Timothy E. Breen

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Kenneth Mark.

The Crown's theory was that the killing was retaliatory in nature, motivated by the victim's breach of the code of silence by identifying the appellant in connection with a prior attempted murder.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: (1) the admissibility of evidence regarding the prior attempted murder and the victim's fear of retaliation; (2) the admissibility of rap lyrics authored by the appellant; and (3) errors in the Crown's closing address regarding the appellant's late disclosure of an alibi and the false testimony of Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and affirmed the conviction.

A provincial offences appeal concerning the destruction of a boundary tree without the consent of the co-owner.

The appellant, a homeowner, obtained a municipal permit to remove a Norway maple tree on the property line between his residence and his neighbors' property, claiming it was hazardous.

He removed the tree without obtaining the neighbors' consent.

The trial justice found him guilty of violating section 10(3) of the Forestry Act.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the Forestry Act did not apply to joint owners of boundary trees and that he had a self-help remedy to abate a nuisance.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding that the appellant's conduct was manifestly unreasonable, particularly given the three-and-a-half-year delay between obtaining the permit and removing the tree, and his failure to seek consent or court authorization.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed by the trial judge, specifically challenging a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $20,000.

The respondent was convicted of producing and selling child pornography through a corporation he controlled, generating gross sales proceeds of $946,391.25, with agreed net proceeds of $797,809.47.

The trial judge calculated the fine based only on the respondent's salary attributable to child pornography production, rather than the full proceeds of crime.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in this calculation and that the full gross sales proceeds constituted proceeds of crime under the Criminal Code.

The court substituted a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $797,809.47, with eight years from expiry of the imprisonment sentence to pay, and a default sentence of four years consecutive imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from injuries sustained by his cellmate at a correctional facility.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's admission of expert evidence regarding footwear impressions on the victim's face, the jury charge regarding inconsistencies in the appellant's statements, and the trial judge's response to a jury question on reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for multiple sexual offences against his step-sister, who was significantly younger.

The trial judge found the appellant had been in a position of trust and had exploited the complainant's vulnerability.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) apprehension of bias based on the trial judge's interventions during trial, and (2) misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding the trial judge's interventions were appropriate and did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for shooting the victim through the heart in a bus shelter in broad daylight.

The appellant claimed self-defence under former s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, asserting that the victim had unlawfully assaulted him.

The jury rejected this claim and found him guilty.

The trial judge imposed a parole ineligibility period of 14 years.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds regarding the jury instructions on self-defence and challenged the parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal from conviction and the appeal from sentence, finding no error in principle or misdirection by the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a 14-year-old complainant.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of a witness regarding the complainant's post-offence conduct and failed to apply the rule against multiple convictions.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed that the sexual assault count should be stayed under the Kienapple principle.

However, the court dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding the trial judge adequately assessed the credibility of the witnesses and made no reversible error.

The duration of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act order was reduced from life to ten years.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault with a weapon following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, where an absolute discharge had been imposed.

The case largely turned on the credibility of the complainant, the sole witness.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence suggesting the complainant may have misled the court about whether he had read a letter from his son before providing it to the Crown.

The court admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably have been used to impeach the complainant’s credibility and might have created reasonable doubt.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The Court addressed whether Crown-requested police background checks of prospective jurors were permissible and what disclosure duties followed from that practice.

It held that limited criminal-record checks to assess juror eligibility are permissible, and that relevant information obtained for jury selection must be disclosed to the defence.

Applying the appellate non-disclosure framework, the Court found no reasonable possibility that disclosure failures changed jury composition.

The Court also held the impugned conduct did not meet the threshold for miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The applicant sought to quash a committal for trial on an allegation of attempting to obstruct justice arising from advice given to a prospective witness before a preliminary inquiry.

Applying the review standard on a motion to quash committal, the court held the Crown evidence lacked sufficient contextual completeness to support a reasonably available inference of specific intent to obstruct justice.

The court distinguished authorities where surrounding words and circumstances supplied interpretive reliability, and found the impugned fragmentary utterance equally consistent with lawful advice to use a proper name rather than a nickname.

Because the record did not provide evidence from which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, the committal order could not stand.