Holly Ann Akin

This addendum clarifies the payment deadline for fines imposed in the main appeal decision (2021 ONCA 665).

The respondent requested clarification, and the court ordered that the fines be paid within seven days of the release of this addendum.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that reduced fines and eliminated a custodial sentence for environmental offences under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA).

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellate judge that the sentencing judge erred in principle by comparing the case to one involving deliberate environmental harm, thus upholding the elimination of the custodial sentence for the individual respondent.

However, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the reduction of fines, finding no error in the original sentencing judge's imposition of separate fines for each count, and restored the original fines for both the corporate and individual respondents.

The individual and corporate accused appealed their sentences for environmental offences under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, involving the failure to safely dispose of PCBs and comply with an environmental protection compliance order.

The sentencing judge had imposed significant fines and an intermittent jail term on the individual.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by relying on a precedent involving a much higher degree of moral culpability and actual harm, whereas the present case involved passive negligence and potential harm.

The appeal court vacated the jail sentence for the individual and reduced the fines for both accused, emphasizing the principle of restraint in regulatory sentencing and the distinction between actual and potential harm.

The appellant was acquitted of importing cocaine but convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking in connection with a 112-kilogram cocaine shipment from Guyana.

He was sentenced to 17 years concurrent on each count.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the legal basis for the conspiracy conviction, the admissibility of overheard utterances, and the fitness of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but granted leave to appeal sentence and reduced it to 15 years concurrent, finding the trial judge erred in treating the appellant's level of participation as equal to that of the primary importer.

The Crown brought a motion to quash an appeal of a section 11(b) Charter order.

At the opening of the hearing, counsel for the respondent advised that the trial was scheduled for July 29, 2019, and abandoned the appeal at that time.

The Crown withdrew its motion to quash.

The appeal and motion were both dismissed as abandoned, with the understanding that the respondent was not precluded from raising the same issue on a future appeal after trial.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for importing cocaine, alleging a violation of his Section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was nearly four years, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The court found that at least 22 months of the delay were attributable to the applicant's obstructionist conduct, including failing to appear, refusing to cooperate with court processes, and difficulties retaining counsel.

Deducting this defence-generated delay brought the net delay below the Jordan ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, Jaime Hodge, was convicted by a jury of importing 1.34 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The court considered sentencing principles, including general deterrence as the overriding factor for cocaine importation, and the established sentencing range of three to five years for similar amounts.

Mitigating factors included the accused's youth, lack of prior record, compliance with release terms, and a "horrific" background involving abuse and family trauma.

Aggravating factors included the sophisticated concealment and high purity of the cocaine.

The court gave limited weight to Gladue factors due to insufficient evidence of their contextual impact on the accused's moral culpability.

Ultimately, the court imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment, with credit for one month of pre-trial custody, resulting in a net sentence of 35 months, along with a 10-year and life weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The defendants applied for a re-hearing of their dismissed s. 8 Charter application regarding a police search of a residential property where marijuana plants were found.

They argued that the Supreme Court of Canada's recent decisions in Jones and Marakah changed the law on standing, allowing them to rely on the Crown's allegations of possession to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court dismissed the application, holding that Jones and Marakah applied to informational privacy claims and did not overrule the Edwards test for territorial privacy claims.

The court found that even if the Crown's allegations were assumed true, they only alleged possession of the plants, not possession of the property, which was insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for conspiracy to import a narcotic.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import cocaine from St. Maarten to Montreal.

The appeal raised three grounds: whether the verdict was unreasonable, whether the jury charge was inadequate, and whether the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter s. 11(b) application regarding delay.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the evidence supported the conviction, the jury instructions were adequate, and the delay was justified under both the Jordan framework and transitional exceptional circumstances.

The sentence of nine years was upheld as fit.

Crown's appeal of the acquittal of the respondent on charges of conspiracy to import a narcotic and importing a controlled substance (cocaine).

The respondent was jointly tried with a co-accused who was convicted of the conspiracy count.

The Crown raised two issues on appeal: whether the trial judge wrongly excluded evidence tying the respondent to the conspiracy, and whether the trial judge erred by imposing a reasonable doubt standard at step two of the Carter test for conspiracy membership.

The appellate court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The accused was charged with drug-related offences following a search warrant executed at his residence.

The defence brought an application to exclude evidence seized during the search, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) supporting the warrant contained erroneous and misleading information and that the search breached section 8 of the Charter.

The Crown argued that the ITO contained sufficient reliable grounds to support the warrant's issuance.

The court conducted a detailed review of the warrant application, examining allegations of errors in the ITO regarding surveillance observations, and determined that despite certain inaccuracies, the warrant was supported by reliable grounds and that any breach would not warrant exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicants, Michael Wong and Michael Singh, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay in their criminal trial for drug production and trafficking.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, calculating the total delay from the date charged to the anticipated end of trial, subtracting defence-attributable delay.

The total delay for Mr. Wong was 29 months and for Mr. Singh was 28 months and three weeks, both falling below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The court also considered potential exceptional circumstances, such as jurisdictional issues and the striking of guilty pleas due to a misapprehension about conditional sentences, but ultimately found no breach of section 11(b) and dismissed the applications.

The offenders were found guilty of conspiracy to import 112 kg of cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The cocaine was hidden in wooden pallets in a sea container shipped from Guyana.

The court found both offenders were principal participants in a sophisticated importation scheme.

Buttazzoni, who had a prior drug conviction in the US and made threats of violence, was sentenced to 17 years.

Ramlall, a first-time offender who received the pallets at his home, was sentenced to 15 years.

Both received credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest.

During a trial for drug importation, the Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to police following his arrest.

The accused made an initial statement in a police cruiser and a subsequent video-recorded statement at the police station.

The court found the cruiser statement involuntary due to an incomplete record and inducements offered by the officer.

Applying the derived confessions rule, the court also excluded the subsequent video statement, finding it was causally, temporally, and contextually connected to the first tainted statement.

The accused were tried before a judge alone on charges arising from a large-scale cocaine importation scheme involving approximately 112 kilograms of cocaine shipped from Guyana to Canada in a sea container.

The Crown alleged conspiracy to import cocaine, importing cocaine, and possession for the purpose of trafficking, relying on surveillance, intercepted communications, controlled delivery evidence, and admissions.

The court found that two of the accused knowingly participated in a conspiracy to import cocaine and later exercised possession of the drugs for trafficking purposes, based largely on circumstantial evidence and intercepted communications demonstrating knowledge, control, and shared financial interest in the shipment.

However, the court found insufficient evidence that any accused actually committed the offence of importing under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act because their involvement occurred after the drugs entered Canada.

Two accused were acquitted entirely due to reasonable doubt regarding knowledge and participation.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

They were charged with importing cocaine following their arrival at Toronto Pearson Airport with suitcases containing several kilograms of cocaine concealed in altered luggage.

Applying the analytical framework from Morin and related jurisprudence, the court assessed the total delay of approximately 30 months and deducted periods attributable to inherent intake, preparation, and scheduling requirements.

The remaining delay attributable to Crown and institutional causes was calculated at approximately 13 months, below the Morin guideline range of 14 to 18 months.

Although the applicants experienced stress and hardship while on bail, the court found the prejudice largely flowed from the charges themselves rather than delay.

Balancing all factors, including the seriousness of the allegations and societal interest in a trial on the merits, the court dismissed the s. 11(b) applications.

The applicants, charged with multiple drug trafficking offences, brought an application under s 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 39 months.

The court applied the Morin framework, attributing much of the delay to inherent time requirements and defence actions, calculating institutional delay at just over 16 months.

Finding minimal prejudice to the applicants' liberty and fair trial rights, the court concluded the balance favoured society's interest in a trial on the merits and dismissed the stay application.

The accused applied for a stay of drug trafficking charges under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial date was approximately 27.25 months.

Applying the framework from Morin, the court analyzed each contested period and concluded that only 12 months constituted Crown or institutional delay, which fell within acceptable institutional delay guidelines.

The court also found that the prejudice claimed by the accused was limited and largely attributable to the stress of being charged rather than the delay itself.

The application for a stay of proceedings was therefore dismissed.

The accused was pulled over for using a cell phone while driving.

A search of the vehicle revealed cocaine, marijuana, and drug trafficking paraphernalia.

The accused claimed he was driving his mother's car in an emergency to help his injured wife and denied knowledge of the drugs.

The court rejected the accused's explanation as incredible, noting inconsistencies in his testimony and the fact that he was driving in the opposite direction of the alleged emergency.

The court inferred knowledge and control from the surrounding circumstances and found the accused guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash their committals for trial following a preliminary inquiry on charges relating to a large cocaine importation scheme.

Police had intercepted a shipping container containing 112 kilograms of cocaine concealed in wooden pallets and conducted a controlled delivery, leading to arrests after the pallets were opened.

The applicants argued there was insufficient evidence of knowledge of the cocaine to permit committal.

Applying the limited weighing standard from R. v. Arcuri, the court held that the circumstantial evidence permitted reasonable inferences of knowledge and participation, including involvement in opening the container and dismantling pallets containing narcotics valued at approximately $4 million.

The court concluded that a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer guilt and that the preliminary inquiry judge did not err in committing the applicants to stand trial.