Amy Michelle Alyea

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of prohibited firearms, and was sentenced to two years less a day.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge made significant errors, including misapprehending the maximum penalty for the drug offence and relying on inaccurate facts.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the sentencing proceedings contained significant errors, warranting a non-deferential review.

However, the Court concluded that the sentence imposed was ultimately fit given the seriousness of the offences, particularly the possession of loaded handguns, balanced against the appellant's youth and rehabilitative potential.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the complainant's prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge did not adhere to model jury instructions and made a factual error regarding a cell phone, the instructions as a whole made it clear how the jury could use the prior inconsistent statements to assess credibility, and the error was not prejudicial.

The appellant brought a motion to unseal a victim impact statement solely for inclusion in the Appeal Book.

The Crown consented to the request.

The Court of Appeal granted the order, directing that the victim impact statement be included in a sealed envelope within the Appeal Book to preserve the intent of the original sealing order.

The applicant, who was on full parole after being convicted of child pornography offences, sought bail pending appeal to modify a parole condition restricting his access to computers.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction under s. 679 of the Criminal Code because a person on full parole is not in 'custody'.

The Court of Appeal held that full parole is a form of custody sufficient to engage the court's jurisdiction under s. 679.

The court granted bail pending appeal and modified the conditions to allow the applicant to use computers and the internet for employment purposes.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings—that the appellant undertook to protect the complainant and that her dependence on him for necessities made her particularly vulnerable to his influence—were supported by the evidence and warranted a conviction.

The appellant appealed a 3-year sentence for extortion and threatening, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give adequate weight to the totality principle.

The appellant committed the offences while in custody for previous offences against the same complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 3-year sentence reflected the totality principle, as the offences would have merited a longer sentence given the appellant's extensive criminal record had he not already been serving a substantial sentence.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of seven bank robberies based on a videotaped confession, eyewitness identification, and circumstantial evidence.

On appeal, he argued that his videotaped statement was inadmissible because police did not reiterate his right to counsel when questioning shifted to other robberies, that the jury was inadequately instructed on photo lineups, that the trial judge's interventions caused a miscarriage of justice, and that the jury was not told to consider evidence for each count separately.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant understood his jeopardy and right to counsel, and dismissed the first three grounds.

While the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider the identification evidence separately for each count, the Court applied the curative proviso because the videotaped confession provided overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a 9-month sentence imposed on the respondent for sexually molesting his stepdaughter over a three-year period.

The victim was between nine and twelve years old.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit given the intrusive nature of the conduct and the blatant breach of trust.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to two years less a day in custody, followed by the probation order imposed at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for repeated acts of sexual abuse against his step-daughter.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in refusing production of therapist notes, and erred in treating after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and that the verdict was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 18-month custodial sentence as fit.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess stolen motor vehicles and four counts of possession of stolen motor vehicles.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the inference available from recent possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge improperly conflated the issues of possession and guilty knowledge, and mischaracterized the defence's position by suggesting the appellant had offered an explanation for possession when he had denied possession entirely.

The appeal was allowed, the substantive possession and conspiracy convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexually assaulting a young foster child in his care and sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment.

He appealed both the conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to credibility issues with the complainant, and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the jury's assessment of credibility.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in principle by declining a conditional sentence and imposing incarceration.

The appellant appealed his convictions and the total sentence of ten years imposed for three offences.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to assess the complainant's credibility based on the totality of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the ten-year sentence was beyond the appropriate range and exceeded the Crown's suggested sentence.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to six years concurrent for each offence, taking into account pre-trial custody.

The appellant, a young person, was convicted of seven counts of extortion and sentenced to 10 months of custody.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the trial judge's handling of his co-accused's guilty plea created an apprehension of bias, and that she erred in admitting his statement, rejecting his alibi, applying the W.(D.) test, and assessing identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no fatal errors in the trial judge's rulings or credibility assessments.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-month custodial sentence was deemed fit for the serious offences committed.

The applicant sought release from custody pending his new trial for first degree murder, having spent almost 10 years in custody.

The Court of Appeal had previously quashed his conviction due to errors regarding jailhouse informant testimony and bad character evidence.

The court found the applicant met his onus under section 515(10) of the Criminal Code, noting the Crown's case was now considerably weaker, the applicant had strong community ties, a positive institutional record, and posed minimal risk to the public.

The application for release was granted subject to strict conditions, including a cash deposit and substantial sureties.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on the testimony of a jailhouse informant.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning but erred by providing the jury with examples of potentially confirmatory evidence that were not capable of confirming the informant's testimony.

The trial judge also erred by allowing the Crown to introduce highly prejudicial investigative hearsay evidence regarding the appellant's antecedents, including alleged ties to terrorism and the drug trade, to rebut a defence claim of an inadequate police investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a former psychotherapist, appealed his convictions for historical sexual offences against five female patients.

At trial, the appellant argued that the sexual acts were either consensual, part of bona fide therapy, or occurred outside the therapeutic relationship.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge fundamentally erred in his jury instructions on consent by conflating medical 'informed consent' with criminal consent and failing to properly put the defence's theory to the jury.

The Court also held that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence from a prior disciplinary hearing under the principled exception, as the necessity and reliability criteria were not met.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in responding to a jury question about reasonable doubt and by holding an in-chambers conference regarding the jury's request to clear the courtroom for the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's repetition of the original reasonable doubt charge was appropriate.

The court also held that the in-chambers conference was not inappropriate, caused no prejudice, and any irregularity was cured by section 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The young person appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm arising from two altercations with another youth on the same day.

The Court of Appeal quashed the simple assault conviction, finding the first incident was a consensual schoolyard scuffle and the resulting head injury was unintended.

The Court upheld the conviction for assault causing bodily harm for the second incident, as the appellant initiated the confrontation and the victim did not consent to fight.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, replacing the suspended sentence with a conditional discharge and one month of probation, noting the appellant's good character and lack of criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against an intellectually disabled complainant.

At trial, the Crown did not argue that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent, but the trial judge instructed the jury on capacity under s. 273.1(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while expert evidence is not strictly required to assess capacity, the trial judge erred by leaving the issue with the jury when it was not raised by the Crown, prejudicing the defence.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for pointing a firearm at her two children during an incident that occurred 19 years prior.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on the testimony of the complainants, despite the appellant's denial and inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility and applied the burden of proof.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and a one-year conditional sentence was imposed.