Brandon Anand Chung

The applicant sought relief in a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

A reference to the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning whether legal online gaming and sports betting would remain lawful under the Criminal Code if users were permitted to participate in games and betting involving individuals outside of Canada.

The majority (Tulloch C.J.O., Gillese, Hourigan and Dawe JJ.A.) answered affirmatively, finding that section 207(1)(a) of the Criminal Code permits Ontario to conduct and manage a lottery scheme with international pooled liquidity, provided Ontario continues to conduct and manage the Ontario-based aspects of the scheme in accordance with provincial law.

The majority rejected the application of the real and substantial connection test and distinguished the Earth Future decisions.

Van Rensburg J.A. dissented, arguing that the Proposed Model would contravene the Criminal Code because it would require Ontario to conduct and manage aspects of the lottery scheme outside Ontario's territorial boundaries, contrary to the plain meaning of "in that province" in section 207(1)(a).

The appellant sought a stay pending appeal of an application judge's decision dismissing its application for a declaration that the modified version of its GotSkill? game was not a game of mixed chance and skill under the Criminal Code.

The appellant also sought injunctive orders preventing enforcement of a bulletin issued by the respondent requiring liquor licensees to cease operating the game.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried and the appellant would suffer irreparable harm, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to the public interest in enforcing gambling and alcohol regulations designed to protect minors and vulnerable individuals.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from the Ontario Court of Justice.

On the conviction appeal, the Court of Appeal found no basis for appellate intervention and dismissed the appeal.

Regarding the sentence appeal, the court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal on the merits.

The court found that the trial judge properly considered planning and deliberation as an aggravating factor without requiring a Gardiner analysis, as defence counsel at trial did not dispute the Crown's submission on this point.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by holding that the conditions of the appellant's incarceration while completing his conditional sentence were not relevant in assessing Duncan/Marshall credit.

However, the court concluded that this error did not affect the fitness of the sentence given significant aggravating factors.

The appellant also complained about the failure to implement a plea deal, but the record showed the Crown was not prepared to proceed with it and defence counsel did not pursue it at trial.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario's determination that the modified version of GotSkill, an electronic terminal game, remains a game of mixed chance and skill under section 197(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant had modified the game following the 2019 Court of Appeal decision in Play for Fun Studios Inc. v. Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario), which found the original version to be a game of mixed chance and skill.

The court upheld the Registrar's decision, finding that despite modifications allowing players to view the next five potential wins, the game continues to involve a systematic resort to chance by inducing players to wager money in hopes of uncovering valuable prizes in future rounds.

The appellant, Seyed Amir Yaghoubi-Araghi, appealed his convictions and sentence for firearm and drug offences following a R.I.D.E. stop, police pursuit, and search that uncovered a handgun and methamphetamine.

He argued that the trial judge erred in failing to exclude the evidence due to breaches of his rights under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge properly recognized the seriousness of the Charter breaches, the evidence was lawfully obtained and the balancing of factors under R. v. Grant did not warrant exclusion.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Michael Westcott, appealed his sentence on the basis that it significantly exceeded the sentence requested by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to provide adequate notice that she was considering a sentence higher than the Crown’s request, as required by R. v. Nahanee.

However, the Court found no error in principle in the judge’s application of the totality principle or her consideration of harsh pretrial custody conditions.

The appeal was dismissed, with the Court clarifying the distinction between joint submissions and contested sentencing hearings.

The appellant, Charles Kennedy, appealed his conviction for unlawful confinement, assault causing bodily harm, and sexual assault.

He sought the appointment of counsel under section 684 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge’s findings and the legal standards for appointing counsel, ultimately dismissing the application on the basis that the grounds of appeal did not surpass the "arguability" threshold and were not legally complex enough to require appointed counsel.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed J.C.'s appeal from a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, finding a miscarriage of justice due to the limited, non-adversarial role assigned to amicus curiae at the original hearing.

The Court held that, in light of subsequent Supreme Court guidance in R. v. Kahsai, the trial judge erred in principle by not appointing amicus with a broader, adversarial mandate to ensure fairness, given the appellant's self-represented and self-defeating position.

The Court ordered a new hearing.

The appellant, C.D., appealed his conviction for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault, and his sentence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned during oral submissions.

The conviction appeal raised three issues: the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct (the "shower incident"), the lack of a caution regarding the complainant's prior consistent statement, and the absence of an instruction against cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors by the trial judge.

The court held that the shower incident evidence was admissible for motive and to rebut defence theories, and that the lack of specific jury instructions was a legitimate tactical decision by defence counsel.

The appellant, N.D., appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his 18-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reviewable errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment or application of legal principles regarding consent and mistaken belief.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court affirming the custodial sentence as fit given the nature of the offences and the aggravating factor of a prior relationship of trust.

The court declined to rule on the appellant's Charter application to vacate the SOIRA order, suggesting it be pursued in a lower court with a more developed evidentiary record.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard motions for leave to adduce evidence and for a confidentiality order in the context of a reference regarding the legality of an online provincial lottery scheme permitting international play.

The court granted leave to the Attorney General of British Columbia and the Canadian Lottery Coalition Members to file their proposed evidence, finding it potentially helpful for the reference panel.

The court dismissed the Canadian Gaming Association's motion for a confidentiality order, ruling that alleged reputational harm was a private interest insufficient to override court openness, especially as the information was largely public.

The Mohawk Council of Kahnawà:ke sought a declaration that Ontario's iGaming scheme, enabled by specific provincial legislative provisions, was inoperative.

The Council argued that these provisions impermissibly allowed private operators to "conduct and manage" lottery schemes, which, under the Criminal Code, is reserved for provincial governments, thus violating the division of powers and triggering the doctrine of paramountcy.

The respondents, iGaming Ontario and the Attorney General of Ontario, challenged the Council's standing and argued that Ontario, through iGO, properly conducts and manages the scheme.

The court granted the Council public interest standing but ultimately dismissed the application, finding that Ontario, through iGO, maintains sufficient control to be considered the "operating mind" of the iGaming scheme, thereby complying with the Criminal Code and avoiding paramountcy.

The appellant, S.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the imposed sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The majority found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly consider the appellant's evidence regarding the complainant's capacity to consent, constituting a W.(D.) error.

MacPherson J.A. also found an error in the rejection of the honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent defence.

Nadeem Ahmed appealed his conviction for fraud and knowingly using a forged document, arguing his police statement was involuntary due to misleading advice regarding potential immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the statement was voluntary.

The court held that police are not required to explain every possible consequence of the criminal justice process, including immigration, and that the officer's statements were not misleading.

The decision emphasized the deference owed to a trial judge's voluntariness ruling unless a palpable and overriding error is demonstrated.

The appellant, Awale Hussein, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal the parole ineligibility component of his sentence.

The conviction appeal was based on alleged errors in dismissing a Corbett application (allowing cross-examination on his criminal record) and in the jury charge regarding police investigation inadequacies.

The sentence appeal argued errors in disregarding juror recommendations for parole ineligibility and treating absence of motive as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in principle or unreasonable exercises of discretion by the trial judge.

The appellant, L.T., appealed a sentence, specifically challenging the imposition of a s. 161 order under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the sentencing judge's discretionary decision.

The court emphasized that s. 161 orders are entitled to substantial deference on appeal and do not require the underlying offence to have been committed in prescribed circumstances.

The absence of an objection to the order at the time of sentencing was also noted as relevant to its fitness.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondent on two counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm, which arose from an incident where her dogs attacked a toddler and a babysitter.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's ruling to exclude evidence of three prior incidents involving the dogs.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by treating the absence of "discreditable conduct" as a basis for exclusion rather than as a factor in applying the similar fact evidence rule.

The court also found that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding the timing and relevance of the prior incidents.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered, with the prior incident evidence deemed admissible.