Christopher M. Speyer

The plaintiff, an elderly widow acting through her litigation guardian, sought to evict her son from her property so she could sell it to fund her long-term care.

The son claimed they had formed an oral contract in 2010 for him to purchase the property and counterclaimed for an interest in the land or unjust enrichment for renovations.

The court found no enforceable contract existed as essential terms were never agreed upon, and the son's actions did not constitute part performance under the Statute of Frauds.

The court also dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, finding the son's rent-free living offset any contributions.

The son was ordered to vacate the property.

The accused was tried for the second-degree murder of his mother.

The court previously found that the accused committed the act that caused her death.

The Crown sought to prove that the accused was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

Based on uncontested expert psychiatric evidence, the court found that the accused suffered from treatment-resistant schizophrenia and was experiencing Capgras delusions and command hallucinations at the time of the offence.

The court concluded that the accused was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his acts or knowing they were morally wrong, and found him not criminally responsible.

The accused was charged with the second-degree murder of his mother.

The Crown and defence agreed to proceed by way of admissions for much of the evidence.

The court first had to determine whether the accused committed the actus reus of the offence before considering a potential defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD).

Based on overwhelming forensic, DNA, and circumstantial evidence, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused unlawfully caused the death of the victim by inflicting multiple sharp force injuries.

The applicants, federal inmates, applied for habeas corpus seeking transfers to minimum-security institutions.

The respondent, the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to summarily dismiss the applications as frivolous, arguing that a refusal to transfer to a lower security classification does not constitute a deprivation of liberty.

The court dismissed the motion, noting that jurisprudence is divided on whether such a refusal amounts to a deprivation of liberty, and therefore the applications were not clearly frivolous or abusive on their face.

Following a judgment declaring a mortgage registered by the respondents to be fraudulent, the applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court applied the principle of reasonableness and considered an offer to settle made by the applicant.

Finding that the applicant obtained a judgment as favourable as the offer, the court awarded partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, fixing the total costs award at $20,000.

The applicant lender sought a declaration that a prior mortgage registered on the respondents' property was a fraudulent sham designed to defeat its security interest.

The respondent lawyer, who acted for both the borrowers and the applicant, registered multiple mortgages on the property, including one to a corporation controlled by his sister, without disclosing them to the applicant.

The court found the prior mortgage was a sham unsupported by any advancement of funds and ordered the land register rectified to delete the fraudulent charge under the Land Titles Act.

The appellant was convicted of multiple historical sexual offences and assault causing bodily harm against two of his daughters.

At trial, extensive evidence of the appellant's uncharged violent behaviour and strict discipline was admitted without objection.

The trial judge failed to provide a promised limiting instruction prohibiting propensity reasoning based on this bad character evidence.

Furthermore, the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that they could not use the evidence of one complainant to bolster or confirm the credibility of the other.

The Court of Appeal found these omissions constituted errors in law, allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for child luring involving prolonged sexually explicit internet communications with a 12-year-old victim, including inducement to create and transmit child pornography.

The court held the sentencing judge erred by discounting the impact on the victim and by failing to treat the production of child pornography and grooming conduct as significant aggravating factors.

Distinguishing prior authorities where conditional sentences were imposed in police sting operations, the court found denunciation and deterrence required incarceration in a case involving an actual child victim over many months.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, the appeal was allowed, and a custodial sentence of two years less a day was imposed.

The appellant was convicted of speeding and stunt driving after being clocked at 154 km/h by a police officer using a BEE III radar device from the shoulder of a highway.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the officer did not operate the radar device in accordance with the manufacturer's manual, which he claimed required the patrol vehicle to be in the same or adjacent lane as the target vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the appeal judge's interpretation that the manual allows the radar to monitor traffic moving in either direction across multiple lanes from a stationary roadside position.

The Court also declined to admit fresh evidence from the radar manufacturer, finding it unnecessary.

The Ontario Review Board granted the respondent an absolute discharge.

The hospital appealed, relying entirely on fresh evidence of the respondent's conduct following his release, which included resuming marijuana use, engaging in threatening behaviour, and facing new criminal charges.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it overwhelmingly demonstrated that the respondent remained a significant threat to public safety.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing before the Board was ordered.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to declare a mistrial after jurors observed him in the courthouse lobby.

He also appealed the sentence, arguing it violated the parity principle because two co-accused received conditional sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the mistrial application and concluding the sentence was appropriate given the appellant's major role in the smuggling enterprise compared to his co-accused.

The appellant was convicted of possession of MDMA for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to four years' imprisonment after police found nearly 100,000 Ecstasy tabs in his vehicle.

On appeal, he argued that his arrest, based on a confidential informant's tip, lacked reasonable and probable grounds, rendering the subsequent search unlawful under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the Debot factors, finding the tip compelling, the informant credible, and the information corroborated.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated November 21, 2014.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ordering the Board to conduct a new and expedited hearing within 60 days and make a new disposition order.

The interim disposition order dated March 30, 2015, remains in effect until the new order is made.

The appellant appealed a one-year sentence for possession of 97 grams of marijuana.

The Crown conceded the sentence was unfit as it was imposed due to a misapprehension of law that a mandatory minimum applied.

The Court of Appeal accepted a joint submission, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to 12 days imprisonment, equating to time served.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for assault, mischief, and failure to comply with an undertaking.

The charges arose from an altercation where the appellant evicted his teenage daughter, grabbed her, and threw her computer, as well as a subsequent breach of a no-contact order regarding another daughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the daughter was not a trespasser, the trial judge properly inferred damage to the computer, and the appellant could not use an unauthorized third party to communicate.

The 45-day sentence was upheld as reasonable.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible, appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board dismissing his Charter application.

He alleged that a delay in holding his annual disposition review hearing violated his rights under s. 7 of the Charter and sought costs, damages, and declaratory relief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the minor delay did not significantly deprive the appellant of his liberty or security of the person.

The Court also held that the Board does not have the jurisdiction to grant costs, damages, or declaratory relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter, and is not required to adopt an inquisitorial approach when hearing Charter applications.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

Following a deterioration in his mental state, he was readmitted to a secure forensic assessment unit.

The Ontario Review Board held a restriction of liberty hearing and found that his continued detention without usual privileges violated his s. 7 Charter rights, ordering the hospital to pay costs under s. 24(1).

The Court of Appeal allowed the hospital's appeal, holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the detention met the least onerous and least restrictive standard, and the Board lacked jurisdiction to award costs as a Charter remedy.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference in relation to his stepdaughter.

At trial, he testified and offered an innocent explanation for the touching, which he had not provided to police upon arrest.

Crown counsel cross-examined him extensively on his failure to provide this explanation earlier, suggesting he had a duty to do so and that his delay undermined his credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that while some cross-examination was justified because the appellant opened the door, the Crown exceeded permissible limits by violating his pre-trial right to silence.

The trial judge also failed to give a proper limiting instruction to the jury.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The young person appealed his manslaughter conviction arising from a group assault that resulted in the victim's death.

He argued his right to silence was violated when the Crown cross-examined him using information allegedly derived from his compelled testimony at the adult co-accuseds' preliminary hearing.

He also challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on duress and aiding and abetting, and the admission of the co-accuseds' guilty pleas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no violation of the right to silence, adequate jury instructions, and that any error regarding the guilty pleas caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant pled guilty to impaired driving causing death and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment and a ten-year driving prohibition.

He appealed only the length of the driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by adopting the Crown's recommendation for a ten-year prohibition without providing reasons or considering its appropriateness.

Given the appellant's youth, lack of prior record, deep remorse, rehabilitation efforts, and employment needs, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the driving prohibition to five years.