Patrick J. Monahan

Following a successful appeal in which the appellants were awarded a 50% interest in a residential property, the court addressed trial costs.

The appellants sought approximately $155,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the result beat their offer to settle.

The court declined, finding the result did not beat the offer because the appellants were awarded 50% ownership rather than 50% of the equity, with the equity value remaining to be determined on a subsequent accounting.

Trial costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $70,000 all inclusive.

The appellant commenced an action seeking damages, alleging the respondent lawyer received mortgage discharge funds on his behalf but took the funds without documenting a loan or repaying them.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's summary judgment motion due to conflicting evidence and credibility issues.

On a boomerang basis, the motion judge dismissed the action as statute-barred, finding the appellant knew of his claim by November 2, 2020, when his demand for payment or a signed loan commitment was refused, and the action was not commenced until 32 months later.

The Court of Appeal found no error, rejected the appellant's fraudulent concealment argument, and dismissed the appeal with costs of $8,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his action against the respondents on the basis that he was an undischarged bankrupt at the relevant time and thus lacked capacity to commence it.

The appellant argued the trustee in bankruptcy had implicitly assigned him authority to commence the action by permitting him to manage the property under s. 30(1)(l) of the BIA.

The Court of Appeal held the motion judge committed no palpable and overriding error in finding that no express assignment had been made, as the trustee was unaware of both the fire damage and the action.

The court further held the appellant's claim for general damages for loss of enjoyment and use of the property was proprietary rather than personal in nature, and therefore vested in the trustee.

Appeal dismissed with no costs order given the respondents' non-participation.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment that dismissed its copyright claim under s. 13(3) of the Copyright Act over competing software secretly developed by a former employee.

The trial judge found the software was not created "in the course of employment" because the employee's actual responsibilities were limited to developing the employer's existing software, he was not directed to create new products, and the employer did not expend resources on the competing software's development.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, holding that the proper test under s. 13(3) focuses on the employee's actual assigned responsibilities, not the class of work the employer could have directed, and found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

The appellant was convicted of five counts of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking (fentanyl, morphine, oxycodone, hydromorphone, and methylphenidate) and one count of simple possession (buprenorphine), and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

On appeal, she raised five grounds including errors in the directed verdict ruling, unreasonable verdict, refusal to consider sole possession by a co-accused, errors in the Charter s. 10(b) analysis, and fitness of sentence.

The Court of Appeal assumed without deciding that additional right-to-counsel breaches occurred but found the s. 24(2) balancing under Grant did not support exclusion, noting no systemic or deliberate disregard for Charter rights and a lack of causal connection between the breaches and the discovery of evidence.

The remaining conviction grounds were dismissed as attempts to parse the trial judge's reasons in search of error.

The conviction and sentence appeals were both dismissed.

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's order refusing an extension of time to file a notice of appeal in high-conflict family litigation.

The court applied the deferential standard under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act and confirmed intervention is limited to legal error, error in principle, or an unreasonable result.

It held the motion judge applied the correct legal framework, including the best interests of the children as the overarching consideration.

The court found no error in assessing the proposed appeal's limited merit, the five-month delay, and prejudice from continued uncertainty in parenting arrangements.

The review motion was dismissed with costs.

The moving party sought panel review of an order refusing a further extension of time to perfect an appeal from a Superior Court order.

The court held that review of a motion judge's decision is deferential and not a de novo reconsideration.

The moving party identified no legal error or misapprehension of evidence in the motion judge's reasoning on delay and prejudice.

The panel declined to reweigh the factors and dismissed the motion with costs.

The appeal arose from a dispute over whether a substantial contribution to a home purchase created a beneficial ownership interest under resulting trust principles.

The majority held the trial judge made a legal error by disregarding key third-party evidence probative of the transferor’s objective intention and allowed the appeal.

The court declared the appellants entitled to a 50% beneficial interest in the property, set aside the judgment and costs below, and remitted related sale and accounting remedies for case management.

A dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible legal or factual error and concluding the transfer was supported by consideration.

The appellant sought to appeal a superior court bail review decision under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after release relief was denied.

The respondent moved to quash for lack of jurisdiction.

The court held that no criminal appeal right exists to the court from decisions under ss. 520 or 521, and provincial legislation cannot create an appeal route in criminal matters absent federal statutory authority.

The court also held that asserting Charter issues did not establish jurisdiction where no statutory right of appeal exists.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction, and the fresh-evidence request was left unaddressed.

The respondents sought dismissal of the appellant's appeal under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court held that an appeal from a default judgment was outside its jurisdiction because the order was interlocutory and the proper route was a motion to set aside default under r. 19.08.

The panel also noted that a party noted in default is restricted from taking further steps absent leave or consent under r. 19.02(1)(b).

Concluding the appeal was jurisdictionally barred and abusive, the court dismissed the appeal without costs.

Two appellants convicted of first degree murder following a home invasion robbery during which the victim was fatally shot appealed their convictions.

The first appellant, found to be the principal shooter, raised grounds including failure to consider defence of a third party, insufficient findings on forcible confinement, and reliance on inadmissible hearsay for identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence, that the evidence supported his participation in forcible confinement as a joint principal, and that the identification evidence was not hearsay.

The second appellant successfully argued that the trial judge applied an objective rather than subjective mens rea standard under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code for party liability for murder.

The Crown conceded the error.

The murder conviction was set aside and a conviction for manslaughter substituted, with a sentence equivalent to 12 years imposed.

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's order dismissing her request for an extension of time to cross-appeal a Divisional Court decision that had upheld the Law Society of Ontario's invalidation of her barrister examination result as procedurally fair and reasonable.

The moving party had been among candidates whose exam results were voided following an investigation into widespread cheating.

The panel held that the motion judge made no error in finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the procedural protections sought were ancillary to a right to a hearing that this court had previously held was not required, and candidates receiving a lesser sanction could not be accorded greater procedural fairness than those who faced more serious sanctions.

The motion was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexual assault arising from an incident where initially consensual sexual intercourse escalated to unprotected intercourse without the complainant's consent.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: errors in the W.(D.) jury instructions, improper Crown closing submissions, and that a pre-trial s. 276/278.92 ruling led to trial irregularities amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any ground.

The jury instructions properly conveyed each pathway to acquittal, the Crown's closing did not cross the line into oath-helping or rhetorical excess, and the pre-trial ruling did not create any irregularity or unfairness warranting appellate intervention.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant subject to a vexatious litigant order, sought to abandon her appeal of an order dismissing her application for relief from candidacy ineligibility under the Canada Elections Act, and sought costs of the appeal against the Chief Electoral Officer.

The appeal was rendered moot after Elections Canada reinterpreted s. 65(i) of the Act and removed the moving party from the ineligibility list.

The court addressed whether a grant of leave under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to commence a proceeding extends to appeals, holding that it does not and a fresh grant of leave is required.

Despite the moving party's failure to obtain leave, the court granted leave in the exceptional circumstances.

However, costs were declined, as the Agency's prior interpretation was reasonable and its proactive reinterpretation advanced Charter values.

The moving party, a construction company, sought to transfer its appeal of a lien action dismissal order from the Court of Appeal to the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act, or alternatively an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The motion judge found that conflicting precedents — TRS Components and Arcamm — created genuine uncertainty over whether the appeal route under s. 71 of the Construction Act lay to the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal.

Unable to conclude the appeal was filed in the wrong court, the motion judge declined the transfer.

The extension of time was granted given that both parties had operated under the shared mistaken assumption that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction, which was attributable to the competing jurisprudence rather than inadvertence.

The applicant sought relief in a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The moving parties sought a stay pending appeal of a summary judgment in a mortgage enforcement action that required them to vacate their residential home.

The responding party had obtained a writ of possession after the moving parties defaulted on a loan of $843,750.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the motion judge found the appeal had little merit and the moving parties had not identified a valid defence.

However, weighing the interests of justice, the court was concerned that immediate enforcement would cause serious harm to the moving parties' three children, including one child with autism.

A stay was granted until March 30, 2026 to permit an orderly transition, with no costs awarded given divided success.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.