used to finance its purchase.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the respondent held a 50 per cent legal and beneficial interest in the property, but allowed the appeal in part by granting the appellant a $500,000 credit on division of sale proceeds for his repayment of the respondent's share of the joint debt.

The plaintiff brought a motion to withdraw admissions made by her former counsel at a status hearing, which had limited her damages claim to avoid the action being dismissed for delay.

The defendants brought cross-motions to hold the plaintiff to those admissions and strike portions of the statement of claim exceeding them.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion and granted the defendants' cross-motions, holding that a client is bound by the representations and admissions made by their counsel in court under the doctrine of ostensible authority.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a personal injury action arising from a single-vehicle accident on a county road.

The municipality argued the claim was barred under s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act because the plaintiffs failed to provide written notice of the claim within ten days of the accident and that the delay prejudiced its ability to investigate the roadway conditions.

The plaintiffs argued there was a reasonable excuse for the failure to give timely notice due to the driver’s severe injuries and hospitalization, and that discoverability delayed awareness of the material facts underlying the claim.

The court held that the plaintiff’s medical condition constituted a reasonable excuse and that issues relating to discoverability, alleged roadway design deficiencies, and potential prejudice to the municipality raised genuine issues requiring trial.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.