Jeffrey Andrew Carolin

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving causing death, arguing Charter violations (s. 8 and s. 10(b)) related to police conduct at the hospital, which he claimed necessitated the exclusion of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) results under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police smelling the appellant's breath in the emergency room did not constitute a s. 8 Charter breach, nor was the appellant detained for s. 10(b) purposes.

The court held that the BAC results were properly admitted as they were obtained via valid warrants based on untainted information.

The Commission previously revoked a Hearing Officer's finding that the respondent officer was not guilty of discreditable conduct for pointing a firearm at the public complainants, substituting a finding of guilt.

The Commission solicited submissions on whether it was in the public interest to vary the penalty at this stage.

Given that the incident occurred over a decade ago and the proceedings had been subject to excessive delay, the Commission determined it was not in the public interest to order a new penalty hearing or to vary the penalty itself.

The original penalty remained unchanged.

Two police officers appealed findings of misconduct for unlawfully arresting two Black youths for assaulting police, and one officer appealed a finding of excessive force for punching a third youth.

The public complainants cross-appealed the finding that the officer was not guilty of discreditable conduct for pointing his firearm at them.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission found the Hearing Officer erred in his analysis of arrest powers under the Criminal Code but substituted its own finding of misconduct for the unlawful arrests.

The Commission confirmed the finding of excessive force for the punch.

Finally, the Commission revoked the not guilty finding regarding the firearm, finding the Hearing Officer erred by failing to consider the Use of Force Regulation and improperly relying on his own experience, and substituted a finding of guilt for discreditable conduct.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession, making available, and making child pornography, raising four grounds: unfair trial due to admission of child pornography, undermined defence, breach of s. 10(b) Charter rights regarding right to counsel, and breach of s. 8 Charter rights regarding a strip search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, finding that the trial judge properly balanced the probative value and prejudicial effect of the evidence, did not err in charging the jury, and correctly applied Charter principles regarding the right to counsel and the reasonableness of the strip search.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug offences, and the sentence imposed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's inference that the appellant knew about the hidden firearm.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by concluding that a conditional sentence was outside the range for firearms offences.

Considering the appellant's significant rehabilitative progress and personal circumstances, the Court varied the sentence for the firearms charge to a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by two years of probation, while maintaining the time served sentence for the drug charges.

The appellant, Justin Longshaw, appealed his convictions for threatening, weapon possession, obstructing a peace officer, and probation breach, stemming from an incident at a bar where identification was the key issue.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of eyewitness identification evidence, particularly the continuous observation by one witness, and her conclusion that providing a false name constituted obstruction.

The sentence appeal was contingent and thus also dismissed.

The appellant, a permanent resident, appealed his robbery convictions, arguing his guilty pleas were uninformed due to misadvice from trial counsel regarding immigration consequences.

He was led to believe that sentences under two years per count would provide a "fighting chance" from an immigration perspective, when in fact, sentences over six months rendered him inadmissible with no right to appeal a removal order.

Applying the test from R. v. Wong, the Court of Appeal found the pleas uninformed and that the appellant suffered subjective prejudice, as he would have opted for a trial or different conditions had he been properly advised.

The convictions were set aside, a new trial ordered, and further proceedings were stayed in the public interest given the served sentences, lack of re-offending, and court resource pressures.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice that had dismissed an application for certiorari.

The appellant sought certiorari to quash a provincial court judge's decision to commit him to trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge that there was a sufficient basis in the evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict on the charge.

The appellant, Carlos Pavao, appealed his convictions for fraud and his sentence.

He was convicted of defrauding ten investors and the public through the sale of non-existent shares in gold mining companies.

His appeal of conviction was based on alleged misapprehensions of evidence by the trial judge and a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and that the delay was justified under the Morin transitional exception.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the restitution and fine orders by $45,000, as these amounts related to individuals who were not named complainants in the indictment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of steroids and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

At trial, the Crown introduced extensive evidence suggesting the appellant was associated with the Hells Angels and was a target of a large-scale organized crime investigation.

The Crown also introduced intercepted communications portraying the appellant as knowledgeable about the criminal justice system, and anecdotal opinion evidence from a police officer regarding steroid stockpiling.

The Court of Appeal held that the gang affiliation and intercept evidence constituted highly prejudicial bad character evidence that was irrelevant to the material issues.

Furthermore, the police officer's anecdotal testimony exceeded the proper bounds of opinion evidence, effectively reversing the burden of proof.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding the cumulative errors rendered the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment, sexual interference, and sexual assault involving three complainants.

The central issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrator.

The appellant appealed the convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence from three educators who claimed the appellant resembled a police composite sketch, that the jury charge on eyewitness identification was inadequate, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the jury charge failed to highlight specific weaknesses and exculpatory features in the eyewitness evidence.

Furthermore, the Court concluded that the verdicts were unreasonable because the identification evidence was largely generic and contradicted by distinctive features the appellant did not possess.

Acquittals were substituted for all convictions.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of robbery, one count of use of an imitation firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, two counts of assault causing bodily harm, and one count of threatening to cause death, arising from violent robberies of two victims behind the Yorkdale Subway Station in Toronto.

The appellant received a global sentence of four years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence consisting of an expert forensic report authenticating Voxer App voicemail messages that would establish his absence from the scene of the robberies.

The Crown consented to the admission of the fresh evidence and conceded that the convictions amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The applicant social housing provider sought access to youth criminal records relating to a young person whose charges had been stayed.

The applicant intended to use the records to commence eviction proceedings against the young person's family based on an alleged illegal act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the applicant had a valid interest in the records, granting access was not desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice.

The court emphasized the young person's heightened privacy rights, the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness, and the potential harm to the young person's rehabilitation and family support if eviction proceedings were facilitated.

Michael Duru, charged with attempt murder and endangering life, sought a new bail hearing after his previous bail was cancelled due to breaches.

The Crown opposed, citing prior breaches including a robbery conviction and a curfew breach.

The court considered the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention under the Criminal Code.

The judge found the robbery to be an unusual circumstance not indicative of a substantial risk of re-offence posing a public danger, and the curfew breach, while serious, did not warrant detention given Duru's lengthy compliance periods.

On tertiary grounds, the court found the Crown's case not to be overwhelming, thus not diminishing confidence in the administration of justice.

Bail was granted with varied conditions, including new sureties (mother and father) and an adjusted curfew to allow for night employment.

The accused was committed for trial on a charge of second degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

On a certiorari motion, a Superior Court judge quashed the committal and substituted a committal for manslaughter, finding insufficient evidence of the requisite intent for murder.

The Crown appealed the quashing, and the accused appealed, arguing he should have been discharged entirely.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that the Superior Court judge exceeded her jurisdiction on a certiorari application by weighing the evidence and failing to recognize that there was some evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer the intent for murder.

The committal for second degree murder was restored.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision concerning charges of importing heroin into Canada and possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused received a package addressed to "John Henshaw" at his Toronto residence, which was later found to contain heroin.

The Crown withdrew two conspiracy counts after all evidence was heard.

The central issue was whether sufficient evidence existed to establish the accused's knowledge of the drugs to meet the Sheppard test for committal to trial.

The court found that the Crown had presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable inference of knowledge, including the receipt of a similar package from Pakistan one month earlier, the false name on the package, and the implausibility of sending high-value drugs to a stranger's address.

Applicants sought to vary or terminate sealing orders made in relation to two search warrants executed on their home in 2013 and 2014.

No items were seized and no charges were laid.

The Crown provided redacted copies of the Informations to Obtain (ITOs), with redactions limited to information that might identify confidential informants.

The applicants challenged the scope of the redactions and sought full access to the ITOs.

The court held that once a search warrant is executed, the warrant and ITO are presumptively accessible to the occupiers of the searched premises, subject only to redactions necessary to protect confidential informant identity.

The court ordered the Crown to produce unredacted copies for judicial review to ensure redactions were not overbroad.

The applicant, a First Nations constable, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal decision dismissing his complaint that his suspension and termination by the OPP Commissioner were discriminatory and acts of reprisal.

The applicant had been terminated after making public comments criticizing the OPP.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's findings that the exclusion of First Nations constables from the procedural protections of the Police Services Act was not discriminatory, but rather respected First Nations self-government.

The Court also upheld the finding that the termination was not a reprisal under the Human Rights Code, as the applicant's public comments were not an assertion of human rights.

A related application by the First Nation Council alleging a denial of natural justice was also dismissed.