Barbara J. Walker-Renshaw

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court reviewed the request in writing.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The appellant, a 20-year-old diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding a doctor's finding that he was incapable of making treatment decisions regarding anti-psychotic medication.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the Board and the doctor applied the incorrect legal test by requiring the appellant to accept his diagnosis and have an actual appreciation of the consequences of treatment.

The court also found that the Board erred in considering the appellant's best interests and the impact of his refusal on his family, and made a palpable and overriding error by failing to make necessary inquiries to assess capacity.

The Board's decision was quashed, and the appellant's presumption of capacity was restored.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2008 for aggravated assault, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue her detention order.

She sought an absolute or conditional discharge, arguing the Board failed to adequately explain its finding that she remained a significant threat to public safety and neglected its inquisitorial duty to explore less restrictive dispositions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's reasons transparent and intelligible, and that it had no further inquisitorial duty given the record and the appellant's position that she did not want restrictions.

The appellant appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her involuntary admission and incapacity to consent to treatment for an eating disorder.

Following the hearing, the appellant was discharged, regained capacity, and her community treatment order was terminated.

The respondent moved to admit fresh evidence of these developments and argued the appeal was moot.

The Superior Court allowed the fresh evidence and dismissed the appeal as moot, finding no live controversy or special circumstances to justify hearing it.

In the alternative, the court held it would have dismissed the appeal on the merits, as the Board's decisions were reasonable and free of palpable and overriding error.

The applicant, acting as substitute decision-maker for his incapable elderly father, brought an application for judicial review challenging a hospital's COVID-19 visitor restriction policy and a related memorandum from the Chief Medical Officer of Health.

The applicant argued the restrictions violated his father's rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter by preventing in-person visits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that neither the hospital's policy nor the CMOH memorandum were subject to judicial review as they did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision with a sufficient public character.

Furthermore, the court held that even if reviewable, the policies did not infringe the Charter, as they were based on sound medical and epidemiological evidence rather than discriminatory presumptions, were not arbitrary or overbroad, and did not constitute state-imposed punishment or treatment.

The appellant, Anderson Tung, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found him incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medications due to his inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of his decision.

The Board's finding was based on evidence of his delusions and denial of mental illness.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, upholding the Board's decision under a reasonableness standard, finding sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the appellant lacked capacity to appreciate the consequences of his treatment decision.

The defendants in a medical malpractice and wrongful death action brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the Family Law Act claims of the deceased's partner, arguing he did not meet the definition of a spouse.

The defendants also moved to remove him as the litigation guardian for the deceased's minor grandchildren.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the partner's spousal status based on conflicting evidence.

The court also dismissed the motion to remove the litigation guardian, finding him qualified, indifferent to the outcome, and not adverse in interest to the minors.

An appeal of an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing a conditional discharge for an NCR accused.

The appellant argued that the Board's finding that he continued to pose a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable and sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board's risk assessment was unreasonable because it was based on speculative evidence regarding the likelihood of reoffending and failed to properly balance the seriousness of potential harm against the risk of that harm materializing.

The court emphasized that lack of insight alone is not a basis to deny an absolute discharge and that the contemplated harm fell towards the least serious end of the spectrum of serious criminal offences.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his treating physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment for schizoaffective disorder.

The appellant argued the Board's decision was unreasonable and raised procedural fairness issues regarding the hearing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant was unable to recognize the manifestations of his illness and could not apply relevant information to his own circumstances to weigh the risks and benefits of treatment.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board decision concerning whether the Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre was required to notify the Board of a significant increase in restrictions on the appellant's liberty when she was transferred from the Secure Forensic Rehabilitation Unit (FRU) to the Secure Forensic Assessment Unit (FAU).

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2004, had been abusing substances while on the FRU, leading to the transfer.

The Board was divided on whether notice was required under s. 672.56(2) of the Criminal Code, but unanimously concluded that the transfer constituted the least onerous and least restrictive measure available.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, establishing a framework for determining when notice of significant increases in restrictions on liberty is required.

Two appellants, both found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and incapable of consenting to medical treatment under provincial law, appealed detention orders imposed by the Ontario Review Board.

The central issue was whether an accused person incapable of consenting to medical treatment could nonetheless consent to a condition regarding psychiatric or other treatment under section 672.55(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the capacity required to consent to such a condition differs from the capacity required to consent to the treatment itself.

An accused need only understand information relevant to the operation of the condition and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of agreeing to it, including potential consequences for liberty.

The Court overruled its prior jurisprudence to the contrary and allowed the appeals, remitting the matters back to the Board for re-hearing.

The appellant, a 54-year-old man with schizophrenia and a history of violence and harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to order his continued detention at a forensic psychiatric facility rather than grant a conditional discharge.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible in 2008 and lived in the community until December 2015, when he decompensated after stopping his antipsychotic medication.

The Board found he posed a significant threat to public safety due to his lack of insight into his mental illness, likelihood of discontinuing medication if discharged, and history of assaultive behavior.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order, finding it was the least onerous and least restrictive alternative available.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering detention of a dual-status offender at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2010 for assault on a minor, was convicted in 2015 of assault causing bodily harm on a nurse at a secure forensic hospital and sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment and three years' probation.

The Board ordered the appellant serve the remainder of his sentence in a hospital at Waypoint.

The appellant challenged the disposition on multiple grounds, including failure to require testimony from the CECC psychiatrist, failure to require testimony from the Minister, failure to hold a review hearing as soon as practicable, presumption of illness rather than wellness, errors of fact, and failure to explain why detention at Waypoint was the least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition reasonable.

This costs endorsement followed a ruling on a status hearing where the plaintiffs' proposed timetable for the action was accepted, and the defendants' request for dismissal was denied.

The plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of $10,668.15.

The physician defendants argued for no costs, while the hospital defendants accepted the quantum but requested apportionment.

The court found the plaintiffs were the successful party on the status hearing and were entitled to costs.

The court deemed the claimed costs reasonable and apportioned them, with the hospital defendants paying $2,668.15 and the physician defendants paying $8,000.00.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to prevent the dismissal of their medical malpractice action for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court applied the two-fold test from *Kara v. Arnold*, requiring an acceptable explanation for delay and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The court found the plaintiffs provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, citing the complexity of medical malpractice actions, financial difficulties of the lead plaintiff, and some lack of cooperation from defendants in scheduling discoveries.

The court also found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants, as documents were exchanged and witnesses were available.

The motion was granted, and a timetable was set for the action to proceed.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's dismissal of his Charter application, in which he sought a recommendation that the Justice Minister award him $35 million in damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming its previous decision in Re Starz that the ORB has no jurisdiction to award or recommend damages.

The self-represented appellant, who is subject to the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board, brought a motion to review a single judge's order refusing his request to adjourn his appeal hearing.

The appellant argued the single judge misapprehended facts and considered irrelevant factors, and claimed he could not prepare his factum due to poisonous gas being injected into his condominium.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no basis to interfere with the single judge's decision.

The court noted the statutory obligation to hear such appeals as soon as practicable and that the appellant was not required to file a factum.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his treating physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant, who had previously been found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder, argued the Board unfairly characterized his evidence and erred in applying the capacity test by focusing on his disagreement with the schizophrenia diagnosis.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded the appellant lacked capacity because he was unable to recognize the possibility that he was affected by the manifestations of a mental illness, preventing him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decision.

AJ appealed a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board that found him incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The Board's decision was based on the two-part capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, as interpreted by Starson v. Swayze.

The court upheld the Board's finding, concluding that AJ, despite possessing cognitive ability, was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decision due to his persistent denial of any mental condition, which was deemed a symptom of his disorder.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Board's reasonable conclusion based on the evidence and the applicable standard of review.

The appellant appealed an order quashing his appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision that had found him incapable of consenting to treatment.

Before the initial appeal could be heard, the respondent determined the appellant had regained capacity, rendering the appeal moot.

The motion judge applied the Borowski test and declined to hear the moot appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion and concluding the case did not raise issues of public importance.