Sabrina Montefiore

The decision addresses a Charter application by Brandon Abrams regarding the timing of detention and the police obligation to hold off investigation until section 10(b) of the Charter is fully implemented.

The court finds that Abrams was not detained prior to his formal arrest, but that his section 10(b) rights were breached when police questioned him about new charges before he had a renewed opportunity to consult counsel.

The court excludes identity documents from evidence but admits drugs, an airsoft pistol, and drug paraphernalia.

The applicant brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay from the charge to the anticipated end of the retrial was 46 months.

After deducting 10.8 months of defence delay and 8.2 months of discrete exceptional delay, the net delay was 27 months.

As this fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters established in Jordan, the court found the delay was reasonable and dismissed the application.

The accused was tried for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

The police obtained judicial authorizations based on information from a confidential informant and an 'address of interest' identified through invalid production orders for Health Canada records.

The court found that the production orders were unconstitutional as they did not disclose an offence, and the information derived from them had to be excised.

The remaining information from the confidential informant lacked credibility and corroboration, failing to provide reasonable grounds for the authorizations.

The court found a serious violation of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights and excluded the seized drugs under s. 24(2), resulting in an acquittal.

The applicant, charged with possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, brought an application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 24 months, but after deducting defence delay and delay caused by the exceptional circumstance of the COVID-19 pandemic, the net delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the remaining delay was reasonable and that the justice system took appropriate mitigating steps during the pandemic.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, charged with possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, brought a motion for disclosure of application materials related to two British Columbia production orders and the date the RCMP was advised by the Crown that those orders were invalid.

The defence sought this disclosure to support a section 8 Charter challenge to authorizations obtained in Ontario.

The court granted the application, finding that the materials were part of the investigative file, relevant to the Charter challenge, and that the date of the Crown's advice was not protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The accused, Inderdip Sahota, brought an application for a stay of proceedings or exclusion of drug and proceeds of crime evidence, alleging breaches of Charter sections 7, 8, and 10(b) and abuse of process by police during an investigation and search.

The court dismissed the application for a stay, finding insufficient evidence to meet the "clearest of cases" standard.

The court also dismissed the application for exclusion of evidence related to the search of the condo unit and pat-down, finding no sufficient causal, temporal, or contextual connection to the trafficked drugs.

However, the court found a breach of the accused's right to counsel under s. 10(b) due to a six-hour delay in facilitating access to a lawyer.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court determined that admitting the evidence, despite the s. 10(b) breach, would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, given the seriousness of the drug trafficking offence and the lack of bad faith by police.

The drugs, proceeds, and cell phones were ordered admitted for trial.

The defendants were charged with importing cocaine after a controlled delivery of a package from Colombia.

The package contained cocaine hidden inside metal grinding wheels.

One defendant accepted the package at his residence, while the other was observed driving nearby in apparent counter-surveillance.

The court found that while the circumstances were suspicious, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either defendant knew the package contained imported cocaine.

Both defendants were found not guilty.

Patricia Morgan was charged with importing cocaine.

A voir dire was held to determine the voluntariness and admissibility of statements she made to Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers.

The court excluded most statements made to CBSA officers due to unreliable recording and lack of context, but admitted the audio/video recorded statement made to an RCMP officer, finding it voluntary and not induced by promises of release or passport return.

The accused, a 24-year-old Antiguan national, pled guilty to importing 4,322 grams of cocaine into Canada concealed in false-bottomed suitcases.

She travelled with her three-year-old daughter and co-accused Teesha Thomas, who was also carrying cocaine.

The accused was arrested at the border and has been in pre-trial detention since May 9, 2015.

The Crown sought seven years imprisonment; the defence sought five years.

The court imposed a sentence of 66 months (5.5 years) imprisonment, with credit for 223 days of pre-trial detention at an enhanced rate, resulting in a further 55 months to be served.

The court also imposed a DNA order, a 10-year firearms prohibition, and a $200 victim fine surcharge payable within two years.

The appellants, charged with drug offences, sought disclosure of police policy directives regarding confidential informants during their preliminary inquiry.

After the Crown refused disclosure, the preliminary inquiry judge issued subpoenas duces tecum to the police chiefs.

A Superior Court judge quashed the subpoenas, finding the preliminary inquiry judge lacked jurisdiction to order what amounted to third-party disclosure.

The appellants appealed.

Although the appeal was moot because the appellants had since pleaded guilty, the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to hear it.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a preliminary inquiry judge cannot use a subpoena duces tecum to circumvent the jurisdictional limits on ordering production of third-party records, which must be sought before a trial judge under the O'Connor regime.

The accused applied for a Rowbotham order seeking a conditional stay of proceedings until the state funded defence counsel after Legal Aid Ontario refused coverage.

The court reviewed the governing principles requiring proof that legal aid was denied, that the accused was indigent, and that proceeding without counsel would materially compromise trial fairness.

The court found the accused had exhausted all legal aid appeals, lacked financial means while attending school full‑time under bail conditions, and faced serious trafficking charges likely involving complex issues including search warrant challenges and voluntariness of a statement.

The court also observed significant limitations in the accused’s literacy and ability to navigate court proceedings.

Concluding that the accused’s fair trial rights would be jeopardized without representation, the court granted a conditional stay pending state-funded counsel.

The accused was convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown and defence agreed on a joint submission of four years' imprisonment but disagreed on whether the accused should receive pre-sentence custody credit for time spent in custody on separate, outstanding charges in another jurisdiction.

The court accepted the joint submission of four years but declined to grant credit for the time served on the outstanding charges, holding that such credit should be determined when those specific charges are resolved.

The accused was charged with possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

On a blended voir dire, the accused alleged that his warrantless arrest and subsequent search violated his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, seeking exclusion of the heroin under s. 24(2).

The court found that the arresting officer had both subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused based on surveillance observations of a suspected drug transaction.

Consequently, there were no Charter violations.

The court further held that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) as the officer acted in good faith and the evidence was reliable and essential.

The applicant sought a Rowbotham order staying a prosecution for importing opium until the Crown funded counsel for trial.

The court accepted that Legal Aid had been denied and that counsel was necessary for a fair trial given the seriousness of the charge, the legal issues, and the applicant's limited English.

However, the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he could not afford private counsel or that he had exhausted other available means, including assistance from family or borrowing.

The application was dismissed without prejudice to a renewed application supported by fuller financial evidence.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in calculating pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal held that because the appellant was detained under section 524(4) of the Criminal Code, the statute restricted credit to a 1:1 basis rather than 1.5:1.

The appeal was allowed to reflect a corrected effective sentence of 169 days, which had already been served.

The appellant, a tax preparer, appealed his convictions for two counts of fraud and his sentence of three years' imprisonment and a $448,000 fine.

He argued that his rights under s. 11(b) of the Charter were violated due to a 65-month delay, and that his s. 8 Charter rights were violated during the execution of search warrants at his home and office.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the delay was largely attributable to inherent time requirements and a mistrial caused by the trial judge's illness, and that the seized documents were properly obtained under s. 489(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The sentence was upheld as being within the accepted range for a serious fraud against the public purse.

Sentencing following jury convictions for possession of prohibited substances and possession of MDMA/methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

Police stopped the accused for Highway Traffic Act concerns and discovered 1,077 ecstasy pills with an estimated street value between approximately $10,770 and $21,540, along with smaller quantities of other drugs.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record including drug offences, breaches of court orders, and domestic assaults, and had demonstrated poor compliance with community supervision.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were paramount in serious trafficking offences and that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the offender’s history and the quantity of drugs involved.

A global penitentiary sentence of 2.5 years was imposed with ancillary DNA and forfeiture orders.

The accused brought a late Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained following a Highway Traffic Act roadside stop, alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application was served 11 days before trial rather than the 30 days required under the Criminal Proceedings Rules for the Superior Court of Justice.

The court refused to abridge the notice period, finding the application should have been brought much earlier and that the alleged factual basis for the Charter challenge emerged only on the eve of trial without supporting evidence.

The court further held there was no air of reality to the proposed Charter claim and noted the accused’s own position that the vehicle was not his undermined any reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Charter application was therefore not permitted to proceed.

The Crown brought a voir dire seeking a ruling that several statements made by the accused during a traffic stop were voluntary and admissible.

The accused argued the statements were compelled and obtained in breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter once the police questioning shifted from Highway Traffic Act compliance to a criminal drug investigation.

The court held that the initial statements relating to vehicle ownership and the first response regarding illegal items were voluntary and admissible because they occurred during a lawful traffic stop and before the investigative focus changed.

However, the final statement admitting additional drugs was obtained after the accused should have been cautioned and informed of the right to counsel, and was therefore excluded.

Despite the Charter breach, the physical evidence seized from the vehicle was admitted under the Grant analysis because it would have been inevitably discovered during vehicle impoundment and inventory.

During a jury trial, the accused brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of possession of a prohibited weapon, alleged to be a push‑dagger concealed within a cane‑sword.

The court considered whether the Crown had adduced any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could find that the weapon was commonly known as a push‑dagger under the relevant Criminal Code regulations.

The Crown relied on testimony from police officers who lacked expertise in weaponry and did not call expert evidence to establish the definitional elements of a push‑dagger or to address the statutory exclusion for an aboriginal ulu knife.

The court held that the absence of evidence on these essential definitional elements created a fatal evidentiary gap.

As a result, there was no evidential basis upon which the jury could convict on the charge.