Karen M. Weiler

In supplementary reasons following an appeal regarding property ownership, the Court of Appeal addressed outstanding financial issues between former spouses.

The court ordered the respondent to reimburse the appellant for mortgage and property tax payments she made on his half-interest in a jointly owned property, finding he would otherwise be unjustly enriched.

The court also awarded the appellant additional occupation rent for the post-trial period.

Given divided success on the main appeal issues, the court ordered the parties to bear their own costs for both the trial and the appeal.

Appeal from trial judgment in matrimonial proceedings concerning ownership of property.

The trial judge found that the appellant's 50% interest in Knapton Farms Ltd. (a corporation holding farm property) and 100% interest in lot 8 (adjoining land) were beneficially owned by the respondent through resulting trust.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge correctly applied resulting trust principles to the Knapton shares but erred regarding lot 8.

The court held that the initial 1994 transfer of lot 8 to the parties as joint owners created a presumption of joint beneficial ownership under the Family Law Act, which the respondent failed to rebut.

However, the court upheld the resulting trust finding regarding the 1996 transfer of the respondent's half-interest to the appellant.

The court also corrected the valuation of farm real estate and addressed equalization, occupation rent, and pre-judgment interest issues.

The appellant challenged the validity of a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued under the Mental Health Act on the grounds that not all participants in the Community Treatment Plan (CTP) signed it within 72 hours of the medical examination.

The Consent and Capacity Board found the CTO valid, holding that only the examining physician was required to sign within the 72-hour period.

The Superior Court appeal judge reversed, finding that all participants must sign within 72 hours.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 72-hour requirement applies only to the examining physician's entry into the CTP, not to other service providers who indicate their agreement to the plan.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder for the sexual assault and murder of a 70-year-old woman committed when he was 15 years old, appealed his sentence.

The Crown had sought and obtained an adult sentence rather than a youth sentence.

The appellant challenged the sentencing judge's decision on three grounds: failure to consider whether the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted, use of the appellant's testimony and denial of guilt as aggravating factors, and failure to properly weigh rehabilitation and integration principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the sentencing judge erred in using the appellant's testimony as an aggravating factor, the error had no impact on the sentence and an adult sentence remained fit given the heinous nature of the crime.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his wife, Adrienne Roberts, who was found murdered in the basement of their home.

He appealed on three grounds: (1) that the application judge erred in dismissing his O'Connor application for production of criminal investigation files relating to two other similar crimes; (2) that the trial judge erred in dismissing his alternate suspect defence application; and (3) that the first degree murder verdict was unreasonable and should be substituted with second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the application judge's O'Connor ruling, no air of reality to the alternate suspect defence, and that the jury's verdict of first degree murder was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

The appellants, Robert Bortolon and his former lawyer Robyrt Regan, appealed findings of civil contempt and custodial sentences of 90 days imprisonment.

The contempt arose from their breach of a court order (the Le May Order) requiring production of documents to the respondent bank.

The appellants had made a deal whereby Regan would deliver documents to Bortolon rather than make them available for inspection by the bank, in exchange for settlement of their personal dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals regarding the contempt findings but allowed the appeals regarding penalty, reducing the custodial sentences from 90 days to 45 days for each appellant.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a search of his vehicle's trunk in response to a 911 call reporting a male possibly armed with a gun.

The appellant appealed on the basis that the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights and that the evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2).

The majority upheld the conviction, finding the trunk search was authorized by common law as a justified safety search incident to investigative detention.

The concurring judge agreed the evidence should be admitted under s. 24(2) but found the search itself violated s. 8 of the Charter, disagreeing with the majority on the scope of permissible searches incident to investigative detention.

RBC Dominion Securities and Royal Bank of Canada Europe sued Crew Gold Corporation for a Success Fee under an investment banking engagement letter.

The parties' dispute centered on whether RBC was entitled to a Success Fee following an unanticipated takeover of Crew by Severstal, in which RBC played no role.

The trial judge found that a causal link between RBC's services and the transaction was required for the Success Fee to be payable, and dismissed RBC's action.

On appeal, RBC argued the trial judge committed extricable errors of law in interpreting the Agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the Agreement contemplated RBC's involvement in the transaction process and that the Success Fee was meant to reward RBC for its success in completing a transaction through its financial advisory services.

A condominium corporation passed a by-law to lease four common element parking spaces to each unit owner to address a parking dispute caused by a popular restaurant tenant monopolizing shared parking.

The appellant unit owner, who leased her units to the restaurant, challenged the by-law as invalid, unreasonable, and oppressive.

The application judge dismissed the application.

On appeal, the majority upheld the application judge's decision, finding the by-law valid and reasonable.

However, Justice Weiler dissented, holding the by-law invalid because it effectively created permanent exclusive use common elements without amending the declaration, and unreasonable because there was no evidence supporting an increase from two to four parking spaces per unit and no practical alternative parking existed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

Police seized cash and drugs from multiple locations.

Before sentencing, the appellant obtained a court order releasing seized funds to pay legal fees.

The sentencing judge refused to order a fine in lieu of forfeiture, reasoning that the appellant had obtained no benefit from the funds other than exercising his constitutional right to counsel.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the sentencing judge erred in principle by refusing to order a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The court also upheld the forfeiture of the appellant's interest in a condominium unit used for drug trafficking.

The appellant was convicted of importing 15 kilograms of cocaine.

On appeal, he challenged the conviction on two grounds: first, that the trial judge failed to properly apply the third part of the W.(D.) analysis regarding the burden of proof; and second, that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons explaining how the Crown proved the appellant's knowledge of the cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt.

The majority dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's reasons could have been clearer, they were sufficient when read in context and demonstrated proper application of the legal principles.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the combination of the trial judge's misstatement of the onus of proof and failure to make explicit findings on the critical issue of knowledge to be fatal to the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and related firearms offences following his arrest on March 19, 2014.

He appealed on the grounds that his arrest was unlawful because it lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and that evidence seized incident to arrest should be excluded under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the arrest was lawful based on a reliable confidential informant's tip that was corroborated by independent police observation.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding misapprehension of evidence concerning the seizure of a cellular phone.

The appellant was convicted of importing 830 grams of cocaine dissolved in two bottles of ginger wine that she carried on a flight from Jamaica to Toronto.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his findings of fact and credibility assessments and gave unsupportable reasons for rejecting her evidence.

The appellant claimed she was an innocent dupe unaware of the cocaine in the bottles.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, made reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, and that the value and manner of the cocaine smuggling supported an inference that the appellant was a knowing participant rather than a blind courier.

The appellant appealed his sentence of twelve months plus three years probation for arson, seeking leave to appeal and challenging the custodial portion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the collateral immigration consequences of the sentence.

The appellant, a 19-year-old with special needs who was unaware of his non-citizen status at sentencing, would have been deported to a refugee camp in a country where he had no connection or supports.

The court imposed a fit sentence of six months less a day, which the appellant had already served.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering detention in hospital rather than conditional discharge for a person found not criminally responsible on a charge of arson.

The appellant argued the Board erred in failing to consider legal mechanisms under the Mental Health Act for managing her condition in the community.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order, finding the Board properly considered the appellant's history of decompensation episodes, medication non-compliance, homelessness, and the need for supervised accommodation to monitor medication compliance and manage public safety risks.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated November 29, 2016.

The appellant sought a hybrid order, but the Board imposed secure detention.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the Board acted reasonably in rejecting the hybrid order request based on evidence from the treatment team and the hospital that secure detention was the necessary and appropriate disposition.

The Board retained discretion to determine when the appellant would be ready for transfer to a less secure setting.

The appellant appealed from convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking in crystal methamphetamine and cocaine, possession of marihuana, and possession of proceeds of crime.

Drugs and cash were found in the appellant's apartment pursuant to a search warrant obtained in relation to alleged criminal activity by the appellant's former roommate.

The appellant claimed he did not know the drugs were in his apartment and that the cash came from legitimate sources.

The Court of Appeal rejected three grounds of appeal: that the trial judge erred in finding sufficient basis for the search warrant, that she erred in assessing the appellant's credibility, and that her reasons for conviction were insufficient.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of vacating the conviction for possession of marihuana, as the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to hear that count as a summary conviction offence.

A unionized Crown employee appealed the dismissal of his claim arising from his employment termination in 2014.

The employee pleaded conspiracy to injure, unlawful means conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, abuse of process, defamatory libel, and slander against the Crown and several Crown managers.

The motion judge dismissed the claim under Rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that the essential nature of the claim arose out of the collective agreement and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Grievance Settlement Board.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the legal test or characterization of the pleadings.

The appellants, operators of hookah lounges in Toronto, challenged the validity of City of Toronto By-Law 1331-2015, which prohibits the use of hookah devices in licensed premises.

The application judge upheld the by-law as a valid exercise of municipal authority to protect public health and safety.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: (1) that the by-law's true purpose was to prohibit hookah lounges rather than protect health; (2) that the by-law impermissibly infringed property and civil rights; and (3) that the by-law conflicted with the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the by-law's purpose was clearly the protection of public health and safety, that any economic impact was incidental rather than determinative of purpose, that the by-law was not confiscatory, and that it did not conflict with provincial occupational health and safety legislation.

The appellant Allto Construction Services Ltd. appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim for $163,202.98 owed under a subcontract to install a sewage system for a pool construction project.

The respondent Aplus General Contractor Inc. denied owing the amount and asserted a counterclaim for damages to an irrigation system and overbilling.

The trial judge dismissed both the claim and counterclaim, finding that Allto failed to prove the amount owed through invoices or accounting.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle.

The court held that Allto's oral evidence of non-payment, combined with Aplus's admission of the contract and performance of work without deficiencies, was sufficient to establish the outstanding claim without requiring further documentary proof.

The respondent's counterclaim for irrigation system damage was rejected as unreliable and unsupported.