Peter Walter Samuel Copeland

The appellant, Emmanuel Pinard, appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm knowing it to be unauthorized.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered arguments regarding the trial judge’s instructions to the jury, the adequacy of assistance to the self-represented appellant, and the admission of evidence of prior discreditable conduct.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s instructions or approach, and dismissed the conviction appeal, also denying leave to appeal the sentence.

In a criminal appeal from jury convictions for first degree murder and attempted murder, the Court addressed whether lesser included offences of second degree murder and manslaughter had an air of reality and had to be left with the jury.

The majority held the trial judge erred by not leaving those included offences on the murder count, and upheld the order for a new trial on that count.

The Court held the error did not taint the attempted murder convictions and rejected additional challenges regarding jury aids, juror bias, and propensity instructions.

The appeal and cross-appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, an inmate, pleaded guilty to intimidating a justice system participant and uttering threats.

On appeal, he sought to strike his guilty pleas due to procedural irregularities, including a failure to properly arraign him on one count, the failure to apply the Kienapple principle to stay the threatening count, and an insufficient plea inquiry.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence indicating the appellant was unmedicated and influenced by correctional officers to plead guilty to secure a federal transfer.

The Court allowed the appeal, struck the guilty pleas, and ordered a new trial, finding that maintaining the pleas risked a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant, Carolyn Burden, appealed her conviction for fraud over $5,000 and her five-year sentence, which included restitution and forfeiture orders.

She argued her guilty plea was uninformed and the sentence unduly harsh, particularly regarding the imposition of both a forfeiture order and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding her plea informed and voluntary.

However, it granted leave to appeal sentence, setting aside the forfeiture order and reducing the fine in lieu of forfeiture to account for prior restitution payments, clarifying that only one such order (forfeiture or fine in lieu) can be imposed and that restitution should reduce the fine.

The appellant, convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, appealed his conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in assessing the appellant's evidence by appearing to place a persuasive burden on him to explain why the allegations were false and by misapprehending his evidence regarding his relationship with the complainants.

Additionally, the trial judge failed to adequately address the evidence of potential collusion between the complainants and its impact on credibility.

Due to these cumulative errors, the conviction appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered on the charges involving S.L.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less one day imposed for sexual assault, arguing it was manifestly unfit.

The respondent had sexually assaulted the complainant four times while she feigned sleep.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by applying an inappropriate sentencing range and failing to justify the conditional sentence with "exceptional circumstances." The court clarified that the appropriate sentencing range for penetrative sexual assault is three to five years, regardless of the victim's state or relationship to the offender, and that "forced penetration" refers to lack of consent.

The appeal was allowed, the conditional sentence set aside, and a three-year term of imprisonment imposed, with credit for time served.

The court declined to impose a SOIRA order due to lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering a dwelling house and his sentence of two years less a day incarceration.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's finding on identity, which was based on circumstantial fingerprint evidence.

The appellant argued a speculative possibility that his fingerprints were on the jewelry box prior to the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that speculative possibilities do not need to be disproven.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge failed to consider rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretion, given the serious nature of the offence, its impact on victims, and the appellant's criminal record.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, C.L., appealed his sentence for two counts of sexual assault and one count of assault.

The trial judge had imposed concurrent sentences of 4.5 years, giving credit for presentence custody.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the harsh conditions of presentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did consider these conditions as a mitigating factor and that the sentence was fit.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for robbery-related offences and possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding surveillance video, which was critical to the similar act evidence application.

This misapprehension led to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered for all robbery-related counts, while the conviction for possession of stolen property was upheld.

The appellants, convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder, appealed their convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals for first-degree murder convictions, ordering a new trial due to the trial judge's error in restricting routes to liability and failing to leave included offenses (second-degree murder and manslaughter) to the jury.

The court found that the murder and attempted murder charges were not inextricably linked.

The appeals on the attempted murder convictions were dismissed, and leave to appeal the life sentences for attempted murder was granted but the appeals were dismissed, finding no error in principle in the sentencing.

The appellant, Bradley Munroe, appealed his convictions for arranging to commit sexual assault (believed victim under 16) and distributing child pornography, as well as his global sentence of 66 months.

On conviction, he raised issues of entrapment, lack of warrant for Facebook records, failure to prove complainant age, and ineffective trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in these assertions, noting the careful guilty plea inquiry by the trial judge.

On sentence, the appellant argued insufficient credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Court found the trial judge properly applied principles from R. v. Marshall, treating the conditions as a strong mitigating factor, and that the sentence was fit.

The appeal was dismissed on all grounds, and the Criminal Code s. 161 order was upheld.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence on the basis that the pre-trial detention credit (Summers credit) was undercalculated.

The Crown conceded the undercalculation by 64 days.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and varied the sentence by reducing it by the conceded amount.

The appellant, Roseanne Whalen, appealed her conviction for second-degree murder, where she was found guilty of failing in her parental duty to protect her two-year-old daughter from fatal assaults by her girlfriend.

The appeal raised four main issues: the fairness of the Crown's closing argument, the trial judge's instructions on the mens rea required for murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, the adequacy of the trial judge's review of evidence relating to mens rea (specifically text messages), and the instruction on after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown's closing did not risk an unfair trial, the trial judge's mens rea instructions were ultimately correct despite an initial misstatement, and the review of evidence and after-the-fact conduct instructions were adequate and did not prejudice the appellant.

Paul Rousselle appealed his conviction for aggravated assault on a four-month-old infant, Baby L., arguing that the trial judge's reasoning was illogical or irrational.

The medical evidence indicated Baby L. suffered injuries consistent with shaking.

Rousselle had initially denied involvement but later confessed to police and his partner that he shook the baby out of frustration when she wouldn't stop crying.

At trial, he recanted, claiming he lied to police to protect his own child from child protective services.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision to accept Rousselle's confessions while rejecting his claims of gentle force was logical and rational, supported by the medical evidence and the circumstances of the confession.

The court also upheld the admission of evidence regarding Rousselle's prior angry reaction to a video game interruption, finding it relevant to his state of mind and not unduly prejudicial.

Crown appeal of sentence for three counts of attempted murder, one count of arson causing damage to property, and one count of possession of incendiary materials.

The accused set fire to his girlfriend's home with the intent to kill her and her two young children (ages 7 and 1) after she asked him to move out.

The seven-year-old suffered severe burns resulting in permanent scarring and loss of functionality in her hands and feet.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 11 years concurrent on each attempted murder count.

The Crown appealed, seeking a life sentence or elevated sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit and increased it to 20 years concurrent on each attempted murder count.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States on charges of murder.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of a critical statement made during a phone conversation with a Nashville police detective, arguing that because he was located in Toronto when the call was made, the evidence was gathered in Canada and must satisfy Canadian rules of evidence, which would render it inadmissible due to alleged Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the extradition judge's decision, finding that evidence obtained by telephone where the call is made by a police officer located in the United States to a person located in Canada for an American investigation is gathered where the officer is located, and therefore need not meet Canadian evidentiary requirements.

The appellant appealed a probation order imposed by the sentencing judge that prohibited him from contacting his parents.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge had changed position from what was indicated during the joint pre-trial meeting, thereby prejudicing him by denying him the opportunity to make submissions on this condition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness and noting that probation had not been decided during sentencing submissions.

The court also noted that the parents could consent to contact if they wished.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sentence of two years' imprisonment plus one year of probation.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant abandoned his sentence appeal and focused on the conviction appeal.

The appellant contended that the trial judge erred in finding that he was a person in a position of trust within the meaning of s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, arguing that if this finding was incorrect, the complainant could have consented to the sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the complainant's clear and uncontradicted testimony established a long-standing relationship of trust and dependency, which the appellant abused.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a five-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault involving forced sexual intercourse with a pregnant woman.

The appellant had prior convictions for sexual assault but received suspended sentences with probation in 2006.

The trial judge identified the appellant's intellectual limitations and mental health status as mitigating factors but did not adequately explain why these factors did not warrant a sentence in the lower range.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not properly calibrated to account for the significant mitigating factor of diminished intellectual capacity and reduced the sentence to four years.

Two appellants, T.F. and M.W., appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the execution-style killing of their friend Tyrone Bracken.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, based on text messages, video surveillance, and post-offence conduct.

The trial judge found that the appellants participated in a pre-arranged plan to murder the victim.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in using post-offence conduct to infer their participation and intent, committed a Villaroman error by reversing the burden of proof, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly used the appellants' failure to express shock or horror at the killing as circumstantial evidence of their knowledge and participation in a planned murder.