Maurice J. Mattis

The court sentenced B.O. for sexual interference and exposing a person under 16 to sexually explicit material, both involving his daughter, M.A. The court reviewed the circumstances of the offences and the offender, the harm to the victim, and the aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court imposed concurrent sentences of 5 years for sexual interference and 2 years for exposing a child to sexually explicit material, with ancillary orders including prohibitions and registration requirements.

The decision applies the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Friesen and emphasizes the gravity of sexual offences against children, the importance of denunciation and deterrence, and the need for proportionality and parity in sentencing.

The accused, Elmi Ibrahim and Samatar Hamadu, brought an application to quash a search warrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for premises at 2646 Victoria Ave East, Thunder Bay.

They argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds and contained misrepresentations regarding the primary residence of a key subject, 'Easy'.

The court, applying the Garofoli process, found that the redacted ITO, when read as a whole and considering the affiant's experience and corroborated confidential informant information, provided sufficient reasonable and probable grounds to believe evidence of drug trafficking would be found at the location.

The court dismissed the application to quash the warrant, ruling the evidence admissible at trial.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and exposing his daughter to sexually explicit material.

The offences allegedly occurred when the daughter was 8 and 9 years old, during visits to the accused's apartment following her parents' separation.

The accused denied the allegations, arguing he was never alone with the complainant and that the allegations were fabricated by the mother to gain an advantage in family court.

The court admitted evidence of the accused's prior physical violence to provide context and explain the complainant's delayed disclosure.

Applying the common sense approach to child witnesses, the court found the complainant credible and reliable, while rejecting the accused's exculpatory evidence due to material inconsistencies and deliberate lies.

The accused was found guilty of all charges.

Daniel Fagan pleaded guilty to possessing a loaded restricted firearm.

The sentencing hearing addressed the appropriate sentence, considering aggravating factors (discharging the firearm in public) and significant mitigating factors (youth, first offender, guilty plea, remorse, and the impact of anti-Black racism on his life).

The Crown sought 3-3.5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court rejected a conditional sentence due to the gravity of discharging a firearm in public, imposing a custodial sentence of two years less a day (509 days after credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail terms), followed by two years of probation.

On extensive pre-trial motions in a first degree murder prosecution, the court addressed Charter challenges arising from a related arrest investigation, lost evidence, and multiple Garofoli applications to successive warrants and production orders.

The court found numerous serious breaches, including unlawful phone pinging, failures under ss. 10(a) and 10(b), unlawful seizure and reporting failures concerning cell phones, and unacceptable negligence in the loss of both bullpen video and a physically seized phone, leading to exclusion of all post-arrest statements, utterances, the seized phones, and extraction reports.

The court also found unacceptable negligence in the loss of the deceased's Corvette, but held that the proportionate remedy was a jury instruction rather than exclusion of the Van Dam evidence.

The Garofoli challenges largely failed because, after excision and amplification, the issuing justice could still have granted the contested authorizations, save for the phone-content search tied to the unlawfully obtained phones.

This is a sentencing decision for O.S., a youth offender who pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown sought an adult sentence, arguing that O.S.'s actions, motivated by incel ideology and deemed terrorism, demonstrated a level of maturity and sophistication rebutting the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The defence argued for a youth sentence, citing O.S.'s age and mental health challenges.

The court found that O.S.'s meticulously planned and deliberate attack, his deep research into extremist ideology, and his lack of genuine insight or responsibility (blaming the incel culture) rebutted the presumption.

Furthermore, O.S.'s refusal to participate in rehabilitative programs rendered a youth sentence insufficient for accountability and public protection.

Consequently, the court imposed an adult sentence.

The Crown sought a declaration that the respondent's admitted offences of first-degree murder and attempted murder, committed in the name of involuntary celibate ("incel") ideology, constituted terrorist activity under s. 83.01 of the Criminal Code.

The court examined the statutory definition of terrorism, specifically the "ideological purpose" and "intention to intimidate" clauses.

The court found that incel culture is an ideology and that the respondent's actions were motivated by this ideology and intended to intimidate the public, particularly women.

Consequently, the court granted the Crown's application, ruling that the offences met the definition of terrorism.

The defendants, facing a first-degree murder charge, applied for a challenge for cause based on racial and unconscious bias during jury selection.

The court found the threshold for such a challenge was met, acknowledging the necessity of questioning jurors on these biases.

The ruling addresses the specific questions to be posed to potential jurors, refining the defence's proposed questions.

The judge emphasized that the key is a juror's commitment to setting aside biases to render an impartial verdict, rather than merely identifying the existence of bias.

A specific preamble and four questions were approved for the challenge for cause.

The Crown sought to admit extrinsic discreditable conduct evidence against the accused, Shamar Bailey and Kwami Garwood, in a first-degree murder trial.

The evidence included a prior incident involving a firearm (Tragunna Lane Incident), firearm photographs found on a co-perpetrator's cellphone, a booking/release video of one accused, and ammunition found in another accused's residence.

The court applied the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect for each item.

The Tragunna Lane Incident, firearm photographs, and ammunition were found admissible.

The booking/release video was admissible only as edited still images to mitigate prejudice.

The defendant, Shamar Bailey, brought a motion to exclude statements made to a police sergeant, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 9 (arbitrary detention) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

Bailey argued that a traffic stop conducted by Sgt. Lawson was a pretext or ruse to further a homicide investigation, rather than a legitimate Highway Traffic Act (HTA) stop.

The court found that Sgt. Lawson had a legitimate road safety purpose for the stop, based on information about erratic driving and a dangling fuel cap, even though there was also a dominant criminal investigative purpose.

The court reiterated that a dual purpose does not invalidate a stop if a legitimate regulatory purpose exists.

Consequently, the detention was found to be lawful under the HTA, and thus, the right to counsel was suspended.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed.

Shamar Bailey, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude his video-recorded statement to homicide officers under section 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that two strip searches conducted after his arrest violated his section 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the second strip search, conducted at 42 Division, was unconstitutional as it lacked objective justification, being based solely on the officer-in-charge's lack of knowledge about the thoroughness of the initial search.

Applying the Grant factors for section 24(2) exclusion, the court found the Charter-infringing conduct serious, the impact on the accused's privacy significant, and the utility of the evidence for the prosecution marginal.

Consequently, the court excluded the statement, concluding that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicant brought a motion for exclusive possession of the jointly-owned matrimonial home and an interim restraining order against the respondent.

The respondent had recently returned to the home from the UK and engaged in intimidating and verbally abusive behaviour towards the applicant and their adult children.

The court found that the applicant and children had reasonable grounds to fear for their psychological and physical safety.

The motion for a restraining order and exclusive possession was granted.

In a criminal proceeding involving allegations of sexual assault and probation breach, the Crown sought to admit text messages sent by the complainant to a friend as res gestae hearsay or alternatively as narrative evidence.

The court held that messages sent before the alleged assault were not instinctive responses to a triggering event, and that messages said to have been sent during or immediately after the alleged assault lacked sufficient independent indicia of reliability to satisfy the spontaneous utterance exception.

The court further held the texts were not essential narrative evidence and their admission would improperly circumvent the rule against prior consistent statements.

However, computer-generated timestamps and screenshot photographs were admitted, with the photographs authenticated under the Canada Evidence Act as electronic documents.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault and one count of breach of probation involving a 16-year-old complainant, SB, whom he believed to be his biological daughter.

The accused admitted to sexual touching on March 1, 2021, but denied vaginal penetration and claimed consent.

He denied any sexual activity on March 3, 2021.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, finding him not credible.

The court found that the sexual activity on March 1, 2021, included non-consensual vaginal intercourse, supported by SB's testimony and medical evidence of vaginal tearing.

The court also found that sexual touching occurred on March 3, 2021, despite the accused's denial, supported by SB's testimony and photographs.

The court emphasized that the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and that any ostensible consent was vitiated by his abuse of a position of trust and authority over a vulnerable young person.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

During a Zoom preliminary inquiry for two accused charged with first-degree murder, a screen capture of one accused was taken and uploaded to social media, violating section 136 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court suspended the observer portion of the Zoom proceedings to prevent further violations, emphasizing the seriousness of such acts and the potential for witness intimidation.

To uphold the open court principle, arrangements were made for public observation in a physical courtroom with limited capacity due to COVID-19 protocols and police supervision, while the main proceedings continued virtually.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit three accused to stand trial for first degree murder in relation to a stabbing at an after-hours club.

The Crown advanced two routes to first degree murder: planning and deliberation, and constructive first degree murder during an unlawful confinement.

The court reviewed the evidence, including witness testimony and surveillance video, and found sufficient evidence upon which a properly instructed jury, acting reasonably, could convict each of the accused of first degree murder under both theories.

All three accused were ordered to stand trial for first degree murder.

The respondent wife brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the applicant husband's claim for an equalization payment as statute-barred.

The central issue was the parties' date of separation, with the wife claiming 1986 and the husband claiming 2015.

The court reviewed the conflicting evidence regarding their living arrangements, financial interdependence, and relationship dynamics over a 29-year period.

Concluding that credibility issues prevented a determination on the written record alone, the court declined to grant summary judgment and ordered a time-limited mini-trial to hear oral evidence.

The applicant, charged with robbery using an imitation firearm, brought an application seeking a declaration that his Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were infringed and a stay of proceedings.

The application alleged that police improperly obtained identification information and lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest without relying on privileged information.

The court dismissed the application, finding no breach of section 8 Charter rights due to insufficient evidentiary foundation and concluding that the police had objectively reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, considering all accumulated evidence, including privileged information.

The appellant, Tola Paul, was convicted of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to put the defences of self-defence and defence of others to the jury, finding no air of reality to these defences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by making factual conclusions and credibility assessments that usurped the jury's role in determining the air of reality of the defences.

The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to reasonably find that the defences of self-defence and defence of others had an air of reality.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, Shayan Syed, sought bail release under s. 522(1) of the Criminal Code after being charged with first-degree murder.

The court considered the secondary ground for detention, focusing on the protection and safety of the public.

Despite a proposed house arrest plan with his mother as surety and electronic monitoring, the court found the applicant presented a high risk due to violent tendencies, unpredictability, a history of violence (assault, uttering threats, breaches of court orders), and unmanaged schizophrenia and psychosis exacerbated by drug use.

The proposed surety's credibility was severely damaged by her denial of a prior threat incident involving the applicant, to which he had pled guilty.

The court dismissed the bail application, concluding the applicant failed to satisfy the secondary ground.