Molly Clare Flanagan

Media applicants sought termination or variation of a sealing order over an Information to Obtain connected to a homicide and trans-national drug trafficking investigation.

Applying the open court principle and the Dagenais/Mentuck framework as restated in Sherman Estate, the court held that the Crown bore the burden of justifying the continued sealing after execution of the warrant.

The Crown's concerns about witness safety and investigative prejudice were found too generalized and insufficiently supported in the circumstances, particularly given the arrests already made and the age and partial public availability of the information.

The application was granted and the sealing order was terminated.

The appellants were convicted of manslaughter and first degree murder, respectively, following a fatal shooting during a home invasion.

On appeal, one appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting highly prejudicial 'resemblance evidence' from his parents based on a surveillance video.

The other appellant argued the trial judge's W.(D.) instructions were deficient for failing to incorporate exculpatory eyewitness evidence, and that the Crown's closing address improperly denigrated that evidence using inadmissible scientific claims.

The Court of Appeal agreed with both appellants, finding the resemblance evidence inadmissible and the jury instructions combined with the Crown's improper closing address fatal to trial fairness.

Both appeals were allowed and new trials ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the first-degree murder of his wife, arguing that bad character evidence was improperly admitted and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to it.

The impugned evidence included a 'list of lies' the appellant wrote regarding his affair and an internet bookmark about compulsive lying.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some of the evidence should not have been admitted, the trial judge's strong limiting instructions prevented any miscarriage of justice.

The court also rejected the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, concluding that trial counsel made reasonable tactical decisions and that the appellant suffered no prejudice given the overwhelming evidence of planning and deliberation.

The appellant, Vernon Terwilligar, appealed his convictions for child luring and making child pornography, and sought leave to appeal a sentence order under section 161 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge’s rejection of the appellant’s evidence and upholding the search warrant’s breadth.

The court also upheld the section 161 order, holding that such orders are available even where the “child” is an undercover officer, as the protective purpose of the provision is best served by a purposive interpretation.

The appellant, convicted by a jury on three counts of sexual assault, appealed his convictions.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the jury charge by improperly expressing opinions, overemphasizing the Crown's theory, and instructing on vitiation of consent through abuse of authority.

He also contended that the verdict on one count was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge fair and balanced, and the verdict reasonable, particularly in light of the similar fact evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sought leave to appeal his sentence for offences related to the possession of a loaded handgun.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's determination of reasonable suspicion for investigative detention or the subsequent pat-down search of a satchel.

While the trial judge erred in considering discoverability under the first branch of the Grant analysis for a s. 10(b) Charter breach, the Court found this error did not impact the s. 24(2) analysis, as the evidence would still be admissible.

The Court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, agreeing that the trial judge erred in relying on a confidential informant tip for an aggravating factor but concluding this error did not impact the sentence imposed, which was at the low end of the range.

The Crown appealed an acquittal in a dangerous driving causing bodily harm case.

The trial judge had excluded Event Data Recorder (EDR) evidence, finding an unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8 Charter violation) and police bad faith.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by concluding that police lacked reasonable grounds to seize the vehicle under s. 489(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in EDR data after lawful seizure, and in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis.

The Court held that EDR data, being objective and impersonal, does not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy post-lawful seizure.

It also found police acted in good faith given conflicting caselaw.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered with the EDR evidence admitted.

Steve Kavanagh appealed his conviction for child luring and making sexual material available to a child, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in directing the jury on the reasonable steps requirement for mistaken belief in age, and in denying a "lost evidence" application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's charge on mistaken belief in age was correct and that the "lost evidence" application was properly denied as the Charter does not generally apply to foreign officers' conduct.

The Court also granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the nature of the sexual offences against children.

The appellant, Alexander Lambert, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The conviction appeal was based on alleged errors in the trial judge's Browne v. Dunn instruction and instructions on the state of mind required for murder.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge overemphasized aggravating factors and underemphasized mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the Browne v. Dunn instruction, the murder intent instructions, or the sentencing judge's discretion in weighing factors for parole ineligibility.

The appellant, Waseem Khan, was convicted of child luring and communicating for the purpose of obtaining sexual services from a person under 18.

He appealed his convictions, arguing errors in the trial judge's mens rea analysis and the dismissal of his abuse of process application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the mens rea ground, finding the trial judge correctly applied the Morrison framework.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the abuse of process ground, concluding the trial judge erred in her interpretation of the "genuine offer" element under s. 286.4 of the Criminal Code.

Consequently, the convictions were vacated, findings of guilt upheld, and a new trial ordered solely to complete the abuse of process application.

The appellant, Roger Wain Foreshaw, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, raising six grounds of appeal.

Key issues included the trial judge's prohibition of cross-examination on a witness's record suspension, the absence of a Mayuran instruction regarding an alleged confession, the application of the Browne v. Dunn rule, alleged misstatements of evidence in the jury charge, errors in the third-party suspect instruction, and a finding of no s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in prohibiting cross-examination on the record suspension, this error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The court upheld the trial judge's decisions on the other grounds, affirming the conviction.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder based primarily on the testimony of a co-operating witness who was present during the shooting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three cumulative errors that rendered the trial unfair: providing an inadequate answer to a jury question about the absence of corroborative evidence, failing to correct improper statements made by the Crown during closing submissions, and improperly excluding a hearsay statement made by the key witness to his lawyer.

The Court ordered new trials for two of the appellants.

For the third appellant, the Court found the verdict unreasonable due to deeply flawed stranger identification evidence and entered an acquittal.

The appellants, Gavin MacMillan and Enzo De Jesus Carrasco, appealed their convictions for sexual assault and administering a stupefying substance, and their nine-year sentences.

They argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence, excluding evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity, instructing the jury on consent (specifically regarding orgasms), and demonstrating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the convictions and sentences.

The court affirmed the trial judge's rulings on expert evidence necessity and impartiality, the proper application of s. 276 of the Criminal Code regarding consent and prior sexual activity, and found no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The sentences were deemed fit and not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction under s. 172.2(2) of the Criminal Code for agreeing by telecommunication to commit sexual interference with a person believed to be under 16.

The appeal raised two grounds: whether the trial judge erred in finding an agreement by failing to consider inconsistent inferences (actus reus), and whether the mens rea for the offence requires an intent to actually carry out the underlying sexual offence, beyond the intent to enter into the agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding of a sufficiently detailed agreement and clarifying that the mens rea only requires the intent to enter into the agreement, aligning the offence with other inchoate child protection provisions.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of two respondents, Kalenda Kalonji and Sam Donaldson, on firearm and drug-related charges.

The trial judge had quashed a search warrant for a residence, finding no reasonable and probable grounds to believe firearms would be found there, and excluded the seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in her s. 8 Charter analysis by failing to consider reasonable common sense inferences that firearms would be kept at a person's residence, effectively elevating the standard of proof for issuing a warrant.

This error led to the improper exclusion of evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals, and ordered a new trial for both respondents.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, appealed his sentence of three years, six months' imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred in failing to give effect to mitigating factors, failing to apply the principle of restraint, and failing to give proper credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first two grounds, finding the sentence fit given the gravity of the offence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part on the third ground, increasing the pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant, Justin Longshaw, appealed his convictions for threatening, weapon possession, obstructing a peace officer, and probation breach, stemming from an incident at a bar where identification was the key issue.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of eyewitness identification evidence, particularly the continuous observation by one witness, and her conclusion that providing a false name constituted obstruction.

The sentence appeal was contingent and thus also dismissed.

The appellant, a permanent resident of Canada for 30 years, sought to set aside guilty pleas to firearms offences on the basis that he was uninformed of the significant immigration consequences.

The Crown conceded the appeal, acknowledging that the appellant's assertion of being unaware was credible, given the absence of a plea inquiry at trial and trial counsel's lack of specific recollection or uniform practice regarding advising on immigration consequences.

The appellant also demonstrated prejudice from potential removal from Canada due to his long-standing residency and family ties.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the guilty pleas and convictions, and ordered a new trial.

J.T. appealed convictions for possessing and making child pornography available, arguing two errors by the trial judge: admitting expert evidence without qualification regarding file downloading, and committing a Sekhon error by relying on anecdotal evidence that child pornography does not automatically appear on computers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first point did not require expertise as it was mundane factual evidence, and the second was not a Sekhon error as the testimony explained technical operation, not guilt, and did not reverse the burden of proof.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition that continued his detention.

He sought an absolute discharge or, alternatively, a transfer to a less secure psychiatric facility.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's conclusion that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety was reasonable, supported by expert evidence.

The request for transfer was also denied as the proposed facilities lacked all-male units, a necessary condition given the appellant's history.

The appeal was dismissed.