Amy Michelle Alyea

The appellant appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention at a forensic psychiatric hospital.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge with terms requiring attendance and voluntary readmission.

The Board found that continued detention was necessary as the least onerous and restrictive disposition given the appellant's significant threat to public safety, chronic drug-induced psychosis, severe addiction, and need for supervised community reintegration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it fell within a range of reasonable outcomes and was supported by expert evidence regarding the necessity of hospital-approved housing and the inadequacy of Mental Health Act provisions for rapid intervention.

The appellant, H.S., appealed convictions for sexual assault and assault against his ex-girlfriend, raising three grounds: the trial judge's dismissal of an application to reopen the case to cross-examine the complainant on an alleged inconsistency in her Victim Impact Statement (VIS), the dismissal of a s. 276 application to introduce evidence of their sexual relationship, and a flawed credibility analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material inconsistency in the VIS, upholding the s. 276 ruling as the evidence lacked probative value beyond prohibited inferences, and affirming the trial judge's credibility assessment as entitled to deference.

The appellant, J.W., appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his discreditable conduct (public nudity) that occurred several years after the charged offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge incorrectly admitted this evidence, as its probative value did not outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The court emphasized that the similarities between the discreditable conduct and the charged offences were generic and lacked a sufficient nexus, and that the trial judge did not adequately assess the moral and reasoning prejudice, even in a judge-alone trial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Chad Noureddine, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder following a jury trial.

The appeal raised four grounds concerning the trial judge's jury instructions: the limited use of a witness's criminal record, the sufficiency of the Vetrovec instruction, the failure to adequately present the defence's position on intent and motive, and the inclusion of an alternate path to conviction not explicitly raised in the Crown's closing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's charge, when considered holistically, was comprehensive and balanced, adequately addressing the issues of witness credibility and all routes to liability.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and released on bail pending appeal, sought a variation of his bail conditions to permit travel to Pakistan for a one-month business trip to resell automotive parts.

The Crown opposed the variation, arguing that the applicant posed a flight risk due to his dual citizenship, the absence of an extradition treaty with Pakistan, and the potential profit from the business venture relative to the existing bail amount.

The court considered the flight risk and the public interest balance, distinguishing the case from a prior refusal and a more serious precedent.

The motion judge granted the variation, allowing the travel, but increased the bail amount from $60,000 to $125,000, finding that the applicant did not pose a serious flight risk and that there were no residual public safety concerns.

The appellants, Derek Oppong and Akido Thomas, appealed their convictions and sentences for kidnapping-related offences with a firearm, committed for the benefit of a criminal organization.

They argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence on gang activity, claiming it was unnecessary and biased, and in refusing to reconsider its admissibility after proposed factual admissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's discretion in admitting expert evidence for contextual understanding and finding no material change in circumstances that would warrant its exclusion.

The court also upheld Mr. Oppong's sentence, finding evidence supported his leadership role in the offence.

The applicant brought a motion before the Court of Appeal.

A non-publication order under s. 517 of the Criminal Code was imposed at the bail hearing in the court below.

Because the decision contains information covered by that order, the court directed that the decision will not be published online until the non-publication order ceases to be in effect, though a copy is available at the Registry.

The appellant challenged his convictions for two counts of second-degree murder, arson, and interfering with human remains, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions.

Specifically, the appellant contended the judge failed to give a W.(D.) instruction regarding his exculpatory statements, a corrective instruction on purported after-the-fact conduct, and improperly instructed the jury on the defence's failure to call evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's charge, concluding that the jury was adequately instructed on reasonable doubt, the assessment of the accused's out-of-court statements, and the irrelevance of the accused's silence at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference on the basis that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons.

The trial judge had stated she was confident of the appellant's guilt but reserved her reasons to address inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

However, no written or oral reasons for conviction were ever delivered.

The Crown conceded the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial, finding that the lack of reasons prevented appellate review.

The appellant, Jessy Herlichka, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing three errors by the trial judge: flawed instructions on the defence of intoxication, refusal to qualify a proposed defence expert in a specific area of expertise, and an inadequate curative instruction after a Crown witness suggested the appellant murdered the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions on intoxication, the limitation of expert testimony, or the curative instruction, concluding that the jury was properly equipped to determine the requisite state of mind for murder.

The appellants, Jermaine Gager and Corey Leonard Smelie, appealed their murder convictions, with Mr. Smelie also seeking leave to appeal his sentence.

They raised several grounds, including errors in qualifying an expert witness on street gangs, inadequate jury instructions, erroneous dismissal of disclosure applications, inconsistent verdicts, and reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings or conduct, and affirmed the fitness of the sentence imposed on Mr. Smelie.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible in 2008 and held under detention orders until the Ontario Review Board granted a conditional discharge in 2019.

The hospital appealed, supported by the Crown, arguing the Board's majority reasons failed to explain how public safety would be protected given the respondent's history of rapid decompensation and recent involuntary admissions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing, finding the Board's reasons inadequate to justify the disposition.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition finding that she continued to pose a significant threat to public safety and refusing an absolute discharge.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in 2004 for theft of a motor vehicle and assault on police officers.

After 15 years in psychiatric care, the Board considered two incidents—a May 2018 threat to kill a co-resident and an October 2018 assault on a bus passenger—in concluding she remained a significant threat.

The appellant argued the Board improperly relied on unproven allegations based on hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly applied the legal test and appropriately considered hearsay evidence in its inquisitorial proceedings.

A dual status offender appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board refusing to schedule a placement hearing to determine whether his current place of custody (a penitentiary) was inappropriate to meet his mental health needs.

The appellant argued that the Review Board was obligated to review placement as part of every disposition review, or alternatively, that the Review Board should have exercised its discretion to order a placement hearing on its own motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Review Board's interpretation that a significant change in circumstances is a prerequisite to scheduling a placement hearing on an offender's application, and found no error in the Review Board's refusal to schedule a hearing on its own motion.

The Crown appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board regarding a respondent found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for violent offences committed at a Canadian Forces recruiting centre.

The respondent was diagnosed with schizophrenia and found incapable of knowing his conduct was morally wrong.

The Board ordered detention on a secure forensic unit but granted limited indirectly supervised privileges to attend a local college for educational purposes within a two-kilometre radius of the hospital.

The Crown challenged both the indirect supervision privilege and the Board's failure to prohibit all contact with uniformed military personnel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding the Board did not err in law and its disposition was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his former girlfriend.

He appealed on five grounds, all relating to errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in: (1) providing contradictory instructions on the relevance of post-offence conduct to planning and deliberation; (2) instructing the jury that post-offence conduct was relevant to the provocation defence when the parties had agreed it was not; (3) failing to include a separate box for the provocation defence in the decision tree, thereby conflating provocation with the mental element required for murder; and (4) failing to correct misstatements in the Crown's closing address.

The cumulative effect of these errors compromised the integrity of the verdict.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction of first degree murder was set aside, and a new trial was ordered on both counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and use of a firearm while committing an indictable offence.

The charges arose from an altercation in which the appellant shot one of two men who approached him and his friends.

The trial judge found the appellant shot deliberately and rejected claims of accident and self-defence.

On appeal, the primary issue was whether the trial judge erred in rejecting the self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings that the danger to the appellant had passed and that the victim posed no danger.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in connection with a home invasion robbery in which the victim was shot and killed.

The Crown's case relied heavily on hearsay statements made by two associates of the appellant to police, in which they implicated him in planning and executing the robbery.

The trial judge admitted these statements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay statements and in dismissing a Charter application based on unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's admission of the hearsay statements did not meet the more restrictive test established by the Supreme Court in R. v. Bradshaw.

The court also clarified the proper approach to calculating delay under the Jordan framework when extraordinary remedies are pursued.

Appeal from conviction on five counts of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code and one count of sexual exploitation under s. 153.

The appellant, a modeling agent, was convicted of sexual offences against three male models.

The jury was unable to reach a verdict on one count.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal including failure to grant severance, failure to declare a mistrial, directed verdict applications, prior consistent statements, and Crown closing address issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

Appeal from conviction for two counts of first degree murder.

The appellant killed two friends and attempted suicide, raising a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) defence.

The trial judge convicted after finding the appellant had the capacity to know that society would regard his actions as morally wrong, despite suffering from a mental disorder.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) misinterpretation of "knowing that it was wrong" under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code; (2) misapprehension of evidence regarding psychotic state; (3) request to recognize diminished responsibility as a partial defence; and (4) request to recognize suicide pact as a partial defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.