Monte MacGregor

The offenders, foster parents to two Indigenous children, were found guilty of first degree murder of one child and unlawful confinement, assault with a weapon, and failure to provide necessaries of life to the other.

The court sentenced them to the mandatory life imprisonment without parole for 25 years for the murder.

For the offences against the surviving child, the court imposed sentences of 3 years, 2 years, and the maximum 5 years respectively, to be served consecutively to each other and concurrently with the life sentence.

The court emphasized the extreme vulnerability of the victims and the profound breach of trust, prioritizing denunciation and deterrence.

After a lengthy judge-alone criminal trial, the court convicted the accused foster parents on counts of unlawful confinement, assault with a weapon, failure to provide the necessaries of life, and constructive first degree murder.

The court rejected the defence evidence in its entirety, accepted the surviving child’s evidence on the core abuse allegations, and relied heavily on electronic communications, treating medical evidence, and expert pediatric and forensic pathology evidence.

The court held that prolonged confinement, use of zip ties and other restraints, deprivation of food, and failure to obtain urgent medical care established the offences relating to the surviving child and also formed part of the same single ongoing transaction of abuse and neglect that culminated in the older child’s death.

Applying the causation principles in Nette and the constructive first degree murder framework in Harbottle and Sundman, the court found that the accused’s failure to provide adequate food and medical attention was a substantial cause of death, that unlawful confinement was the underlying crime of domination, and that the Crown proved the requisite intent for murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

This decision provides the full reasons for the sentencing of Alexander Raybe, who pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm stemming from separate incidents in August and November 2021, both involving the discharge of a firearm in residential areas.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years in the penitentiary, less pre-sentence custody, with consecutive sentences for each offence.

The judge considered aggravating factors such as the discharge of firearms and the dangerous nature of the incidents, and mitigating factors including the guilty plea, the offender's youth, lack of prior record, difficult upbringing, and experience with systemic racism.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles for firearms offences, while also applying the principles of totality and restraint.

Ancillary orders included a 10-year and a life firearms prohibition, and a DNA order.

Dayne Sitladeen was found guilty of manslaughter in the shooting death of Blain Grindley.

The court considered aggravating factors including his extensive criminal record involving violence and firearms, his leadership role in the offence, and his flight to the United States where he continued criminal involvement.

Mitigating factors included some rehabilitative efforts in detention.

The court imposed a sentence of 13 years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his unexpired U.S. sentence, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition and a DNA order.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for firearm-related offences.

The accused, Malik Mbuyi, brought an application under sections 7, 8, and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude DNA evidence obtained via two search warrants (TPS and Brantford warrants) in a first-degree murder trial.

The applicant argued that police circumvented proper procedures, misled the issuing justice, and engaged in an abuse of process by obtaining a DNA warrant for stale youth offences primarily to advance the homicide investigation.

The court dismissed the application, finding no Charter breach under section 8, no abuse of process under section 7, and that even if there were breaches, the evidence would be admissible under section 24(2) due to the seriousness of the crime, reliability of the evidence, and public interest in adjudication on the merits.

The accused, Malik Mbuyi, was charged with first-degree murder in relation to two deaths and conspiracy to commit murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an accomplice, Kareem Zedan, who was deemed an unreliable "Vetrovec" witness, but whose testimony was corroborated by circumstantial evidence including DNA, CCTV footage, and cellphone records.

The court found the accused to be the shooter and to have the requisite intent for murder (transferred intent for one victim, gratuitous for the other).

However, due to the inconsistencies in the accomplice's testimony and lack of sufficient corroborative evidence regarding planning and deliberation, the court found the Crown failed to prove first-degree murder or conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the accused was found guilty of two counts of second-degree murder.

This is a sentencing decision for O.S., a youth offender who pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown sought an adult sentence, arguing that O.S.'s actions, motivated by incel ideology and deemed terrorism, demonstrated a level of maturity and sophistication rebutting the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The defence argued for a youth sentence, citing O.S.'s age and mental health challenges.

The court found that O.S.'s meticulously planned and deliberate attack, his deep research into extremist ideology, and his lack of genuine insight or responsibility (blaming the incel culture) rebutted the presumption.

Furthermore, O.S.'s refusal to participate in rehabilitative programs rendered a youth sentence insufficient for accountability and public protection.

Consequently, the court imposed an adult sentence.

The Crown brought an application to admit the accused's rap music videos and lyrics as prior discreditable conduct evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to use the evidence to establish the accused's membership in a street gang and to provide a motive for the shooting.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence of a relationship between the deceased and the accused, nor any evidence that the deceased was involved in gang activity.

The court concluded that the lyrics were not relevant to an issue at trial and their prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value.

The Crown sought a declaration that the respondent's admitted offences of first-degree murder and attempted murder, committed in the name of involuntary celibate ("incel") ideology, constituted terrorist activity under s. 83.01 of the Criminal Code.

The court examined the statutory definition of terrorism, specifically the "ideological purpose" and "intention to intimidate" clauses.

The court found that incel culture is an ideology and that the respondent's actions were motivated by this ideology and intended to intimidate the public, particularly women.

Consequently, the court granted the Crown's application, ruling that the offences met the definition of terrorism.

The defendants, facing a first-degree murder charge, applied for a challenge for cause based on racial and unconscious bias during jury selection.

The court found the threshold for such a challenge was met, acknowledging the necessity of questioning jurors on these biases.

The ruling addresses the specific questions to be posed to potential jurors, refining the defence's proposed questions.

The judge emphasized that the key is a juror's commitment to setting aside biases to render an impartial verdict, rather than merely identifying the existence of bias.

A specific preamble and four questions were approved for the challenge for cause.

The Crown sought to admit extrinsic discreditable conduct evidence against the accused, Shamar Bailey and Kwami Garwood, in a first-degree murder trial.

The evidence included a prior incident involving a firearm (Tragunna Lane Incident), firearm photographs found on a co-perpetrator's cellphone, a booking/release video of one accused, and ammunition found in another accused's residence.

The court applied the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect for each item.

The Tragunna Lane Incident, firearm photographs, and ammunition were found admissible.

The booking/release video was admissible only as edited still images to mitigate prejudice.

The defendant, Shamar Bailey, brought a motion to exclude statements made to a police sergeant, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 9 (arbitrary detention) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

Bailey argued that a traffic stop conducted by Sgt. Lawson was a pretext or ruse to further a homicide investigation, rather than a legitimate Highway Traffic Act (HTA) stop.

The court found that Sgt. Lawson had a legitimate road safety purpose for the stop, based on information about erratic driving and a dangling fuel cap, even though there was also a dominant criminal investigative purpose.

The court reiterated that a dual purpose does not invalidate a stop if a legitimate regulatory purpose exists.

Consequently, the detention was found to be lawful under the HTA, and thus, the right to counsel was suspended.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed.

Shamar Bailey, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude his video-recorded statement to homicide officers under section 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that two strip searches conducted after his arrest violated his section 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the second strip search, conducted at 42 Division, was unconstitutional as it lacked objective justification, being based solely on the officer-in-charge's lack of knowledge about the thoroughness of the initial search.

Applying the Grant factors for section 24(2) exclusion, the court found the Charter-infringing conduct serious, the impact on the accused's privacy significant, and the utility of the evidence for the prosecution marginal.

Consequently, the court excluded the statement, concluding that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused, Myles Robinson, was charged with possession of a loaded and prohibited firearm and related breach of recognizance charges.

The charges stemmed from an attempted firearm sale where Robinson was the alleged purchaser.

The court found no evidence that Robinson ever had personal, constructive, or joint possession of the firearm, as he never exercised the requisite control over it.

However, the court found him guilty of attempted possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, as his actions went beyond mere preparation and were moments from completion of the substantive crime.

He was found not guilty of the original possession and breach charges.

During deliberations in a lengthy murder trial, the jury sent several notes indicating they had reached unanimous verdicts for two accused and a unanimous verdict on a lesser included offence for the third accused, but were deadlocked on the greater offence for the third accused.

Five majority jurors sent notes attacking the reasoning of the minority jurors, including allegations of racism.

The trial judge declined to conduct an inquiry into the minority jurors' reasoning or declare a mistrial, finding that doing so would violate the common law jury secrecy rule and s. 649 of the Criminal Code.

The court accepted the unanimous verdicts reached by the jury.

In a trial for first-degree murder involving three co-accused, the Crown and one co-accused sought to admit text messages and prior convictions of another co-accused to establish a drug dealer-purchaser relationship and a disposition for violence and firearms.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding that its probative value in supporting the co-accused's defence of lack of intent outweighed the prejudicial effect.

The court provided mid-trial and final limiting instructions to the jury regarding the permissible and impermissible uses of the disposition evidence.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion alleging his statement to police was obtained in violation of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The police delayed his access to counsel for ten hours while securing search warrants.

When finally offered a call at 2:35 a.m., the accused asked to wait until morning when his lawyer would be awake.

The police nevertheless proceeded to interview him at 4:15 a.m.

The court found the accused was reasonably diligent in exercising his rights and did not waive them.

The police violated their duty to hold off eliciting evidence, and the statement was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown sought to commit three defendants for first-degree murder in the shooting death of Jordan Henry.

The incident occurred outside a New Year's Eve party following an altercation.

The court, after a preliminary inquiry, found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit two defendants (Mohamed Shokri and Zakaria Hassan Adam) for first-degree murder, and one defendant (Abdikadir Abdi) for second-degree murder.

The decision analyzed the test for committal, treatment of circumstantial evidence, distinction between inference and speculation, and the elements of planned and deliberate first-degree murder and party liability.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence allegations said to have occurred when the complainant was a child and later a teenager.

The court found the complainant honest and the accused generally unimpressive, but held that sincerity did not resolve serious reliability concerns arising from the complainant's evidence about memory formation, suppression, flashbacks, and therapeutic recall.

Applying the criminal burden of proof and the W.(D.) framework, the court concluded that the decisive details necessary for conviction were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all three counts of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault.

The Crown applied to admit a videotaped statement of a deceased witness under the principled exception to hearsay in a second-degree murder trial.

The witness had an extensive criminal record and was released on her own recognizance shortly before giving the statement, raising concerns about her motive to fabricate.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the inability to cross-examine the witness on her motives would seriously impair the respondent's right to make full answer and defence, thereby failing the threshold reliability requirement.