Thomas R. Lederer

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following an application to enforce two Letters of Request from a Florida court, directed at David Smith.

The underlying dispute involved allegations of a hate mail campaign orchestrated by Isaac Perlmutter against Harold Peerenboom, with David Smith allegedly involved.

All parties (Isaac and Laura Perlmutter, Harold Peerenboom, and David Smith) sought costs for the Canadian application.

The court found it impossible to meaningfully decide the issue of costs without knowing the ultimate results of the two related Florida actions, as the success or failure of the allegations would significantly impact the entitlement to costs.

Given the ongoing litigation and the direct interest of all parties in the outcome, the court ruled that each party should bear its own costs.

Mirza Baig appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding his involuntary patient status and incapacity to consent to antipsychotic treatment.

The court examined whether the Board erred in finding the statutory requirements for involuntary status under the Mental Health Act were met and if there was sufficient evidence for incapacity.

The court affirmed that "serious bodily harm" includes psychological harm and found corroborating evidence for the risk of harm to others.

It also upheld the Board's finding of incapacity, noting that the patient's delusional beliefs prevented him from appreciating treatment consequences, despite arguments regarding substance-induced psychosis.

The plaintiff, a receiver and manager of a limited partnership, brought a motion for summary judgment in an action against subscribers to recover alleged debts under "Assumption of Loan and Debt Agreements." The defendants opposed the motion and sought dismissal of the action.

The court found that these agreements were neither guarantees nor indemnities enforceable by the Limited Partnership, but rather primary obligations to the original creditor contingent on the success of the underlying transaction.

Furthermore, the court determined the action was statute-barred, as the limitation period for a claim for contribution and indemnity had expired, having commenced no later than when a Master refused to add the subscribers as defendants in a prior action.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a commercial bakery, sought damages for stock spoilage and business interruption following a power outage caused by an ice storm.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the policy's exclusions for loss or damage to electrical transmission or distribution lines not located on the premises applied.

The court found that the policy exclusions clearly precluded coverage for both stock spoilage and business interruption losses caused by damage to off-premises electrical transmission lines.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against the insurer.

The defendants brought two motions to amend their pleadings in an action for "section 8" damages under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.

The proposed amendments sought to introduce a defence based on the ex turpi causa doctrine, arguing that the plaintiff's alleged non-infringing alternative (NIA) would infringe a third-party patent, thus making hypothetical sales unlawful and precluding damages.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing the amendments were not tenable and would cause non-compensable prejudice.

The court, applying Rule 26.01, found the proposed amendments raised tenable legal arguments, distinguishing and interpreting relevant case law on NIAs and the ex turpi causa doctrine.

The court also found that any prejudice to the plaintiff could be compensated by costs or an adjournment.

The motions to amend the pleadings were granted.

This case involved two consolidated applications, which proceeded as a trial, concerning disputes over an automobile export business.

The applicants, Wangdah Material Toronto Ltd. and Qing Chen, sought damages for unpaid deposits and commissions related to vehicles purchased for export to China.

The respondent, 1691530 Ontario Ltd., counter-claimed for funds retained by Qing Chen from the unauthorized sale of two vehicles.

The court found that the business relationship was based on a series of individual and independent contracts, not an overarching agreement.

Qing Chen breached trust by selling the respondent's vehicles and retaining funds.

The court dismissed the applicants' claims for unpaid deposits and "Captain interest," finding no contractual obligation for the respondent to pay them.

Judgment was granted in favor of the respondent for $79,159.81, plus pre and post-judgment interest, and costs of $30,000.

The plaintiff, William Conners, was injured as a passenger in a car accident.

He initiated two actions: one against the driver, owner, and their insurer, Gore Mutual, and another against Unica Insurance, an insurer of a past employer.

Both Gore Mutual and Unica brought motions for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the actions against them.

Gore Mutual argued lack of coverage due to the driver operating the vehicle without the owner's consent.

Unica contended no coverage as Conners was no longer an employee for whom a vehicle was furnished.

The court dismissed both actions, finding that Conners was not an "insured person" under either policy based on the Insurance Act and relevant policy exclusions.

The plaintiff, a travel wholesaler, sought summary judgment against the defendant travel agency for unpaid airline tickets totaling $312,964.10, which were charged back after fraudulent credit card payments.

The defendant argued it was a "middleman" or agent of the plaintiff and not liable.

The court found a direct contractual relationship between the plaintiff as a wholesale seller and the defendant as its customer, making the defendant responsible for payment.

The court rejected the agency argument due to lack of evidence of consent, control, or authority to affect the principal's legal position.

Judgment was awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendants, Balance Residential Management Limited and Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation 2514, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss various claims made by the plaintiff, 1658410 Ontario Inc. (Advance Repairs & Maintenance), following the termination of a janitorial services agreement.

The plaintiff's claims included damages for lack of notice, unpaid invoices, interest, general damages for breach of contract, loss of business reputation, employee poaching, property damage, slander, and breach of a verbal contract for future services.

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff only on the claims for 30 days' notice, unpaid invoices, and associated interest, which the defendants conceded.

All other claims, including those for general damages, employee poaching, slander, and breach of a verbal contract for another condominium, were dismissed as not raising a genuine issue requiring a trial, often due to contractual liability limitations or insufficient evidence.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund (Fund) appealed an arbitrator's decision that allowed it to withdraw its acceptance of priority for accident benefits.

Echelon General Insurance Company (Echelon) had initially notified the Fund that a snowmobile involved in an accident was uninsured, leading the Fund to accept priority.

The Fund later discovered Echelon's policy actually covered the snowmobile and sought restitution.

The arbitrator found Echelon failed to conduct a reasonable investigation as required by O. Reg. 283/95, s. 3.1, making its notice to the Fund improper.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding that the Fund was not an "insurer" under the regulation and had specific, different treatment, including an exemption from the strict rules preventing withdrawal of priority acceptance.

The court affirmed that Echelon's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation meant no proper priority dispute was raised, and Echelon remained the priority insurer.

The plaintiff, Aon Benfield Canada ULC, sought an award of costs following a proceeding that involved an interim injunction, an interlocutory injunction, and a settlement of the action.

The defendant, Aamir Vazir, a former employee, had misappropriated highly sensitive proprietary software ("PathWise") and attempted to erase evidence.

The court granted the injunctions and the action settled, with costs being the only outstanding issue.

Aon Benfield sought $269,463.89 in costs, including significant disbursements for technical support.

Vazir opposed, arguing issues related to the plaintiff's conduct and the proportionality of the costs.

The court found the hours worked by the plaintiff's counsel not excessive given the case's importance and Vazir's egregious conduct.

However, to balance the indemnity principle with access to justice and avoid a "chilling effect," the court reduced the legal fees by $20,000, awarding Aon Benfield $249,463.89, payable within 90 days.

The plaintiff, Sirron Systems Inc., appealed a Master's order granting security for costs to the defendants, Scott, Pichelli & Easter Limited, Peter Pichelli, and Joel Easter.

The Master had ordered Sirron Systems Inc. to post $33,252.11.

The appeal challenged the Master's findings regarding the plaintiff's assets, impecuniosity, and the merits of the claim, arguing palpable and overriding errors.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's holistic assessment, particularly noting that the plaintiff did not allege impecuniosity before the Master and that the merits of the case were neutral.

The plaintiff, an accountant, claimed additional compensation for work performed on two land development projects for the defendants, arguing this work was outside his initial accounting retainer.

The defendants contended that the plaintiff's compensation already included this work.

The court found no explicit agreement for additional payment for the development work and awarded the plaintiff damages based on restitutionary quantum meruit, valuing his substantial and substantive involvement in the projects.

The plaintiffs, Suzanne and Joyce Powell, purchased a house that subsequently revealed significant water leakage and mould issues.

They sued the previous owner, Tadeusz Lojko (who settled), and their real estate agent, Barbara Kirby, and her brokerage, Royal Lepage Real Estate Services Ltd., for negligence and breach of professional duties.

The court found that the agent failed to adequately advise the plaintiffs regarding the risks of not obtaining an independent home inspection or reviewing the full seller-provided report, especially given the plaintiffs' financial vulnerability and the summary report's indications of potential issues.

However, the plaintiffs were also found partially responsible due to Suzanne Powell's strong determination to purchase the property.

The court apportioned liability: 25% to the agent and brokerage, 25% to the plaintiffs for their own loss, and the remaining 50% to the seller (Lojko) as per the Pieringer Agreement.

Damages for repairs and lost rent were assessed.

Katie Mohammed, a resident of Whitchurch-Stouffville, posted comments on social media expressing concern that an amendment to an agreement between the municipality and United Soils Management Ltd., allowing for the deposition of "acceptable fill" in a gravel pit near a water tower, could lead to groundwater contamination and harm children.

United Soils Management Ltd. sued her for defamation.

Mohammed brought a motion to dismiss the action under anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The court found that the plaintiff's action lacked substantial merit, that Mohammed had valid defenses (justification, fair comment, qualified privilege, responsible communication), and that the harm suffered by the plaintiff did not outweigh the public interest in protecting freedom of expression.

The court also found that the plaintiff brought the proceeding in bad faith and for an improper purpose, awarding Mohammed $7,500 in damages.

This endorsement addresses two motions to intervene in a land claim action brought by the Cree Nation of Eeyou Istchee against the Crown.

The Moose Cree First Nation sought to intervene as a necessary party, claiming exclusive Aboriginal title to a portion of the disputed lands.

The Nishnawbe Aski Nation (NAN), a political territorial organization representing 49 First Nations, sought to intervene as an added party, asserting a general interest in the interpretation and application of Treaty #9.

The court granted the Moose Cree First Nation status as a necessary party without conditions under Rule 5.03, acknowledging its direct territorial claim.

The Nishnawbe Aski Nation was granted status as a friend of the court under Rule 13.02, with specific limitations on its participation, as it lacked a direct or immediate interest in the substance of the claim independent of its members.

The court emphasized the complexity of multi-lateral disputes between First Nations in the context of reconciliation.

The plaintiff, United Soils Management Ltd., brought a motion for leave to examine the Mayor of Whitchurch-Stouffville as a non-party witness, pursuant to Rule 39.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

This motion arose within the context of the defendant, Katie Mohammed's, anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation claim under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court considered the plaintiff's diligence in bringing the motion and the discretionary nature of granting leave, noting the legislative intent for anti-SLAPP motions to be summary.

The court found the plaintiff's pattern of interlocutory motions, including this one, to be contrary to the summary nature of anti-SLAPP proceedings and dismissed the motion for leave to examine the Mayor.

The plaintiff, Joseph Nemeth, sought summary judgment in an employment termination case against Hatch Ltd. Nemeth argued that the termination clause in his employment contract was ambiguous and attempted to contract out of the Employment Standards Act, 2000, particularly regarding severance and benefits, thus entitling him to common law reasonable notice.

The court, following its prior decision in Cook v. Hatch Ltd., found the termination clause unambiguous and compliant with the Act, rejecting the argument that silence on severance and benefits constituted an attempt to contract out.

The court also distinguished Singh v. Qualified Metal Fabricators Ltd., which had found ambiguity in a similar clause.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and summary judgment was granted to the defendant, dismissing the action.

The plaintiffs, Harold Gerstel and 2102503 Ontario Inc., sought to remove arbitrators, set aside an arbitration agreement, and lift a stay of court proceedings in a business dispute that had been referred to a rabbinical court (Beis Din) for binding arbitration.

The plaintiffs alleged bias on the part of the arbitrators and unfair treatment, particularly regarding the production of financial records and communications between the arbitrators and the defendants.

The court dismissed the motions, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias or breach of equality and fairness, emphasizing judicial restraint in interfering with community-based arbitration processes, while affirming the court's residual jurisdiction to ensure fundamental principles are upheld.

The City of Toronto moved for summary judgment to dismiss an action brought by the plaintiffs for injuries sustained by Selome Aemoro Walelegne after tripping on a sidewalk discontinuity.

The court applied the Hyrniak v. Mauldin framework and found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The City met its minimum maintenance standards for patrolling and inspecting sidewalks under O. Reg. 612/06 and was protected by the statutory defences in the City of Toronto Act, 2006, as it took reasonable steps and could not reasonably have known about the specific defect.

Furthermore, the plaintiff was found to have contributed to her own injury by walking off the intended path.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action dismissed.