Richard Macklin

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Lynne Catherine Foulidis’s motion for a panel review and to set aside the Deputy Registrar’s order dismissing her appeal for delay.

The court found that the motion judge correctly concluded the appeal lacked merit and that the criteria for an extension of time to perfect the appeal were not met.

The court reviewed the trial judge’s findings regarding the retainer agreement and legal fees, and found no palpable and overriding error.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant police officer appealed a decision of the Waterloo Regional Police Services Board to dismiss him due to disability under s. 47(2) of the Police Services Act.

The Commission held a preliminary hearing to determine whether the appeal under s. 47(5) should proceed as a hearing de novo or an appeal on the record.

Applying principles of statutory interpretation, the Commission concluded that the legislature intended for a full evidentiary hearing to take place before the Board, and that the appeal to the Commission must proceed on the record of the Board's proceeding.

The appellant appealed and sought judicial review of a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding that the Residential Tenancies Act applied to her relationship with the respondent.

The appellant claimed she lived in the unit and shared a kitchen, which would exempt her under s. 5(i) of the Act.

The Board accepted the respondent's evidence that the appellant did not live on the premises.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal and judicial review, finding no error in the Board's assessment of the evidence or its refusal to admit fresh evidence under the Palmer test.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

This appeal concerned whether an order appointing an arbitrator under section 10 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, is appealable.

The appellant argued that the application judge erred in appointing the arbitrator and in not limiting the scope of the arbitration.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal, asserting that section 10(2) of the Act precludes appeals from such appointments.

The Court of Appeal held that the power to appoint an arbitrator under section 10(1)(b) applies when parties fail to agree or one party refuses to follow through on an agreement to appoint.

This interpretation is consistent with the Act's purpose of limiting court intervention and appeal rights in arbitration matters.

The court found that the application judge's order, including the determination of the arbitrator's jurisdiction, was made under section 10(1) and was therefore not appealable.

The appeal was quashed.

The moving party sought to quash the respondent's application for judicial review and motion for leave to appeal an Ontario Land Tribunal decision.

The moving party argued the proceedings were moot due to recent legislative amendments to the Planning Act under Bill 185.

The court dismissed the motion to quash, finding the moving party failed to meet the high threshold of showing the proceedings were manifestly devoid of merit, leaving the statutory interpretation and mootness issues to be decided by the panel hearing the merits.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a dismissed motion brought by Evergreen Community (Burlington) Ltd. for an injunction and an order for inspection against FirstCanada ULC.

FirstCanada, the successful party in the motion, sought costs on a mixed partial/substantial indemnity scale, while Evergreen argued for partial indemnity.

The court awarded FirstCanada costs on a partial indemnity scale, finding that Evergreen was not unreasonable in rejecting FirstCanada's non-Rule 49 settlement offer, which included a broad release that would have precluded future claims.

The total costs awarded to FirstCanada were $175,214.10.

This appeal concerned a failed agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a residential development, where the appellant (buyer) had an express obligation to obtain severance approval but failed to communicate or take steps for almost five years.

The respondent (seller) subsequently refused access to the property, deeming the APS terminated.

The appellant sought declarations that the APS was valid and for specific performance.

The application judge dismissed the appellant's application, finding the appellant in breach due to inordinate delay and the respondent justified in treating the APS as ended.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, affirming that where an APS has no fixed deadline, performance must occur within a reasonable time, and that inordinate, unexplained delay can constitute a fundamental breach justifying termination without a prior notice of a new deadline, depending on the circumstances.

Evergreen Community (Burlington) Ltd. brought a motion seeking an interim or interlocutory injunction against FirstCanada ULC to prevent alleged ongoing environmental contamination (LNAPL) from FirstCanada's property onto Evergreen's, and an order for inspection under Rule 32 to conduct groundwater and soil testing.

Evergreen argued the contamination stalled its billion-dollar development project.

The court dismissed both requests, finding that the injunction sought was mandatory and Evergreen failed to meet the strict 'strong prima facie case' test, particularly regarding irreparable harm and the ongoing nature of contamination.

The court preferred FirstCanada's expert evidence that a Record of Site Condition (RSC) or Risk Assessment could be obtained despite existing contamination.

The order for inspection was denied due to procedural unfairness and lack of demonstrated necessity for the upcoming summary judgment motion.

The applicant sought to schedule a motion for leave to appeal and an application for judicial review from a summary dismissal by the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The applicant requested that the leave motion, appeal, and judicial review be heard together by a single panel, relying on the recent Supreme Court decision in Yatar.

The court ordered that the motion for leave to appeal be heard first by a single judge, to respect the legislative deference implicit in the leave requirement, with the judicial review and potential appeal to follow if leave is granted.

The applicant brought a motion to dismiss the appellant residents association's appeals of official plan and zoning by-law amendments permitting an 8-storey residential building.

The appellant argued the development would block protected scenic views of Casa Loma and the downtown skyline, violate mid-rise building performance standards, and negatively impact a building with heritage value.

The Tribunal found that the specific views the appellant sought to protect were not identified in the applicable Official Plan schedule, the mid-rise guidelines were not zoning by-laws, and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to compel heritage designation.

Concluding the appeals lacked valid land use planning grounds and had no reasonable prospect of success, the Tribunal granted the motion and dismissed the appeals without a hearing.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his discharge under s. 47(2) of the Police Services Act to the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.

The Waterloo Police Association (WRPA) and the Police Association of Ontario (PAO) brought motions to intervene in the appeal, and the Chief of Police sought to confirm his status as a respondent.

The Commission granted intervenor status to the PAO as amicus and to the WRPA with participatory rights to be determined.

The Commission also confirmed the Chief of Police as a respondent on the appeal, noting his full participation in the proceeding below, without deciding whether his participation below was proper.

The defendants brought a motion seeking dismissal of the actions due to the plaintiffs' alleged breach of court orders regarding privileged documents.

In the alternative, they sought removal of the plaintiffs' counsel and an increase in security for costs.

The court denied the motion, finding that there were reasonable excuses for the alleged breach of the Crown Privilege Order and that no likely prejudice was suffered by the defendants.

The request for increased security for costs was also denied, as it would be unjust to the plaintiffs and there was no evidence of their inability to pay.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal concerning a failed real estate transaction.

The appellant vendor sued the respondent purchaser for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) and sought loss of bargain damages.

The motion judge found the respondent liable but erred in calculating damages by relying on expert evidence instead of the difference between the APS price and the actual resale price.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that where a vendor reasonably mitigates damages by reselling the property in an arm's length transaction, the loss of bargain damages are the difference between the original APS price and the resale price, and expert evidence is not required.

The cross-appeal, which challenged the pre-judgment interest rate and the deduction of interest on the deposit, was dismissed.

This appeal concerned a failed real estate transaction where the appellant vendor sued the respondent purchasers for losses after the purchasers refused to close.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the purchasers, finding the vendor was not ready to close on the scheduled date as the house was not substantially complete, thus terminating the agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming that the purchasers were ready to close and did not act in bad faith by obtaining financing, and that the vendor's miscalculation of the situation was its own responsibility.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought an urgent case conference after the respondent purported to evict the applicant and changed the locks, contrary to a prior court order barring eviction.

The respondent claimed he had not received the prior order.

During the conference, the respondent confirmed receipt of the order and agreed not to take further steps to evict the applicant until a motion to vary the order is heard.

The court directed the respondent to schedule a motion to vary the order, to be heard alongside the applicant's motion for contempt, and permitted the applicant to change the locks to reopen for business.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their breach of contract claim, which was dismissed under Rule 60.12(b) for their persistent failure to comply with interlocutory orders requiring them to permit the respondents to inspect disputed limestone.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appellants' position, noting their history of non-compliance and attempts to avoid the inspection order.

The court upheld the motion judge's decision to dismiss the claim, finding it amply justified, and denied leave to introduce fresh evidence blaming former counsel, stating such complaints are for a negligence action.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2) to vary a prior court order that required his companies to continue paying remuneration to the respondents pending the completion of a court-ordered share buyout.

The applicant argued that the ongoing payments caused financial hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic and sought to terminate the payments or treat them as a set-off against the share purchase price.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the ongoing remuneration was a foreseeable consequence of the original order requested by the applicant, and the pandemic was not a new fact that would have altered the original decision.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant, Yong Yeow Tan, was ordered to pay costs to the respondents, C & K Mortgage Services Inc. and the Receiver for Camilla Court Homes Inc. and Elite Homes Inc. C & K Mortgage Services Inc. was awarded $20,000, and the Receiver was awarded $7,500, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The appellant entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential unit in a condominium project and paid a $500,000 deposit, mostly directly to the developer.

The developer was subsequently placed into receivership by the first mortgagee.

The receiver disclaimed the appellant's agreement of purchase and sale.

The appellant sought an order requiring the receiver to complete the sale, arguing he had an equitable interest in the property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal, finding that the agreement explicitly subordinated the purchaser's interest to any mortgages and that the appellant's equitable claims could not defeat the mortgagee's prior secured legal interest.