Amani Oakley

The respondents brought a medical malpractice action after the plaintiff suffered a severe brain injury from a cardiac arrest during a caesarean section.

The trial judge found the primary obstetrician (Dr. Padmore), the anesthesiologist (Dr. Jamensky), and the hospital liable for negligence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeals of Dr. Padmore and the hospital, finding the trial judge erred in his legal causation analysis regarding their respective pre-delivery acts and omissions.

The Court dismissed Dr. Jamensky's appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that he breached the standard of care by prematurely converting the patient to a general anesthetic and that this negligence caused the cardiac arrest.

Dr. Jamensky was held solely liable for the agreed $12 million in damages.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) decision confirming the dismissal of a complaint against a physician.

The physician had accessed the deceased patient's hospital records multiple times after being sued for medical malpractice, without the patient's consent.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the HPARB and the investigating committee unreasonably interpreted the Personal Health Information and Protection Act (PHIPA).

The court held that the physician acted as an agent of the hospital, not a health information custodian, and therefore could not unilaterally access the records outside the civil litigation discovery process.

Following a 42-day medical negligence trial where damages were agreed at $12 million, the plaintiffs sought costs of over $4.5 million.

The court considered the complexity of the case, the high hourly rates of senior counsel, and the defendants' stout denial of liability.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $4,218,052.00 in partial indemnity costs and disbursements, payable two-thirds by the unsuccessful physicians and one-third by the hospital.

The court declined to make a Sanderson Order, instead ordering the plaintiffs to pay $250,000 in costs to the two successful defendant physicians.

The applicant brought a motion to adjourn a scheduled hearing because she was working as a medic in Ukraine, citing unstable internet access and security concerns that would make it difficult to instruct counsel.

The respondent opposed the motion, noting the late request and scarce court resources.

Despite concerns about the late request and missed deadlines, the court granted the adjournment in the interests of justice to allow the applicant sufficient time to instruct counsel, making the new date peremptory on the applicant.

The applicant brought a motion to strike portions of the record considered by the DIOC and to determine whether materials provided to but not reviewed by the DIOC form part of the record on judicial review.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, holding that the admissibility of evidence before the DIOC is a matter for the panel hearing the judicial review.

The court directed that unreviewed materials be provided to the panel in a sealed envelope.

The court also granted consent redactions sought by the DIOC and granted interim redactions sought by the applicant to protect her privacy interests pending the panel's decision, applying the Sherman Estate test.

The plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest and anoxic brain injury during an urgent caesarean section.

The plaintiffs sued the treating obstetricians, anesthesiologist, and the hospital for medical negligence.

The court found the initial obstetrician negligent for failing to diagnose the pregnancy early, failing to discuss termination, and failing to document severe risk factors associated with the plaintiff's morbid obesity.

The anesthesiologist was found negligent for prematurely converting to a general anesthetic and failing to adequately manage the airway, directly causing the cardiac arrest.

The hospital was found vicariously liable for a triage nurse's failure to follow protocols during a telephone call.

Liability was apportioned equally among the three negligent defendants.

The respondent doctor brought a motion for an extension of time to appeal an order granting the Ontario Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA) intervenor status in a judicial review application.

The underlying application concerned a regulatory decision regarding the doctor's access to a former patient's medical records.

The Divisional Court granted the extension of time, finding the short delay was reasonably explained by counsel's inadvertence.

On the merits, the court set aside the intervenor order, concluding that OTLA's proposed submissions would be duplicative of the applicant's and that the matter was primarily a private regulatory dispute.

The defendant obstetricians brought a motion for partial summary judgment in a medical negligence action, arguing the plaintiffs' expert reports were insufficient to establish standard of care or causation.

The motion was brought shortly before a scheduled ten-week trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that partial summary judgment would not be proportionate, cost-effective, or timely, and risked inconsistent findings and duplication of resources.

The court also noted that the sufficiency of the complex expert evidence was better assessed in the context of a full trial.

This motion concerned compelling answers to undertakings and refusals given on examinations for discovery in a medical malpractice action.

The plaintiffs alleged negligent treatment of Yasmeen Mukhtiar following a C-section, leading to paralysis and a diagnosis of conversion disorder.

The court reviewed the scope of discovery, the relevance of questions, and the principles governing hypothetical questions in medical malpractice cases.

It also considered the role and responsibilities of the Most Responsible Physician (MRP) in a multidisciplinary team.

The Master largely granted the plaintiffs' requests, ordering many of the defendant physicians to provide further answers and documents.

Following a 70-day medical malpractice jury trial where the plaintiff was awarded $3.75 million in damages, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The plaintiff sought over $3.3 million in costs and disbursements, while the defendants argued for a significantly lower amount, citing proportionality and excessive hours.

The court analyzed the Rule 57 factors, noting the complexity of the case, the necessity of extensive preparation by plaintiff's counsel, and the fact that defence costs themselves exceeded $3.2 million.

The court fixed the plaintiff's costs at $2,404,765 for fees and $628,387 for disbursements, totaling $3,033,152.

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action requested an urgent case management conference to seek an extension of time to deliver their expert reports on income loss and liability.

The defendants opposed the extension, arguing the plaintiffs should be barred from delivering the reports due to their breach of the existing timetable.

The court granted the extension, finding that the timetable could be varied to allow the plaintiffs more time without reducing the time afforded to the defendants to deliver their responding reports, thereby preserving the scheduled trial date.

During a medical malpractice jury trial, the defendant physicians sought leave under Rule 53.08 to file a supplementary expert report and to elicit testimony from their experts on matters not explicitly stated in their reports.

The court denied leave for the supplementary report, finding it failed to comply with Rule 53.03 by omitting the reasons for its conclusions, and its admission would cause undue prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The court also ruled on several evidentiary objections, narrowly interpreting the 'latency' principle.

The court held that experts cannot use conclusory statements in their reports to ambush opposing parties with new reasons or theories at trial, though exceptions were made where testimony directly responded to new developments during the trial.

Prior to a medical malpractice jury trial, the court ruled on several procedural and evidentiary motions.

The plaintiffs had entered into a Pierringer Agreement with the defendant hospital and nurses, leaving only the physicians as defendants.

The court ruled that both the plaintiffs and the physicians could cross-examine the settling nurses at trial.

The court also determined the sequencing and phrasing of jury questions, ruling that standard of care must be determined before causation, and permitting 'caused or contributed' language due to the presence of multiple tortfeasors.

Finally, the court allowed the plaintiffs to use photographs of the amputations in their opening address but restricted the experts' use of lengthy PowerPoint presentations.

The defendant manufacturer brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss claims of negligent manufacturing, failure to warn, and breach of implied warranty arising from an incident where a police officer was accidentally struck in the head by a TASER electrical weapon fired by his partner.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issues were inextricably linked to the conceded trial issue of negligent design.

The court also declined to strike an affidavit sworn by plaintiffs' counsel, ruling it was admissible as 'evidence about evidence' to demonstrate the record that would be available at trial.

The court conducted a case management conference in a medical malpractice action initiated in 2011.

The plaintiffs' renewed request to schedule a partial summary judgment motion against one physician defendant on liability was denied due to its partial nature, previous dismissal, and the plaintiffs' breach of an order to set the action down for trial.

The court provided specific directions for the action's progression, including allowing the plaintiffs to file a motion to extend time for setting down for trial, noting the discontinuance against Nurse Defendants, and scheduling further discussions on a de bene esse examination and expert report deadlines.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of expert medical evidence from Dr. Harmeet Gill, an ophthalmologist, in a medical malpractice trial.

The plaintiffs sought to have Dr. Gill testify on the standard of care for ophthalmologists, diagnosis and treatment of orbital cellulitis, the general standard of care for physicians dealing with orbital cellulitis (including emergency room and infectious disease specialists), and causation.

The defendants objected to Dr. Gill testifying outside his specialization and on causation.

The court admitted Dr. Gill's evidence regarding the standard of care for ophthalmologists, general physician knowledge (e.g., sepsis identification), and multidisciplinary team communication and record-keeping, finding it relevant and necessary to the plaintiffs' theory of the case.

However, the court excluded Dr. Gill's opinions on causation, as he admitted lacking expertise on the ultimate outcome of septic patients.

The plaintiffs sought costs for undertakings and refusals motions brought against several defendants in a medical malpractice action.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $6,800 in costs against five defendant physicians who failed to answer undertakings until after the motion was served.

However, the court awarded costs of $3,257.64 to another defendant physician who was successful on the single refusal argued and had answered undertakings promptly.

No costs were awarded against two other defendants who resolved their issues prior to the hearing.

The defendant hospital brought two motions: one to enforce an alleged settlement (a Pierringer Agreement) and another for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim.

The court dismissed the motion to enforce the settlement, finding that while the parties had agreed on the settlement amount, essential terms regarding document production and witness cooperation remained unresolved.

The court also dismissed the summary judgment motion, concluding that competing expert evidence regarding the nursing standard of care and whether the nurses' actions contributed to the plaintiff's compartment syndrome created genuine issues requiring a trial.

The plaintiff moved for directions to pre-emptively dismiss or stay the defendant Dr. Shah's motion for summary judgment and to prevent cross-examination of the plaintiff's expert witnesses.

The plaintiff argued the case was complex, the defendant had no realistic prospect of success, and the process was burdensome and raised access to justice concerns.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that the summary judgment motion was not an abuse of process and that the defendant had the right to complete the evidentiary record, including cross-examining experts.

The court imposed terms to ensure the summary judgment motion proceeded as scheduled.

The appellant physician appealed a partial summary judgment order in a medical malpractice action arising from the delayed diagnosis of a brain tumour.

The appellant had admitted breach of the standard of care and causation, leaving only contributory negligence and the specific list of injuries to be determined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness, no error in the burden of proof regarding contributory negligence, and no error in the motions judge's listing of specific injuries based on uncontradicted expert reports.