Mitchell Huberman

Nicola Puddicombe, convicted of first-degree murder, applied for a reduction in her parole eligibility period under the "faint hope" clause (s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code).

The screening judge determined whether there was a reasonable prospect that a jury would reduce her parole ineligibility.

The court found that despite the cold-blooded nature of the murder and the applicant's initial denial of full responsibility, her significant progress in therapy, positive institutional conduct, and evolving insight into her role in the offence provided a reasonable likelihood of success before a jury.

The application to empanel a jury was granted.

The defendant was charged with multiple offences against the complainant, his intimate partner, including assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, assault, pointing a firearm, and uttering threats, as well as breaches of probation.

The Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence across counts, which was dismissed due to lack of similarity between incidents.

The court assessed the complainant's credibility and reliability, noting vagueness, inconsistencies, and a potential motive to fabricate due to the relationship's end and financial difficulties.

Ultimately, the court found that the Crown failed to prove any of the alleged offences beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the defendant's acquittal on all counts.

The accused, Winston Durant, sought a stay of criminal proceedings for sexual assault and related charges, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, calculating a total delay of 42.5 months.

After deducting 11 months of defence-caused delay (including refusal to schedule pre-trial and earlier trial dates), the net delay was 31.5 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

However, the court found two exceptional circumstances: a one-month delay due to the complainant's hospitalization and at least six months due to the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on jury trials.

Subtracting these seven months reduced the remaining delay to 24.5 months, below the ceiling.

The court further found that the accused failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite proceedings, having actively sought to delay the trial.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed, and the trial was ordered to proceed.

The offender, Zeishan Gill, pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded restricted firearm contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

The offence involved fleeting possession of a firearm belonging to another individual during a police raid.

Despite a prior firearm conviction from 2013, the court considered significant mitigating factors, including the offender's guilty plea, demonstrated remorse, compliance with stringent bail conditions for over two years, and successful engagement in drug addiction rehabilitation.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of two years less one day, while the defence proposed the same length of sentence to be served as a conditional sentence in the community.

The court accepted the defence's position, imposing a sentence of two years less one day imprisonment, to be served as a conditional sentence with strict terms (house arrest for the first half, curfew for the second half), followed by two years of probation, a lifetime weapon prohibition order under s. 109, and a DNA order.

The applicant, a federal inmate, brought a habeas corpus application challenging his involuntary transfer from a medium-security to a maximum-security penitentiary.

The transfer was based on allegations of an inappropriate relationship with staff and contraband introduction.

The applicant argued the transfer was unlawful due to procedural unfairness, specifically the Correctional Service of Canada's failure to disclose the Security Reclassification Scale (SRS) scoring matrix.

The court found that the non-disclosure of the SRS scoring matrix constituted a major breach of the duty of disclosure, rendering the transfer procedurally unfair and unlawful.

The application was granted, and the transfer decision quashed.

Omari Rodney was charged with drug and firearm offences after fleeing police and discarding a loaded handgun.

The defence argued that his Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were violated, seeking exclusion of the evidence.

The court found that Rodney was not psychologically detained before he fled and discarded the gun, and that his subsequent arrest for firearm possession was lawful.

The search incident to arrest was also deemed lawful.

Even if Charter violations occurred, the court determined the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the offences and the public interest in a trial on the merits.

Rodney was found guilty of all charges.

The defendant, Ikenna Nwene, was charged with importing 461 grams of heroin.

The package was intercepted by authorities, duties were paid, and it cleared customs before a controlled delivery was attempted.

Nwene attended to pick up the package with a fake driver's license in the consignee's name but refused to take it when he suspected the officer was undercover.

The court found that the physical element of importing was completed when the package cleared customs.

Based on circumstantial evidence, including the fake ID, his actions at the DHL store, and his attempt to discard evidence, the court concluded that Nwene was involved in the scheme and knew the package contained a controlled substance.

He was found guilty of importing.

The defendant, Zachary Collins, was found guilty of 11 counts related to drug and firearm offenses.

The defence brought an entrapment application concerning the firearm charge (Count 11), arguing that an undercover police officer induced the commission of the offence, going beyond merely providing an opportunity.

The court applied the two-branch test for entrapment from R. v. Mack and R. v. Ahmad.

The court found that while the police had reasonable suspicion, their conduct did not amount to inducement.

Despite the officer's persistence in inquiring about firearms, the defendant consistently indicated a willingness to procure them and initiated contact regarding the firearm transaction on October 1.

The court concluded that the police merely provided an opportunity, and the defendant chose to follow through.

The entrapment application was dismissed.

A jury found the accused guilty of child luring and making sexually explicit material available to a child, involving communications with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl.

The court considered the circumstances of the offences, the accused's background (first offender, difficult childhood, mental health issues, low risk to reoffend, significant collateral consequences), and the parties' sentencing positions.

The Crown sought 30 months imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence or 14 months.

The court rejected the Crown's proposed sentencing range of three to five years for these offences, aligning with the view that a new range has not yet been definitively established post-Friesen.

It also found that a conditional sentence was not appropriate given the gravity of the offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence, despite mitigating factors.

This criminal trial concerned five charges against Mahesh Bisesar related to child pornography: making, communicating for the purpose of making, arranging to make, possessing, and accessing.

The court dismissed the "making" charges, ruling that directing actions during a live stream did not constitute "making" a visual representation under the Criminal Code.

The court also found reasonable doubt regarding the accused's identity as the Skype chat participant due to shared account access.

However, the accused was convicted of possession and accessing child pornography, as images and videos found on his computer were deemed to be knowingly possessed and accessed by him, rejecting defence explanations of malware, client files, or employee actions as speculative.

The applicant challenged the constitutional validity of s. 577 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the Attorney General's power to direct an indictment without providing reasons or a preliminary hearing violates s. 7 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that binding precedent establishes there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing and that core prosecutorial discretion, including the decision to direct an indictment, is not subject to routine judicial review absent an abuse of process.

The media parties sought to terminate or vary sealing orders related to Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for search warrants in a high-profile murder and terrorism case.

The Crown and the accused, Nathaniel Veltman, sought to maintain significant restrictions to protect fair trial rights and privacy.

The court applied the Sherman test, finding a serious risk to fair trial rights and privacy due to widespread pre-trial publicity.

The court ordered a publication ban on broad swathes of evidence and a limited sealing order on highly sensitive personal and graphic information, concluding these measures were necessary and proportionate to balance open court principles with fair trial rights and privacy.

The applicant filed a constitutional challenge to s. 163(3) of the Correctional and Conditional Release Regulations, arguing it permitted the Parole Board of Canada to indefinitely defer post-suspension hearings for provincial inmates awaiting federal transfer.

After the application was filed, the Board held the applicant's hearing, rendering the application moot.

The court exercised its discretion to hear the moot application, finding an ongoing adversarial context, strong grounds, special circumstances transcending the applicant's interest due to the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on transfers, and a need to conserve judicial resources by resolving a recurring issue evasive of review.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for the brutal beating of an 82-year-old woman during a home invasion.

The Crown sought 18 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years, citing the offender's Aboriginal background, mental illness, and the jury's recommendation.

The court found the offender posed a significant danger and set the base parole ineligibility at 18 years.

However, the court found that the 27 months the offender spent in administrative segregation constituted a gross violation of his s. 12 Charter rights against cruel and unusual treatment.

As a remedy, the court reduced the parole ineligibility period by 27 months, resulting in a final period of 15 years and 9 months.

The accused, charged with violent offences related to a home invasion, appeared for a mandatory 90-day detention review under section 525 of the Criminal Code.

The accused sought release on a surety plan, arguing that the passage of time and the risks associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in correctional facilities justified release.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused's extensive criminal record and history of breaching court orders established a substantial likelihood of re-offence.

The proposed supervision plan was deemed insufficient to mitigate the secondary ground concerns, and the theoretical risk of COVID-19 did not outweigh the risk to public safety.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a ruling that the recent amendments to the Criminal Code under Bill C-75 eliminating peremptory challenges operated retrospectively.

The accused argued that the right to challenge jurors is a substantive right.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the right to a jury trial is substantive, but the right to peremptorily challenge jurors is procedural.

Following recent jurisprudence, the court held that the elimination of peremptory challenges does not breach the right to a fair trial and applies prospectively to the accused's jury selection.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder following a home invasion where an 82-year-old woman was beaten to death.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on first-degree murder, arguing the jury should only be left with second-degree murder or manslaughter.

The Crown argued first-degree murder could be established through planning and deliberation or constructive murder based on forcible confinement.

The court granted the directed verdict application, finding no evidence to support planning and deliberation, nor evidence of a discrete act of forcible confinement separate from the killing itself.

The jury was directed to return a verdict of acquittal on first-degree murder and subsequently convicted the accused of second-degree murder.

The Crown brought an application to admit a video statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for second-degree murder.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary, alleging his will was overborne by persistent questioning, inducements, and delayed cautions.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, noting the police did not offer inducements, the questioning was not oppressive, and the accused understood his rights.

The statement was ruled admissible subject to editing out specific prejudicial references.

This is a ruling on a Corbett application to determine the admissibility of the accused's criminal record for cross-examination on credibility during a trial for second-degree murder.

The court balanced the probative value and prejudicial effect of the record, considering the nature, similarity, and remoteness of previous convictions, and the need to prevent an unbalanced picture for the jury.

The judge decided to admit an edited version of the record, excluding drug offences, mischief over $5000, crimes indicating antipathy to the justice system (assault peace officer, escape lawful custody), sexual assaults, and possession of a firearm, while allowing crimes of dishonesty (theft, possession of stolen property) and some assaults and breaches of court orders, with aggravated assault reduced to assault.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual offences against a single complainant.

The appeal addresses multiple errors arising from jury management during deliberations and the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The jury reported deliberation impasses, requested materials and evidence playbacks, and one juror indicated unavailability beyond the third day.

The trial judge provided transcripts of portions of the appellant's police interview used in cross-examination rather than replaying the cross-examination itself, failed to replay the appellant's testimony after the jury withdrew their request, exhorted the jury twice without clarifying that no time limit existed on deliberations, and failed to adequately relate the evidence to the defence position in the charge.

The cumulative effect of these errors resulted in a miscarriage of justice.