D’Arcy J. Hiltz

The appellant physician appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that rescinded the respondent's involuntary psychiatric admission.

The respondent had revoked his power of attorney while involuntarily detained, making his estranged wife his substitute decision maker instead of his mother.

The physician, believing the respondent lacked capacity to revoke the power of attorney, relied on the mother's consent to continue the detention.

The Board found it lacked jurisdiction to determine capacity to revoke a power of attorney and that the physician could not unilaterally disregard the revocation without a formal assessment under the Substitute Decisions Act.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was correct and that the physician should have sought the wife's consent or brought a Form G application if she refused.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming she was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The appellant argued there was insufficient corroboration of the physician's evidence, an insufficient examination, and a failure to inform her of treatment consequences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded the appellant's own testimony and medical records corroborated the physician's diagnosis.

The court also held that the appellant's refusal to allow the physician to explain the treatment risks did not invalidate the finding of incapacity.

This is a supplementary endorsement addressing Rocco Capano's appeal from two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board.

The Board had confirmed Dr. Geagea's finding that Capano was incapable with respect to antipsychotic medication and confirmed Capano's involuntary status.

The court dismissed the appeal regarding involuntary status as moot, given Capano's discharge from CAMH.

The appeal concerning incapacity for antipsychotic medication was also dismissed, as the Board's decision was found to be reasonable and fully supported by the evidence.

The Appellant, Rocco Capano, appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board that confirmed a Community Treatment Order (CTO) and a finding of incapacity regarding a Community Treatment Plan (CTP).

The Respondent, Dr. Justin Geagea, sought to uphold the decisions and dismiss the appeals as moot.

The court found that since Capano was no longer subject to the CTO or CTP, the tangible dispute had disappeared, rendering the issues academic.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeals, dismissing them.

Stephen Doherty appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment, specifically antipsychotic medication.

The court addressed the mootness doctrine, determining the appeal was not moot due to the potential impact on future substitute decision-making.

Applying a reasonableness standard to the Board's factual findings, the court upheld the Board's determination that Doherty lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decisions, despite some symptomatic improvement.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The amicus curiae argued the appeal judge improperly considered the appellant's subsequent involuntary patient status, the Board's decision was unreasonable, and the appellant was denied a fair hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appeal judge only used the subsequent status as background, there was ample evidence of the appellant's inability to appreciate the consequences of his treatment decisions due to delusions, and any curtailment of cross-examination was on tangential matters.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her involuntary admission and finding her incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decisions on a standard of reasonableness.

The court found that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant met the criteria for involuntary admission under the Mental Health Act due to the risk of serious bodily harm to her mother.

The court also upheld the Board's finding that the appellant lacked the capacity to consent to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, as her delusions prevented her from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment for a schizoaffective disorder.

The appellant argued the Board's reasons were insufficient, unreasonable, and failed to properly consider his refusal of medication due to side effects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's chain of analysis clear, its decision reasonable, and noting the appellant's inability to recognize his illness rendered him incapable with respect to all proposed medication.