Royland Moriah

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The trial was scheduled for December 9 and 10, 2025, nearly 23 months after arrest.

The accused argued that delayed core disclosure at the outset of the prosecution caused significant delays.

The Crown argued that once disclosure was made, the accused's actions led to adjournments of the first two trial dates due to scheduling errors and unavailability.

The court found that after deducting defence delay from the total delay, the net delay was 12.5 months, well below the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months for Ontario Court of Justice summary conviction cases.

The application was dismissed.

Treyshawn Duffy pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of a loaded restricted weapon, and possession of an overcapacity magazine while prohibited.

The court considered aggravating factors, including his criminal record and the commercial nature of the drug operation, alongside significant mitigating factors such as his guilty plea, demonstrated remorse, strong family support, efforts towards rehabilitation, and the impact of a difficult childhood marked by poverty and violence, including the effects of anti-Black racism.

The Crown sought a 4.5-year global sentence, while the defence proposed 4 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years, granting credit for pre-sentence custody, including enhanced credit for lockdown days, and considering restrictive bail conditions.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and forfeiture of seized items.

The Crown applied to admit the out-of-court statements of a complainant who relocated to the United States and refused to testify at trial.

The statements included a sworn video statement to police and testimony from a preliminary hearing.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that necessity was established due to the witness's unavailability and refusal to testify.

The court held that the sworn video statement met the threshold for reliability based on procedural and substantive factors, including extensive corroborative evidence.

The video statement was admitted for the truth of its contents, while the preliminary hearing testimony was ruled admissible only at the instance of the defence to challenge credibility and reliability.

The accused, Keenan Kawall, brought a mid-trial Charter application to exclude photographic evidence obtained by police without consent and subsequently used with facial recognition software to identify him.

The defence argued the photographs violated his Section 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure, particularly in light of Ontario Regulation 58/16 (the "street check" regulation) and the potential for future invasive technological use.

The Crown argued no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a public space and the regulation did not apply.

The court found that while the officer violated O. Reg. 58/16 by arbitrarily collecting identifying information, Mr. Kawall's Section 8 Charter rights were not engaged because he had a diminished expectation of privacy in a public space, and the photographs did not reveal core biographical information.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

This ruling addresses a Leaney application by the Crown to admit a police officer's opinion evidence regarding the identity of the accused from surveillance video footage.

The court applied the "prior acquaintance/better position" test, finding the officer sufficiently familiar with one accused (Siddiqui) to offer an opinion.

The application was granted for high-quality video footage from a school portable but denied for poor-quality video from the East York Town Centre, emphasizing that video quality is a crucial factor for admissibility of recognition evidence.

The applicant, charged with various firearm offences, sought a bail review of a detention order made by a Justice of the Peace.

The applicant argued the Justice of the Peace erred in law by finding the proposed release plan and surety inadequate to address secondary ground concerns, and that a proposed move to the Niagara region constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no error of law or misapprehension of evidence in the original decision, and concluding that the proposed change of residence was not a material change.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with human trafficking, sexual assault, and domestic assault, sought a bail review.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on a new culturally appropriate supervision plan and an error in law by the initial justice who failed to properly apply Gladue principles.

Applying the ladder principle and considering the applicant's Indigenous background, the court found the proposed plan, which included residence at a Native men's shelter and supervision by the Toronto Bail Program, sufficiently addressed the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The applicant was ordered released on strict conditions.

The accused, Shondell Lucas-Johnson, was convicted on two counts of procuring the sexual services of a person 18 years of age.

The complainant, ML, had prior experience in the sex trade and chose to work at a spa introduced by the accused.

The relationship was romantic and domestic, with ML retaining her earnings and sharing living expenses.

The court found the accused was not violent or threatening towards ML, who herself exhibited violence.

Aggravating factors included the accused's criminal record for domestic disputes and being on probation.

Mitigating factors included his youth, family support, and educational/employment history.

The Crown sought a three-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought nine to twelve months.

The court imposed a 12-month custodial sentence, with credit for 836 days of pre-trial custody, resulting in no further time to be served.

Ancillary orders included two years' probation, a DNA order, a five-year firearm prohibition, and a 150-meter no-contact/restriction order regarding the complainant.

One count was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The defendants brought applications to exclude evidence obtained during a drug trafficking investigation, alleging Charter violations under sections 8 and 24(2).

The Crown charged both defendants with conspiracy to commit robbery and various firearms and drug offences.

The defendants challenged: (1) police observations made in a condominium hallway on February 22, 2016; (2) the search of a residence on June 9, 2016; and (3) the search of a vehicle incident to arrest.

The court rejected all applications, finding that the police conduct was lawful and that the defendants' reasonable expectations of privacy were not violated.

The accused was charged with 14 counts related to human trafficking, procuring, and material benefit involving two young women.

The Crown sought to admit cross-count similar fact evidence, which the court excluded due to substantial dissimilarities in the circumstances.

Regarding the first complainant, the court found her evidence unreliable and acquitted the accused of all related charges.

Regarding the second complainant, the court found no evidence of exploitation or coercion, resulting in acquittals for human trafficking and material benefit.

However, the court found the accused guilty of two counts of procuring for introducing and recruiting the second complainant to work in the sex trade.

The Crown brought an application under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to allow the complainant in a human trafficking case to testify by video link from Nova Scotia.

The complainant, who was 17 at the time of the alleged offences, had returned to Halifax and expressed severe anxiety about returning to Toronto to testify, fearing the accused's associates and the disruption to her support network.

The court granted the application, finding that the complainant's vulnerability and the potential for emotional distress in Toronto would likely interfere with the presentation of her evidence, and that modern video technology sufficiently protected the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

During a trial for drug importation, the Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to police following his arrest.

The accused made an initial statement in a police cruiser and a subsequent video-recorded statement at the police station.

The court found the cruiser statement involuntary due to an incomplete record and inducements offered by the officer.

Applying the derived confessions rule, the court also excluded the subsequent video statement, finding it was causally, temporally, and contextually connected to the first tainted statement.

The accused were tried before a judge alone on charges arising from a large-scale cocaine importation scheme involving approximately 112 kilograms of cocaine shipped from Guyana to Canada in a sea container.

The Crown alleged conspiracy to import cocaine, importing cocaine, and possession for the purpose of trafficking, relying on surveillance, intercepted communications, controlled delivery evidence, and admissions.

The court found that two of the accused knowingly participated in a conspiracy to import cocaine and later exercised possession of the drugs for trafficking purposes, based largely on circumstantial evidence and intercepted communications demonstrating knowledge, control, and shared financial interest in the shipment.

However, the court found insufficient evidence that any accused actually committed the offence of importing under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act because their involvement occurred after the drugs entered Canada.

Two accused were acquitted entirely due to reasonable doubt regarding knowledge and participation.

The Crown sought to admit the preliminary inquiry testimony of a shooting victim under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code and the principled exception to the hearsay rule after the witness failed to appear for trial and could not be located.

The witness had previously been declared hostile and repeatedly denied knowledge of the accused or the identity of the shooter, while the Crown relied on intercepted telephone conversations to suggest otherwise.

The court held that the reliability of the testimony was deeply compromised and that the jury would be unable to assess the witness’s demeanor or interpret his evasive and sarcastic responses.

Much of the proposed evidence depended on untested hearsay and Crown questioning that embedded the prosecution theory rather than probative admissions by the witness.

Balancing fairness to the accused against the probative value of the evidence, the court exercised its discretion under s. 715(1) to exclude most of the prior testimony.

Sentencing following jury convictions for possession of prohibited substances and possession of MDMA/methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

Police stopped the accused for Highway Traffic Act concerns and discovered 1,077 ecstasy pills with an estimated street value between approximately $10,770 and $21,540, along with smaller quantities of other drugs.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record including drug offences, breaches of court orders, and domestic assaults, and had demonstrated poor compliance with community supervision.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were paramount in serious trafficking offences and that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the offender’s history and the quantity of drugs involved.

A global penitentiary sentence of 2.5 years was imposed with ancillary DNA and forfeiture orders.

During a jury trial, the accused brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of possession of a prohibited weapon, alleged to be a push‑dagger concealed within a cane‑sword.

The court considered whether the Crown had adduced any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could find that the weapon was commonly known as a push‑dagger under the relevant Criminal Code regulations.

The Crown relied on testimony from police officers who lacked expertise in weaponry and did not call expert evidence to establish the definitional elements of a push‑dagger or to address the statutory exclusion for an aboriginal ulu knife.

The court held that the absence of evidence on these essential definitional elements created a fatal evidentiary gap.

As a result, there was no evidential basis upon which the jury could convict on the charge.

The Crown brought a voir dire seeking a ruling that several statements made by the accused during a traffic stop were voluntary and admissible.

The accused argued the statements were compelled and obtained in breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter once the police questioning shifted from Highway Traffic Act compliance to a criminal drug investigation.

The court held that the initial statements relating to vehicle ownership and the first response regarding illegal items were voluntary and admissible because they occurred during a lawful traffic stop and before the investigative focus changed.

However, the final statement admitting additional drugs was obtained after the accused should have been cautioned and informed of the right to counsel, and was therefore excluded.

Despite the Charter breach, the physical evidence seized from the vehicle was admitted under the Grant analysis because it would have been inevitably discovered during vehicle impoundment and inventory.

The accused brought a late Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained following a Highway Traffic Act roadside stop, alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application was served 11 days before trial rather than the 30 days required under the Criminal Proceedings Rules for the Superior Court of Justice.

The court refused to abridge the notice period, finding the application should have been brought much earlier and that the alleged factual basis for the Charter challenge emerged only on the eve of trial without supporting evidence.

The court further held there was no air of reality to the proposed Charter claim and noted the accused’s own position that the vehicle was not his undermined any reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Charter application was therefore not permitted to proceed.

The three accused were charged with 32 armed robberies of gas stations and convenience stores.

Following their arrest after a foot pursuit, they were held for several hours before giving videotaped confessions.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings alleging police brutality, and challenged the admissibility of their statements and physical evidence seized.

The court dismissed the stay application, finding no evidence of police brutality, and upheld the lawfulness of the arrests and search warrants.

However, the court ruled the statements inadmissible because the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, largely due to the police's failure to video-record the critical 'pre-interviews' where the accused allegedly waived their right to counsel and agreed to confess.