Maureen Anne Pecknold

On a pre-trial motion in a first degree murder prosecution, the applicant sought exclusion of proposed after-the-fact conduct evidence tendered by the Crown on the issue of identity.

The court applied the governing framework for admissibility of after-the-fact conduct evidence, focusing on relevance, materiality, and the balance between probative value and prejudicial effect.

Evidence that the accused did not return to his residence after the homicide and left belongings there, as well as evidence of the circumstances of his arrest, was held admissible.

Evidence of police efforts to locate the accused at unrelated locations before his arrest was excluded as irrelevant because there was no evidentiary foundation to infer he would be expected to be found there.

In a first degree murder prosecution arising from an alleged intimate partner homicide, the court determined multiple pre-trial evidentiary motions concerning ante mortem statements, hearsay, and prior discreditable conduct.

Applying the traditional state of mind exception and the principled hearsay approach, the court admitted the deceased's August 15, 2022 police statement in edited form, together with threatening August 14, 2022 text messages, because those items were highly probative of motive, animus, identity, and level of culpability.

The court excluded several other statements to co-workers, the father, and a lawyer where threshold reliability was not established or the probative value was tenuous and outweighed by prejudice.

The defence was permitted to introduce the deceased's August 15, 2022 texts to her sister and the accused as contextual evidence relevant to ultimate reliability.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking and firearm possession, brought a motion for further disclosure from the Crown.

The requested disclosure included notes from a confidential source handler (PC Neadles) and information related to an unrelated motor vehicle accident involving a person of interest (Marcus Nugent).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the confidential source notes were protected by informer privilege, which the applicant failed to overcome by demonstrating necessity for innocence or guilt.

The information related to the motor vehicle accident was deemed irrelevant to the applicant's case.

The applicant, F.N., sought bail after being charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder following the poisoning of two young children with sodium nitrite, resulting in one fatality.

The court considered the three grounds for detention under the Criminal Code, with particular focus on the tertiary ground, which assesses whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

Despite the applicant presenting strong sureties and a reasonable release plan, the court found the Crown's circumstantial case to be formidable, given the applicant's access to the chemical and familiarity with the victims' household.

The gravity of the offence, involving the deliberate poisoning of defenceless children, was deemed extremely high.

The application for bail was dismissed, as the court concluded that a reasonable, informed member of the public would lose confidence in the administration of justice if the applicant were released under these circumstances.

The applicant, Mohandranjan Navaratnam, sought a mistrial and permission to re-elect to a jury trial, arguing that the Crown's delayed disclosure of an occurrence report breached his Charter rights to full answer and defence and a jury trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the report was subject to third-party disclosure, not first-party, and that even if it were, the delay did not prejudice the applicant's rights given his prior knowledge of the incident and existing defence strategy.

The applicant, serving a life sentence for first-degree murder and attempted murder with no parole eligibility for 25 years, applied under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period.

The screening judge considered the applicant's institutional record, letters of support, and the nature of the gang-related offences.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's lack of remorse and failure to take accountability for the specific violent acts meant there was no reasonable prospect a unanimous jury would reduce his parole ineligibility.

The accused brought a constitutional challenge against sections 276(2), 278.92, 278.93, and 279.94 of the Criminal Code, as amended by Bill C-51.

These provisions govern the admissibility of a complainant's sexual history and private records in sexual assault cases, requiring defence disclosure of records in their possession and granting the complainant standing with counsel at admissibility hearings.

The accused argued these amendments violated his fair trial rights, right to make full answer and defence, and right to remain silent under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the amendments constitutional.

It held that the provisions appropriately balance the accused's fair trial rights with the privacy, security, and dignity interests of sexual assault complainants, and do not infringe on the right against self-incrimination or the right to surprise in cross-examination.

The defendant, Nicholas Walker, was charged with first-degree murder in a retrial following a Court of Appeal order.

The trial proceeded without a jury.

The Crown alleged Walker was the shooter and that the killing was planned and deliberate, stemming from prior acrimony with the victim, Clifenton Ford.

The defence primarily challenged identification and the elements of planned and deliberate murder.

The court, relying on circumstantial evidence including video footage, DNA, and witness testimony, found beyond a reasonable doubt that Walker was the shooter.

The court also concluded that the murder was planned and deliberate, leading to a conviction for first-degree murder.

In a retrial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce lay opinion evidence from a restaurant owner who recognized the accused in poor-quality security footage of the shooting.

The defence opposed the admission, arguing the witness was not in a better position than the trier of fact and could not point to specific identifying features.

The court applied the Leaney test and ruled the evidence admissible, finding that the witness's long-standing acquaintance with the accused and his interactions with him at the restaurant shortly before the shooting put him in a better position than the court to make a comparison.

The applicant, charged with murder, sought a second bail review after his initial application was denied.

The court considered new evidence constituting a material change in circumstances, including a new supervision plan with his parents as sureties, their relocation to Oshawa to distance him from the crime scene, substantial financial pledges, and significant support from family friends.

Additionally, the court considered the increased vulnerability of the applicant, who suffers from asthma and bronchitis, to COVID-19 in detention.

The court found the new plan sufficient to address public confidence concerns and granted bail with strict conditions.

The accused entered guilty pleas to three counts of assault and one count of assault on a peace officer.

He pleaded not guilty to assault on a peace officer, assault on a peace officer causing bodily harm, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The court found that while the accused assaulted three Walmart employees outside the store after refusing to show his receipt, there was reasonable doubt as to whether he assaulted the arresting officer during the initial resistance.

The court dismissed the charges of assault and assault resisting arrest causing bodily harm.

The court found the accused guilty of possession of property obtained by crime based on circumstantial evidence that he had discarded a bag containing unpaid merchandise.

The accused was tried for prowling, a home invasion, and breach of probation.

The Crown alleged the accused was the masked prowler and the intruder who broke into the complainant's basement and assaulted him.

The court found the complainant's identification evidence unreliable due to poor lighting, discrepancies in physical descriptions, and a failed photo lineup.

However, the court found the accused guilty of breaching his probation by possessing a pellet gun, as CCTV footage proved he placed the gun in the trunk of his girlfriend's car.

The accused was charged with prowling and breaking and entering with intent to commit an indictable offence on December 31, 2016 and January 2, 2017, as well as breach of probation for possessing a pellet gun on January 24, 2017.

The Crown relied primarily on the identification evidence of the victim, supported by circumstantial evidence including motive, the presence of a matching ammunition magazine at the scene, and sightings of the accused's vehicle.

The defence challenged the reliability of the identification, highlighting significant discrepancies between the victim's descriptions and the accused's physical characteristics, the victim's failure to identify the accused in a photo lineup, and exculpatory DNA evidence from a tuque found at the scene.

The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after violently beating a woman in his apartment, resulting in serious injuries including a broken nose.

The accused had a criminal record that included previous assaults against a domestic partner.

The Crown sought an additional 6 to 12 months in custody on top of time served, while the defence sought a sentence of time served and probation.

The court imposed a sentence of two years in prison, less credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 17 days to serve, followed by three years of probation.

In the context of a dangerous offender application, the applicant (Robertson) sought to exclude expert reports (de Munnik, Marshall, and Woodside) on grounds that they constituted personal health records unlawfully obtained by the Crown.

The court found that the consents signed by Robertson as a young offender were limited in scope and duration, and did not authorize disclosure to the Ministry of the Attorney General.

Given the conflicting information provided to Robertson regarding confidentiality and the lack of legal advice at the time, the court ruled that the reports of de Munnik and Marshall were not lawfully obtained.

Consequently, Dr. Woodside's report, which relied on these inadmissible reports, was also excluded.

The Crown was directed to propose a new expert assessor.

The accused was tried before a judge alone on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations made by a child complainant concerning events said to have occurred when she was seven years old.

The Crown relied principally on the complainant’s videotaped statement and testimony, while the defence raised concerns arising from a missing second police video statement, third party records, inconsistencies in the complainant’s accounts, and evidence suggesting influence from counselling in the context of ongoing family custody litigation.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and the jurisprudence governing the assessment of child witness testimony, the court found that the complainant’s evidence about the most serious allegation, and her evidence overall, did not satisfy the Crown’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all charges, and the lost evidence application was therefore moot.

This sentencing decision concerns David Kreindl, who was convicted of aggravated assault and other offences after shooting his intimate partner, J.R., in the face with a flare gun, causing severe and lasting physical and psychological injuries.

The court considered sentencing principles under the Criminal Code, emphasizing denunciation, general and specific deterrence, and public protection, particularly given Kreindl's prior conviction for the murder of another intimate partner.

The Crown sought a 15-year sentence, while the defence proposed 10-12 years.

The court found numerous aggravating factors, including the premeditated nature of the assault, the profound victim impact, Kreindl's criminal record, lack of empathy, poor rehabilitation prospects, and disregard for court orders.

Mitigating factors were minimal, primarily his difficult reintegration into Canada after 20 years of imprisonment.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit similar fact evidence of the accused's prior manslaughter conviction in a first-degree murder trial.

The court applied the R. v. Handy framework, balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.

While some similarities existed between the current murder charge and the prior manslaughter (gambling debt, use of a meat cleaver), the court found significant dissimilarities in the circumstances and a substantial time gap of over 13 years.

The court determined that the evidence's probative value on issues such as situation-specific propensity, planning, intent, mental disorder, accident, or self-defence was insufficient to outweigh the profound moral and reasoning prejudice to the accused.

The Crown's application was dismissed, and the similar fact evidence was deemed inadmissible.

David Kreindl was charged with multiple counts, including attempted murder and aggravated assault, after shooting J.R. in the face with a flare gun.

The court found Kreindl guilty of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, threatening, and discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life or wound, maim, or disfigure.

However, the court found him not guilty of attempted murder, as the Crown failed to prove specific intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt, despite the severity of the victim's injuries and the intentional nature of the shooting.

Kreindl was also found guilty of failing to comply with an undertaking and two counts of failing to appear in court.

The offender, a pastor, was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against two young parishioners during a purported religious 'cleansing' ceremony.

The Crown sought a sentence of 3 to 5 months' imprisonment, emphasizing the egregious abuse of trust.

The court agreed that the offences warranted a 5-month custodial sentence to address denunciation and deterrence.

However, the court found that the offender's almost three years spent on stringent house arrest bail conditions, which prevented him from working, had a substantial impact on his life and amounted to a form of punishment.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court granted credit for the house arrest equal to the requested custodial term, imposing a suspended sentence with three years of probation, along with DNA, weapons prohibition, and SOIRA orders.