Justin Reid

The Crown appealed a youth sentence for dangerous driving causing death.

The sentencing judge had found that ss. 42(5)(a) and 42(2)(p) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which restrict deferred custody orders, violated ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the provisions are constitutional when viewed within the YCJA's broader sentencing framework, which provides robust non-custodial alternatives like youth probation.

The sentence was varied to 18 months' probation and 100 hours of community service.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the Crown's appeal from a conditional sentence imposed for sexual assault involving non-consensual condom removal.

The majority allowed the appeal, finding the sentence manifestly unfit and inconsistent with established sentencing ranges for penetrative sexual assault.

The majority substituted a three-year penitentiary sentence, emphasizing the gravity of the offence, the respondent’s moral culpability, and the severe harm to the victim.

The dissent would have deferred to the sentencing judge and corrected only the technical error in the conditional sentence’s length.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed S.B.’s sentencing appeal and upheld an adult sentence for first degree murder under s. 72 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The majority held the Court of Appeal erred on the standard of proof by not applying beyond a reasonable doubt to rebuttal of diminished moral blameworthiness, but found no impact on outcome because the presumption was rebutted on the record and no reviewable error occurred in the accountability analysis, including treatment of social context evidence and rehabilitative potential.

Concurring judges agreed the appeal should be dismissed but disagreed that beyond a reasonable doubt is the proper standard for rebuttal under s. 72(1).

This criminal sentence appeal under the Youth Criminal Justice Act addressed the proper interpretation of s. 72(1) governing when a young person may receive an adult sentence.

The Court held that under s. 72(1)(a), the Crown must rebut the statutory presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness beyond a reasonable doubt, and that objective offence seriousness is not a proper factor at that first-stage developmental-age inquiry.

Applying that standard, the majority found legal errors in the sentencing analysis and concluded the Crown had not displaced the presumption on this record.

The appeal was allowed, the adult life sentence was set aside, and a youth sentence was imposed with remittal on pre-sentence custody credit and supervision conditions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the constitutionality of two sentencing provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) relating to deferred custody and supervision orders (DCSOs): ss. 42(2)(p) and 42(5)(a).

The sentencing judge had found these provisions unconstitutional and imposed a DCSO sentence not otherwise available.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in her constitutional analysis and in failing to apply the impugned provisions and other relevant sections of the YCJA.

The Court substituted a sentence of 18 months’ probation and a 100-hour community service order, with credit for time served under the DCSO.

The media appellants sought full, unredacted access to youth court records concerning eight young persons accused of second-degree murder, arguing that the open court principle (Dagenais-Mentuck test) should grant them presumptive access.

The Youth Court and Superior Court granted only partial, redacted access, holding that the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) statutory scheme for record access (s. 119(1)(s)) takes precedence over the common law open court principle.

The YCJA requires applicants to demonstrate a "valid interest" and that access is "desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice" balancing public interest with the young persons' heightened privacy rights and rehabilitation goals.

The Superior Court also declined to hear the appellants' constitutional challenge to the YCJA provisions, deeming the Youth Court the more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the YCJA's specific statutory regime for youth record access is a valid exception to the open court principle and that the media must meet its criteria via a formal application on notice.

It also upheld the discretion not to hear the constitutional challenge at the Superior Court level.

K.K. sought bail pending his appeal of sexual offence convictions involving minor complainants.

The appeal grounds included claims that his guilty pleas were involuntary due to the trial judge's erroneous discharge of counsel and denial of an adjournment, leading to pressure to plead guilty while unrepresented.

The Court of Appeal granted bail, finding the appeal was "not frivolous" and that K.K.'s surrender could be assured with appropriate conditions.

The court also determined that detention was not necessary in the public interest, considering K.K.'s compliance with previous release terms and the ability of strict bail conditions to mitigate public safety concerns.

The applicant, G.J.R., sought bail pending appeal after his initial bail was revoked due to new charges while on house arrest.

The application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court found that the applicant failed to satisfy the "not frivolous" test for the appeal's merits, specifically regarding the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The trial judge's rejection of the defence was upheld, as it was based on independent reasons, including a finding of no evidence of communicated consent and a lack of reasonable steps taken by the applicant, and the trial judge's ultimate assessment of credibility.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault against his intimate partner, who was pregnant, deaf, mute, and unconscious at the time of the attack.

The victim suffered life-threatening injuries.

The court considered the offender's substance abuse, remorse, and the harsh conditions of his pre-trial custody during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court imposed a gross sentence of 7 years, reduced to 2 years, 6 months, and 11 days after applying credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, appealed sentences imposed for four home invasion robberies, which resulted in a total term of nine years imprisonment (adult and youth sentences).

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to differentiate youth sentencing principles from adult ones, misapplying the paramountcy of individual deterrence and rehabilitation for youthful first offenders, and improperly using the appellant's youth as an aggravating factor.

The court reduced the global adult sentence from nine years to seven years, while affirming the one-year concurrent youth sentence as it was already spent.

The accused was charged with the attempted murder of his spouse and assault with a weapon against another individual.

The court acquitted the accused of the assault with a weapon charge due to the unreliability of the complainant's evidence.

On the attempted murder charge, security video captured the accused brutally beating his unconscious spouse, causing life-threatening injuries.

The court found the specific intent to kill was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but convicted the accused of the included offence of aggravated assault, rejecting the defence of necessity.

The accused was found in possession of a loaded handgun, ammunition and cocaine when stopped by police while walking along a street late at night.

The trial judge found that several of the accused's constitutional rights were infringed by police but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, convicting the accused of various firearms offences and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

A majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed reversible error in assessing the seriousness of the Charter-infringing police conduct, excluded the evidence and entered acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, substantially for the reasons of the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal, while leaving open the question of whether remedies other than exclusion of evidence may be available under s. 24(1) of the Charter when dealing with s. 24(2).

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, sexual assault, and incest relating to sexual abuse of his daughter.

The appellant claimed the Crown breached its disclosure obligations by failing to produce therapeutic records obtained by the victim in New York.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant failed to establish that the Crown decided to use the records before disclosure and that any non-disclosure did not impair his right to full answer and defence.

The Court allowed the sentencing appeal on consent, setting aside a conviction for sexual assault relating to the 1997/1998 incident to avoid double jeopardy under the Kienapple principle, and adjusted the sentences accordingly.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and possession of cocaine for trafficking after police officers detained him on a street in Windsor, Ontario without reasonable suspicion, violating his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The trial judge found the detention arbitrary and the searches unlawful but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police acted in good faith.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in assessing the seriousness of the Charter breach by relying solely on the officers' subjective belief that they were not detaining the appellant.

The court found the police should have known they were exceeding their powers following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Grant, and excluded the evidence, entering acquittals on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired and dangerous driving offences.

The central issue at trial was the identification of the driver of the vehicle involved in a collision that caused serious injuries to the victim.

The appellant conceded he was impaired and an occupant of the vehicle but maintained he was not the driver.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to recognize inconsistencies in witness descriptions of the driver's clothing and the possibility of a third person being the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the eye-witness testimony alongside substantial circumstantial evidence, including video footage, the appellant's clothing, and his movements following the crash, which collectively established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for arson and failure to comply with a probation order.

The Board ordered continued detention on the general forensic unit of Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, alternatively a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's refusal of an absolute discharge but found the Board's reasoning for refusing a conditional discharge was unreasonable and remitted the matter for reconsideration of whether a conditional discharge was appropriate.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that found him to remain a significant threat to public safety and ordered a conditional discharge with reporting and drug testing requirements.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for assault with a weapon in 2007, sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's disposition, finding that the Board's conclusion that the appellant would likely discontinue antipsychotic medication, increase cannabis use, and decompensate into psychosis was supported by evidence, including the appellant's lack of insight into his need for medication and his history of drug use.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and attempt to obstruct justice, as well as the lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order imposed as an ancillary order on sentence.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal but challenged the lifetime SOIRA order, arguing it should be 20 years.

Both the appellant and respondent agreed on this issue.

The court found that although there is no right of appeal from a SOIRA order imposed under s. 490.012(1) of the Criminal Code, the trial judge retains inherent jurisdiction to correct an erroneous SOIRA order.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction, but the appellant was directed to return the matter to the trial judge for correction.