D’Arcy J. Hiltz

The appellant physician appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that rescinded the respondent's involuntary psychiatric admission.

The respondent had revoked his power of attorney while involuntarily detained, making his estranged wife his substitute decision maker instead of his mother.

The physician, believing the respondent lacked capacity to revoke the power of attorney, relied on the mother's consent to continue the detention.

The Board found it lacked jurisdiction to determine capacity to revoke a power of attorney and that the physician could not unilaterally disregard the revocation without a formal assessment under the Substitute Decisions Act.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was correct and that the physician should have sought the wife's consent or brought a Form G application if she refused.

This is a supplementary endorsement addressing Rocco Capano's appeal from two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board.

The Board had confirmed Dr. Geagea's finding that Capano was incapable with respect to antipsychotic medication and confirmed Capano's involuntary status.

The court dismissed the appeal regarding involuntary status as moot, given Capano's discharge from CAMH.

The appeal concerning incapacity for antipsychotic medication was also dismissed, as the Board's decision was found to be reasonable and fully supported by the evidence.

The Appellant, Rocco Capano, appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board that confirmed a Community Treatment Order (CTO) and a finding of incapacity regarding a Community Treatment Plan (CTP).

The Respondent, Dr. Justin Geagea, sought to uphold the decisions and dismiss the appeals as moot.

The court found that since Capano was no longer subject to the CTO or CTP, the tangible dispute had disappeared, rendering the issues academic.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeals, dismissing them.

Stephen Doherty appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment, specifically antipsychotic medication.

The court addressed the mootness doctrine, determining the appeal was not moot due to the potential impact on future substitute decision-making.

Applying a reasonableness standard to the Board's factual findings, the court upheld the Board's determination that Doherty lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decisions, despite some symptomatic improvement.

The appeal was dismissed.