Christopher Diana

The respondent was charged with speeding.

A justice of the peace ordered the prosecutor to disclose the entire user manual for the speed measuring radar device used by the police officer.

The Ontario Provincial Police brought an application for certiorari to quash the disclosure order, arguing a third party records hearing was required.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that while the justice of the peace erred by not making a specific finding that the manual was first party disclosure, there was no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because the entire manual (except for one section on legal requirements) was obviously relevant and constituted first party disclosure.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the scope of a judge's jurisdiction under section 36(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act to direct a police force to enforce a child custody and access order.

The motion judge ordered the Ontario Provincial Police to enforce a custody and access order in place of the Waterloo Regional Police Service due to an inherent conflict of interest arising from the father's membership in the WRPS and allegations that the WRPS had inappropriately intervened to further the father's interests.

The appellants argued the motion judge lacked authority to impose such an obligation and that only the Ontario Civilian Police Commission could determine whether a municipal police force had failed to provide adequate policing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that section 36(2) permits a judge to specify any police force having jurisdiction in the area where the child may be found, and that in exceptional circumstances such as this, a judge may order the OPP to assist where the municipal police force cannot act due to a conflict of interest.

Hydro One appealed an application judge's decision declining to grant a general declaration that the Ontario Provincial Police must produce accident reports containing driver and owner information to parties who suffer property loss in motor vehicle accidents.

Hydro One argued that while section 200(1) of the Highway Traffic Act requires drivers to provide such information on request, this provision is unavailable when only property loss occurs and no representative is present at the scene.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that although it may have had jurisdiction, it was not appropriate to take jurisdiction due to the absence of an active lis, lack of necessary factual record, and absence of interested parties including the Privacy Commissioner and Attorney General.

Hydro One appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice seeking a declaration that the Ontario Provincial Police must provide accident reports containing personal information of drivers and vehicle owners when Hydro One's property is damaged in traffic accidents.

The OPP refused to provide such reports without a court order, citing the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal to receive written submissions on two jurisdictional issues: whether the court could make a declaration interpreting a statute under the Rules of Civil Procedure when there is no actual lis between the parties, and whether the court could make a declaration interpreting FIPPA provisions outside the context of a judicial review of a privacy commissioner's decision.

The applicant sought to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant.

The respondent, who has physical disabilities, requested that the application be transferred from Toronto to the Central West region to accommodate her needs.

The court granted the transfer to Milton in the interests of justice, noting the respondent's accessibility issues.

Pending the hearing of the application, the court ordered that the respondent must seek leave before commencing any new proceeding or taking further steps in existing proceedings, in both her personal capacity and as an estate trustee.

Police services applied to quash subpoenas duces tecum issued by a preliminary inquiry judge compelling production of police policy directives governing confidential informants.

The subpoenas were issued after the Crown had refused defence disclosure requests for the documents on grounds of irrelevance and informer privilege.

The Superior Court held that a preliminary inquiry judge lacks jurisdiction to determine disclosure applications, whether framed as first-party disclosure under Stinchcombe/McNeil or third-party production under O'Connor.

By issuing subpoenas that effectively compelled production of materials the Crown had declined to disclose and which were arguably held by third parties, the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction.

The subpoenas were therefore quashed.