Brandon Anand Chung

The appellant was found in the driver's seat of an inoperable vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

He was acquitted at trial on the basis that the vehicle's inoperability rebutted the presumption of operation under s. 320.35 of the Criminal Code.

The summary conviction appeal judge overturned the acquittal, holding that the presumption could only be rebutted by proving the accused did not occupy the seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the plain text of s. 320.35 provides only one method of rebutting the presumption, and inoperability or lack of realistic risk of danger does not suffice.

The appellant was committed to stand trial for aggravated assault following a preliminary inquiry where the sole identification evidence was a manifestly unreliable in-dock identification.

He brought an unsuccessful certiorari application to quash the committal, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to apply the Supreme Court's decision in Hay to discharge him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Hay did not overturn established authority prohibiting preliminary inquiry judges from weighing the reliability of direct evidence.

The Court further held that even if Hay created an exception for directed verdicts, it does not apply to preliminary inquiries.

The applicant physician applied for reinstatement of his certificate of registration, which was revoked in 2019 for sexual abuse of a patient.

The College did not oppose the application.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had engaged in extensive rehabilitation, including psychotherapy and boundaries courses, and demonstrated significant insight and remorse.

Concluding that the risk of future misconduct was low and manageable, the Tribunal granted the reinstatement subject to strict terms, conditions, and limitations, including clinical supervision and practice assessments.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge's exchanges with defence counsel created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court applied the established bias test and emphasized the strong presumption of judicial impartiality and the heavy burden required to rebut it.

Although the trial judge's comments to defence counsel were found to be inappropriate and short-tempered, they arose in the context of counsel's repeated improper questioning, including myth-based reasoning and impermissible use of prior sexual history evidence.

Viewed realistically and practically, the exchanges did not demonstrate that the trial judge was predisposed to one side.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a medical doctor, appealed his convictions for 16 counts of sexual assault and 1 count of sexual exploitation against 13 patients.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's universal ruling permitting the cross-count use of similar fact evidence.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the risk of prejudice, using acquitted counts as similar fact evidence, finding sufficient similarity, and discounting the risk of inadvertent tainting from media and the CPSO website.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's treatment of the similar fact evidence or the risk of tainting.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in her assessment of inadvertent tainting for two counts.

The appellant, convicted of 12 counts of fraud, brought a motion seeking directions and assistance in cross-examining police and civilian witnesses regarding the late disclosure of police emails.

The appellant sought production of redacted portions of emails generated between 2021 and 2024 concerning the disclosure process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding it was a request for production governed by the Trotta test.

The court concluded there was no reasonable possibility that ordering production would result in admissible fresh evidence or assist in developing a successful ground of appeal, as there was no air of reality to the underlying abuse of process claim.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, brought a motion under s. 683 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on proposed fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence consisted of recordings in which the complainant allegedly recanted her trial testimony, and a subsequent police statement in which she resiled from that recantation.

The Crown opposed the motion, arguing it was an abuse of process because the recordings were obtained in breach of a non-communication order.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that cross-examination could assist the appeal panel in assessing the credibility of the recantation.

The cross-examination was ordered to proceed remotely, subject to strict limits on its scope.

The accused brought an application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for the production of third-party records.

The accused argued that a Case Management judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the application, asserting that s. 278.3 requires the application to be heard by the trial judge.

The court held that s. 551.3 of the Criminal Code expressly grants a Case Management judge the powers of a trial judge at the pre-evidentiary stage, including the power to adjudicate disclosure and admissibility issues.

The court found no conflict between the provisions and concluded it had jurisdiction to hear the application.

The corporate defendant and its supervisor pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death and an OHSA violation, respectively, following a fatal workplace accident where a worker drowned in a flooded underground chamber.

The court accepted a joint submission, imposing a $225,000 fine and $200,000 in restitution on the corporation, and a $50,000 fine on the supervisor.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, noting the systemic safety failures while acknowledging the defendants' guilty pleas, remorse, and post-offence safety improvements.

The applicant sought relief in a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

A reference to the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning whether legal online gaming and sports betting would remain lawful under the Criminal Code if users were permitted to participate in games and betting involving individuals outside of Canada.

The majority (Tulloch C.J.O., Gillese, Hourigan and Dawe JJ.A.) answered affirmatively, finding that section 207(1)(a) of the Criminal Code permits Ontario to conduct and manage a lottery scheme with international pooled liquidity, provided Ontario continues to conduct and manage the Ontario-based aspects of the scheme in accordance with provincial law.

The majority rejected the application of the real and substantial connection test and distinguished the Earth Future decisions.

Van Rensburg J.A. dissented, arguing that the Proposed Model would contravene the Criminal Code because it would require Ontario to conduct and manage aspects of the lottery scheme outside Ontario's territorial boundaries, contrary to the plain meaning of "in that province" in section 207(1)(a).

The applicants sought judicial review of administrative decisions dismissing disciplinary charges against two police officers for lack of jurisdiction.

The hearing officers and the Ontario Civilian Police Commission found that the six-month statutory deadline under s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act for serving a notice of hearing had expired.

The applicants argued that the deadline should be paused during a review by the Complaints Director.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, holding that the administrative decision-makers reasonably interpreted the plain wording of the statute, which contained no exception for a Director's review.

The appellant sought a stay pending appeal of an application judge's decision dismissing its application for a declaration that the modified version of its GotSkill? game was not a game of mixed chance and skill under the Criminal Code.

The appellant also sought injunctive orders preventing enforcement of a bulletin issued by the respondent requiring liquor licensees to cease operating the game.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried and the appellant would suffer irreparable harm, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to the public interest in enforcing gambling and alcohol regulations designed to protect minors and vulnerable individuals.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from the Ontario Court of Justice.

On the conviction appeal, the Court of Appeal found no basis for appellate intervention and dismissed the appeal.

Regarding the sentence appeal, the court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal on the merits.

The court found that the trial judge properly considered planning and deliberation as an aggravating factor without requiring a Gardiner analysis, as defence counsel at trial did not dispute the Crown's submission on this point.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by holding that the conditions of the appellant's incarceration while completing his conditional sentence were not relevant in assessing Duncan/Marshall credit.

However, the court concluded that this error did not affect the fitness of the sentence given significant aggravating factors.

The appellant also complained about the failure to implement a plea deal, but the record showed the Crown was not prepared to proceed with it and defence counsel did not pursue it at trial.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario's determination that the modified version of GotSkill, an electronic terminal game, remains a game of mixed chance and skill under section 197(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant had modified the game following the 2019 Court of Appeal decision in Play for Fun Studios Inc. v. Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario), which found the original version to be a game of mixed chance and skill.

The court upheld the Registrar's decision, finding that despite modifications allowing players to view the next five potential wins, the game continues to involve a systematic resort to chance by inducing players to wager money in hopes of uncovering valuable prizes in future rounds.

The appellant, Seyed Amir Yaghoubi-Araghi, appealed his convictions and sentence for firearm and drug offences following a R.I.D.E. stop, police pursuit, and search that uncovered a handgun and methamphetamine.

He argued that the trial judge erred in failing to exclude the evidence due to breaches of his rights under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge properly recognized the seriousness of the Charter breaches, the evidence was lawfully obtained and the balancing of factors under R. v. Grant did not warrant exclusion.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Michael Westcott, appealed his sentence on the basis that it significantly exceeded the sentence requested by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to provide adequate notice that she was considering a sentence higher than the Crown’s request, as required by R. v. Nahanee.

However, the Court found no error in principle in the judge’s application of the totality principle or her consideration of harsh pretrial custody conditions.

The appeal was dismissed, with the Court clarifying the distinction between joint submissions and contested sentencing hearings.

The appellant, Charles Kennedy, appealed his conviction for unlawful confinement, assault causing bodily harm, and sexual assault.

He sought the appointment of counsel under section 684 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge’s findings and the legal standards for appointing counsel, ultimately dismissing the application on the basis that the grounds of appeal did not surpass the "arguability" threshold and were not legally complex enough to require appointed counsel.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed J.C.'s appeal from a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, finding a miscarriage of justice due to the limited, non-adversarial role assigned to amicus curiae at the original hearing.

The Court held that, in light of subsequent Supreme Court guidance in R. v. Kahsai, the trial judge erred in principle by not appointing amicus with a broader, adversarial mandate to ensure fairness, given the appellant's self-represented and self-defeating position.

The Court ordered a new hearing.