Candice Suter

The media appellants sought full, unredacted access to youth court records concerning eight young persons accused of second-degree murder, arguing that the open court principle (Dagenais-Mentuck test) should grant them presumptive access.

The Youth Court and Superior Court granted only partial, redacted access, holding that the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) statutory scheme for record access (s. 119(1)(s)) takes precedence over the common law open court principle.

The YCJA requires applicants to demonstrate a "valid interest" and that access is "desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice" balancing public interest with the young persons' heightened privacy rights and rehabilitation goals.

The Superior Court also declined to hear the appellants' constitutional challenge to the YCJA provisions, deeming the Youth Court the more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the YCJA's specific statutory regime for youth record access is a valid exception to the open court principle and that the media must meet its criteria via a formal application on notice.

It also upheld the discretion not to hear the constitutional challenge at the Superior Court level.

The appellant was convicted by jury of sexual assault and touching a person under the age of 16 for a sexual purpose against his stepdaughter.

The trial judge imposed a four-year sentence on the sexual touching count and stayed the sexual assault conviction.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on four grounds: the prejudicial effect of evidence regarding the complainant's mother's conviction for invitation to sexual touching; errors in the trial judge's ruling on a third-party records application; errors in the jury charge; and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the grounds raised.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by the trial judge on January 10, 2018.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a Vetrovec warning regarding the evidence of a key Crown witness.

The appellant also contended that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence of the Crown and defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had effectively complied with the spirit of Vetrovec by carefully examining the evidence and considering both confirmatory aspects and frailties.

The court noted that a Vetrovec warning is discretionary and that counsel had agreed at trial that no such warning was necessary.

The court also rejected the argument regarding uneven scrutiny, noting that the appellant was essentially requesting that the court re-weigh evidence, which is the function of the trial judge.

The appellant was convicted of sexual offences against his nephew.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility by relying on his prior convictions for driving-related offences without sufficient detail about the nature, dates, or specifics of those convictions.

The trial judge characterized these convictions as crimes of dishonesty demonstrating callous disregard for the rules.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the manner in which evidence of the appellant's criminal record was adduced at trial deprived the trial judge of the information necessary to make an informed assessment of the impact of those convictions on the appellant's credibility as a witness.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference following a trial before a judge of the Superior Court of Justice sitting without a jury.

The complainant testified about three separate incidents that allegedly occurred when she was nine or ten years old.

The appellant denied the allegations and challenged the Crown's timeline.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony and found the complainant's evidence, corroborated by other witnesses, proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis for the uneven scrutiny claim and rejecting each of the appellant's specific arguments regarding the trial judge's treatment of the evidence.

The appellant appealed her conviction for three thefts at Shoppers Drug Mart and her sentence of six months imprisonment plus two years probation.

The trial judge had found her guilty based on witness identification and surveillance video evidence, and not guilty of two thefts from No Frills.

The appellant argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons regarding identification, the commission of the offences, and her liability as a party to the thefts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's brief reasons were responsive to the issues raised and provided a sufficient basis for appellate review.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence and struck the victim surcharge requirement following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Boudreault, but otherwise upheld the sentence given the appellant's extensive criminal history.

The Crown appealed an acquittal of sexual assault charges.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his sister-in-law on two occasions without her consent.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding his testimony that the sexual activity was consensual to be credible.

The trial judge negatively assessed the complainant's credibility based on her post-assault behaviour, which included continued association with the accused and failure to flee or call for help.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by relying on stereotypical views about how sexual assault victims should behave.

The court determined that this legal error was material to the verdict because the trial judge's belief in the accused's credibility was inextricably linked to her flawed assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement following a judge-alone trial.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in admitting certain expert evidence regarding memory and stress-induced adrenaline, this error did not undermine the conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, which was supported by the appellant's own admissions regarding striking the complainant and tearing her underwear with intent to engage in sexual activity.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding the unlawful confinement conviction, finding that the restraint was momentary rather than for a significant period of time, and that any confinement formed an integral part of the sexual assault, triggering the Kienapple principle against multiple convictions for the same conduct.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and related firearm offences.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction as unreasonable, arguing that no properly instructed trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was the shooter.

The appellant raised two main arguments: first, that police committed procedural missteps in obtaining the complainant's identification, and second, that the trial judge erred by focusing on credibility rather than reliability of the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments and dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the reliability of the identification evidence and made no error in principle or palpable and overriding error of fact.

This is a motion decision concerning an application by Aboriginal Legal Services (ALS) for leave to intervene in a criminal appeal.

The motion judge initially declined to grant leave on the material filed but agreed to reconsider on a proper record.

Upon receipt of supplementary materials, the motion judge granted leave to intervene, finding that ALS had an important perspective distinct from the immediate parties on issues relating to Gladue principles and their application to the weight placed on prior criminal records.

The intervention was granted subject to conditions limiting the length of the factum to 10 pages and oral submissions to 20 minutes.

This is a motion decision concerning an application by Aboriginal Legal Services to intervene as a friend of the court in a criminal appeal.

The appellant challenged the admission of his criminal record into evidence at trial, arguing that Gladue principles should inform the probative value and prejudicial effect analysis under R. v. Corbett, and should apply to the use of prior convictions in assessing credibility.

The motion judge found that while Aboriginal Legal Services has recognized expertise in criminal law issues affecting Indigenous peoples, the record did not establish that it could make a useful contribution to the appeal without causing injustice to the immediate parties.

The motion was dismissed, but the applicant was permitted to re-submit on a proper record with specified conditions.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 26 months imprisonment.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The trial judge found that the complainant, a 17-year-old first-year university student, was incapable of consenting to sexual activity due to her level of intoxication and unconsciousness during portions of the assault.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in understanding the distinction between "blacking out" and unconsciousness, in equating pain with lack of consent, and in drawing inferences about the complainant's intoxication.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding the trial judge's findings were supported by evidence and that the verdict was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering with intent, sexual assault with a weapon, robbery, unlawful confinement, and possession of the proceeds of crime arising from a planned home invasion robbery against two women.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 9 years imprisonment, falling between the Crown's submission of 12-15 years and defence counsel's submission of 5-7 years.

The appellant appealed, arguing that if the trial judge erred in treating aggravating factors, a 7-year sentence would be more proportionate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the 9-year sentence was fully reasoned, within the appropriate range, and within the trial judge's proper discretion.

The accused applied under section 523(2)(b) of the Criminal Code to vacate a detention order following the conclusion of a preliminary hearing on charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and kidnapping arising from a violent group beating.

The Crown's case relied on identification evidence including a post-arrest statement, officer identification from surveillance video, and dock identification.

The court found that the preliminary hearing evidence revealed significant admissibility challenges to the Crown's key identification evidence, particularly regarding the voluntariness of the statement and the reliability of the officer's identification.

Although the objective gravity of the offence remained extreme, the apparent strength of the Crown's case was substantially diminished.

The court granted the application and ordered the accused's release on strict conditions, finding a material change in circumstances sufficient to reconsider the necessity of detention on the tertiary ground.

The accused was committed for trial on a charge of second degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

On a certiorari motion, a Superior Court judge quashed the committal and substituted a committal for manslaughter, finding insufficient evidence of the requisite intent for murder.

The Crown appealed the quashing, and the accused appealed, arguing he should have been discharged entirely.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that the Superior Court judge exceeded her jurisdiction on a certiorari application by weighing the evidence and failing to recognize that there was some evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer the intent for murder.

The committal for second degree murder was restored.

The appellant was observed street racing and subsequently abandoned his vehicle in a stranger's driveway.

Police detained the appellant, conducted a pat-down search for officer safety, and discovered the vehicle's keys.

The appellant was arrested for careless driving and outstanding warrants.

Police impounded the vehicle as apparently abandoned under s. 221(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and conducted an inventory search, discovering a loaded handgun.

The trial judge found Charter breaches under s. 10 but admitted the handgun under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and the sentence of seven years' imprisonment, finding the searches lawful and the sentence fit.

The appellant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, receiving an eight and one-half year sentence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by presuming police truthfulness, applying uneven scrutiny to his testimony, misapprehending evidence, and engaging in speculation.

The Court of Appeal rejected all conviction grounds, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual findings were well-supported by the record.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of granting 65 days of pre-sentence custody credit that the trial judge had overlooked.

The appellant, Velle Chanmany, appealed his conviction for breaching a recognizance condition prohibiting cell phone possession.

The trial judge found a s. 8 Charter violation but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the court found no s. 8 or s. 9 Charter violation regarding arbitrary detention or unreasonable search for identification, but a serious s. 10(b) Charter violation for failing to immediately advise the appellant of his right to counsel upon investigative detention.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant test, the court concluded that the deliberate nature of the Charter breach and its significant impact on the appellant's rights outweighed society's interest in the reliable evidence, leading to its exclusion.

The appeal was allowed, conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The Court of Appeal issued supplementary reasons to allocate a previously imposed total sentence of six years among the appellant's various convictions.

The court allocated three years for trafficking in Oxycodone, five years concurrent for trafficking in Fentanyl, and one year consecutive for forgery charges, resulting in a net sentence of seven and a half months on the forgery charges after pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility after shooting the victim outside a bar.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on self-defence, failed to leave the defence of provocation, and misstated witness evidence.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly tailored the self-defence instruction to the key factual issue of whether the victim drew a gun first, correctly concluded there was no air of reality to provocation, and made no material errors regarding witness testimony.

The sentence was upheld as fit given the aggravating factors, including the use of an illegal handgun in a public place.