Royland Moriah

The offender pleaded guilty to importing 2.67 kg of cocaine.

Prior to sentencing, she developed an aggressive form of optic neuritis, leaving her nearly blind and requiring immediate, specialized hospital treatment during unpredictable relapses to prevent total vision loss.

The court found that provincial and federal correctional facilities could not guarantee the timely emergency medical intervention she required, creating a real risk of complete blindness if incarcerated.

Finding that a penitentiary sentence would be disproportionately harsh due to this medical hardship, the court departed from the usual 6-to-8-year range and imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The trial was scheduled for December 9 and 10, 2025, nearly 23 months after arrest.

The accused argued that delayed core disclosure at the outset of the prosecution caused significant delays.

The Crown argued that once disclosure was made, the accused's actions led to adjournments of the first two trial dates due to scheduling errors and unavailability.

The court found that after deducting defence delay from the total delay, the net delay was 12.5 months, well below the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months for Ontario Court of Justice summary conviction cases.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant child applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board to review her emergency admission to a secure treatment program.

The respondent facility argued that the child's complex mental health issues, history of suicidal ideation, and pattern of evading the facility placed her at risk of serious bodily harm.

The Board found that the criteria for emergency admission under subsection 171(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act were not met, as the evidence did not establish that the child posed a risk of serious bodily harm to herself or others as a result of her mental disorder at the time of admission.

The Board ordered the child's release.

Treyshawn Duffy pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of a loaded restricted weapon, and possession of an overcapacity magazine while prohibited.

The court considered aggravating factors, including his criminal record and the commercial nature of the drug operation, alongside significant mitigating factors such as his guilty plea, demonstrated remorse, strong family support, efforts towards rehabilitation, and the impact of a difficult childhood marked by poverty and violence, including the effects of anti-Black racism.

The Crown sought a 4.5-year global sentence, while the defence proposed 4 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years, granting credit for pre-sentence custody, including enhanced credit for lockdown days, and considering restrictive bail conditions.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and forfeiture of seized items.

The two accused were charged with multiple offences, including aggravated assault, robbery, and attempted murder, following a violent altercation captured on video surveillance.

The court found the Crown proved the identity of the larger suspect.

The primary accused was convicted of assault, assault by choking, assault with a weapon, and aggravated assault, as his self-defence claim was rejected due to disproportionate force.

The co-accused was convicted of assault, assault by choking, and assault with a weapon as a party, but acquitted of aggravated assault due to evidence of abandonment.

Both were acquitted of robbery and attempted murder.

The Crown applied to admit the out-of-court statements of a complainant who relocated to the United States and refused to testify at trial.

The statements included a sworn video statement to police and testimony from a preliminary hearing.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that necessity was established due to the witness's unavailability and refusal to testify.

The court held that the sworn video statement met the threshold for reliability based on procedural and substantive factors, including extensive corroborative evidence.

The video statement was admitted for the truth of its contents, while the preliminary hearing testimony was ruled admissible only at the instance of the defence to challenge credibility and reliability.

In a judge-alone criminal trial involving allegations of repeated sexual abuse of a child by a person in a position of trust, the court admitted the complainant's prior video-recorded police statements under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code and considered evidence of alleged grooming through pornography and electronic messaging.

The court reviewed the law concerning delayed disclosure by child complainants and the proper assessment of children's evidence, but found significant credibility and reliability concerns in the complainant's testimony, including inconsistencies, memory failures, admitted dishonesty in other contexts, and possible motive to fabricate.

The court also found the supporting evidence from the complainant's mother to be speculative in important respects and concluded that the forensic DNA evidence did not materially confirm the allegations.

Reasonable doubt remained on all six counts, and the accused was acquitted.

The accused, Keenan Kawall, brought a mid-trial Charter application to exclude photographic evidence obtained by police without consent and subsequently used with facial recognition software to identify him.

The defence argued the photographs violated his Section 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure, particularly in light of Ontario Regulation 58/16 (the "street check" regulation) and the potential for future invasive technological use.

The Crown argued no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a public space and the regulation did not apply.

The court found that while the officer violated O. Reg. 58/16 by arbitrarily collecting identifying information, Mr. Kawall's Section 8 Charter rights were not engaged because he had a diminished expectation of privacy in a public space, and the photographs did not reveal core biographical information.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

This ruling addresses a Leaney application by the Crown to admit a police officer's opinion evidence regarding the identity of the accused from surveillance video footage.

The court applied the "prior acquaintance/better position" test, finding the officer sufficiently familiar with one accused (Siddiqui) to offer an opinion.

The application was granted for high-quality video footage from a school portable but denied for poor-quality video from the East York Town Centre, emphasizing that video quality is a crucial factor for admissibility of recognition evidence.

The accused, charged with robbery and aggravated assault, sought an adjournment of their trial due to outstanding disclosure, specifically facial recognition software results and an officer's memo book notes regarding identification.

The Crown opposed a full adjournment, proposing to start the trial with other witnesses.

The court balanced the accused's fair trial rights with the need to control the trial process.

The court ruled that the trial would commence with the lead investigator and complainant, allowing the defence to recall the investigator once the missing disclosure was provided, and delaying the identifying officer's testimony until his notes were disclosed.

The applicant, charged with various firearm offences, sought a bail review of a detention order made by a Justice of the Peace.

The applicant argued the Justice of the Peace erred in law by finding the proposed release plan and surety inadequate to address secondary ground concerns, and that a proposed move to the Niagara region constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no error of law or misapprehension of evidence in the original decision, and concluding that the proposed change of residence was not a material change.

The accused sought an adjournment of a sexual offence trial to pursue disclosure of police records concerning a separate allegation made by the complainant against a third party during the same timeframe.

The court considered the governing discretion over adjournments, the defence right to make full answer and defence, the likely need for additional ss. 276 and 278 applications, and the effect of further delay on a young complainant in a pandemic-delayed proceeding.

The court found the defence had long-standing notice of the third-party allegation and had not acted diligently.

Balancing the accused's interests against complainant impact and the public interest in timely trial management, the court held that granting the adjournment would risk a miscarriage of justice and dismissed the application.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking disclosure of a complainant's youth police occurrence report in a human trafficking and sexual assault prosecution.

The court held that the Youth Criminal Justice Act did not permit accused persons to access a youth record where no charge had been laid, rejecting the line of authority permitting disclosure through s. 123.

The court further held that disclosure was not warranted under the Criminal Code third party records regime because the report contained nothing necessary to full answer and defence, apart from the fact of a proximate police interaction, which the Crown agreed to admit.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with human trafficking, sexual assault, and domestic assault, sought a bail review.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on a new culturally appropriate supervision plan and an error in law by the initial justice who failed to properly apply Gladue principles.

Applying the ladder principle and considering the applicant's Indigenous background, the court found the proposed plan, which included residence at a Native men's shelter and supervision by the Toronto Bail Program, sufficiently addressed the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The applicant was ordered released on strict conditions.

On a Crown application in a jury trial for human trafficking and related offences, the court considered whether evidence of one accused's prior discreditable conduct toward a third party was admissible.

Applying the prior discreditable conduct framework, the court held the alleged baton assault had diminished probative value because the complainant did not link that assault to her decision to leave with the accused or to her fear for her safety.

The moral and reasoning prejudice of the physical assault evidence outweighed its probative value, so that portion was excluded.

However, surrounding narrative evidence, including the accused's conversation with the complainant, his statement about dealing with the third party, the verbal argument, the third party's distressed appearance, and her agreement that the complainant could leave, was admitted to explain procurement and the unfolding narrative.

The accused, charged with human trafficking and sexual assault, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the two complainants on their prior involvement in the sex trade.

The accused argued the evidence was necessary to challenge the complainants' credibility regarding statements made to police about their unfamiliarity with escort work.

The court largely dismissed the application, finding the proposed questioning either relied on prohibited twin-myth reasoning or lacked relevance to a live issue at trial.

Limited evidence of prior sex work was permitted solely through an Agreed Statement of Facts to contradict specific statements made to police.

The Crown applied under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code to have a key complainant in a human trafficking case testify via videoconference from outside Canada.

The accused opposed the application, arguing the witness's disruptive behaviour at the preliminary inquiry demonstrated that remote testimony would impede the court's ability to control the proceedings and undermine effective cross-examination.

The court granted the application, finding the accused failed to show that remote testimony would be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.

The court permitted the witness to testify from her home, subject to strict conditions to ensure the integrity of the proceedings.

The accused, charged with human trafficking offences, brought a Charter application to exclude text messages extracted from a seized cell phone, alleging multiple s. 8 breaches.

The court dismissed arguments that the police failed to file timely Reports to Justice, conducted an unlawful warrantless search during intake, and relied on a facially invalid warrant.

Although the Crown conceded a minor s. 8 breach because the police retrieved the phone from a locker 25 minutes after the warrant's time window expired, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was minimal and the evidence highly reliable.

The applicants, charged with human trafficking and related offences, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 37 months.

The court deducted periods of defence-caused delay, bringing the net delay below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

Furthermore, the court found that exceptional circumstances, including a complainant's disruptive conduct at the preliminary inquiry, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the overall complexity of the multi-accused case, justified the delay.

The application was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to publishing intimate images of his former partner without her consent, contrary to s. 162.1 of the Criminal Code.

The offences occurred following the breakdown of their relationship and a dispute over a loan.

The Crown sought a sentence of 30 days in custody and two years of probation, while the defence argued for a non-custodial sentence.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, noting the significant emotional impact on the victim and the breach of trust involved in the distribution of the images.

The accused was sentenced to 30 days of intermittent custody, followed by two years of probation, and voluntarily paid $3,000 in restitution.