Steven Pickard

The plaintiff sought a declaration of beneficial ownership of residential property occupied rent-free for years, or alternatively damages, on the basis of proprietary estoppel arising from an alleged promise that the property would be left to her by will.

The court held that the evidence did not establish an unambiguous assurance intended to be taken seriously, and that any reliance on such an alleged promise was unreasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances, including later solicitor correspondence and trust documentation preserving the registered owner's control.

The court further found no detriment because the claimed repairs and improvements were ordinary incidents of occupation and were outweighed by the substantial benefit of rent-free residence.

The defendant's statutory counterclaim for wrongful registration of a certificate of pending litigation also failed because the claim to an interest in land was reasonably advanced and no actual damages were proven.

The action was dismissed, vacant possession was ordered within 90 days, and the CPL was discharged.

The Ontario Land Tribunal held a first Case Management Conference regarding an appeal by Indwell Community Homes against the City of Sarnia's refusal of a minor variance application for a 5-storey affordable housing apartment building.

The Tribunal granted party status to GA Farag Properties Ltd. and Richard Chumko, and participant status to numerous individuals and organizations.

A second Case Management Conference and a four-day merit hearing were scheduled.

The plaintiffs, a congregation that broke away from the British Methodist Episcopal Church ("BMEC") and a new incorporated church, brought a motion seeking an order conveying title to a historic 1866 church property — established by freed slaves who arrived via the Underground Railroad — to the trustees of the new church.

They also sought to add the Director of Titles as a party on the basis that the BMEC had filed a fraudulent Application to Change Name on the land titles register, and argued the BMEC's proprietary claim was statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court dismissed the motion to convey title, finding the plaintiffs failed to establish by evidence or legal principle that they were the present-day successors of the original Bethel Congregation trustees, and that the BMEC Act, 1913 conclusively vested the property in the BMEC.

The court further held that a vesting order application is not an action to "recover" land within the meaning of the Real Property Limitations Act, and that the BMEC's unregistered statutory interest was not extinguished.

The Application to Change Name was found not to be a fraudulent instrument but was ordered deleted from the register as made in error through an incorrect process.

Following a prior motion decision, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful moving party sought partial indemnity costs after prevailing on the motion.

The responding party argued that any costs should instead be borne by a third party municipality, alleging administrative error and a breached undertaking not to take a position on the motion.

The court found the municipality had merely consented to the motion and had filed no evidence or submissions beyond that consent.

As there was no pleading supporting liability against the municipality, the court ordered the unsuccessful responding party to pay partial indemnity costs to the moving party.

The defendant brought a motion to rectify the land registry record under section 159 of the Land Titles Act.

The parties are abutting landowners, and the defendant's property requires an easement over the plaintiff's land for access.

The Committee of Adjustment had previously granted a permanent easement as a condition of severing the land, but a temporary one-year easement was mistakenly registered on title following a private agreement between the parties.

The court held that the Certificate of Consent under the Planning Act does not immunize the resulting transfer from rectification where the registered instrument does not match the approved instrument.

The motion was granted, and the title was ordered rectified to reflect a permanent easement.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $7,700 to the responding party.

The moving party sought costs following an oral ruling that granted an adjournment to seek directions due to the responding party's lawyer's behaviour during an examination.

The court fixed costs at $11,242, including costs thrown away.

Finding that the lawyer's conduct—passing a note to his client during the examination and unilaterally taking a break for a full discussion—crossed the line, the court ordered the lawyer to personally pay 50% of the costs award.

The appellant, a coalition of landlords, appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a municipal residential rental licensing by-law enacted as a pilot project.

The appellant argued the by-law was arbitrary, enacted in bad faith, and ultra vires due to alleged violations of the Charter, the Residential Tenancies Act, and privacy legislation.

The Court of Appeal applied a deferential standard of review to municipal decisions and found the by-law was passed in good faith for valid health and safety purposes.

The court dismissed all constitutional and statutory challenges, concluding the by-law did not restrict marketing, permit unlawful entry, interfere with subletting, encroach on criminal law powers, or require disclosure of protected personal information.

The appellant, Essex Condominium Corporation No. 125 (ECC 125), appealed a partial summary judgment that dismissed its claim for unpaid common expense fees against the respondents based on a limitations defence.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by reversing the burden of proof on the issue of discoverability under the Limitations Act, incorrectly placing the onus on the plaintiff to disprove that its claim was statute-barred.

The Court clarified that the burden remains on the defendant to prove the claim was discoverable.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the summary judgment, and directing the claim for unpaid common expense fees to proceed to trial.

The appellants appealed the Committee of Adjustment's refusal of a minor variance to permit a detached accessory additional dwelling unit (ADU) in the front yard of their waterfront property.

The Tribunal found that the Zoning By-law did not explicitly prohibit front yard placement and that locating the ADU in the rear yard was impracticable due to a 100-year floodplain line.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal and authorized the variance, subject to a 9-metre setback condition, concluding that it met the four tests under section 45(1) of the Planning Act.

The defendants, Wildwood by the Lake Leaseholders Association and three individual board members, moved for summary dismissal of two actions brought by the plaintiff, a former board member.

The plaintiff alleged defamation arising from an investigation into her alteration of a job description document and subsequent reprimand.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motions, finding substantial factual disputes and witness credibility issues that require a trial.

The judge emphasized that the case was not suitable for summary judgment, particularly given the need for credibility assessments and the potential for the defence of qualified privilege to be defeated by malice or by exceeding the scope of the privilege.

The court also reiterated the Court of Appeal's caution against granting partial summary judgment.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Dubé J. dated October 11, 2023.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal with no order as to costs.

A case management conference was held regarding appeals of the Municipality of Chatham-Kent's Development Charges By-law No. 148-2022.

The Tribunal granted participant status to Kevin Owen, representing all participants.

The parties reported positive discussions to narrow the issues.

The Tribunal extended the deadline for submitting a draft Procedural Order and scheduled a seven-day video hearing for May 2024.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff condominium corporation's action, which included claims for unpaid common fees, an underfunded reserve fund, and breach of an oral contract regarding legal fees.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims for unpaid common fees (due to being statute-barred under the Limitations Act) and the oral contract for legal fees (finding no binding agreement due to lack of consensus and consideration).

However, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed for the claim regarding the underfunded reserve fund, as the court found a genuine issue requiring a trial and confirmed the condominium corporation's standing to pursue this claim on behalf of unit-owners.

The Tribunal convened a first Case Management Conference regarding appeals of the Municipality of Chatham-Kent's Development Charges By-law No. 148-2022.

The Tribunal deferred the granting of participant status to the next CMC to allow for coordination among the 25 requesters.

The Tribunal directed the parties to submit a revised draft Procedural Order and scheduled a second CMC to address participant status, the procedural order, and a scoped issues list.

The appellant, the Municipality of Chatham Kent, brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Aston J. dated November 14, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action arising from a $200,000 real estate investment.

The plaintiffs alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment regarding the calculation of profits and holdbacks from the sale of two properties.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the enforceability of the settlement releases, alleged misrepresentations of costs, and whether the claims were statute-barred.

This appeal concerned a dispute between a real estate developer (appellant) and a home builder (respondent) arising from an agreement for the sale of land.

The appellant sought interest on the unpaid purchase price, alleging the respondent breached provisions related to commencing construction and failing to close the transaction by a stipulated outside date.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's dismissal of both claims.

The court found no evidence to support the appellant's claim regarding permit availability for construction delays and determined that the appellant's own breach in installing sanitary sewers prevented it from relying on the respondent's alleged delay.

The claim for 12% interest for delayed closing was also rejected due to a lack of proof of damages and the appellant's prior breach.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a noting of default in a four-year-old mortgage action.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing the proposed defence lacked merit.

The court considered principles of proportionality and the preference for matters to be determined on their merits.

Given the plaintiff's significant delay in prosecuting the action after the defendant made a substantial payment, and the absence of demonstrated prejudice, the court granted the defendant's motion to set aside the noting of default, allowing the defendant to file a Statement of Defence.

The applicant appealed the Town of Amherstburg Committee of Adjustment's denial of a minor variance to permit a second driveway on a corner lot.

The Tribunal applied the four-part test under s. 45(1) of the Planning Act.

Preferring the evidence of the applicant's land use planner, the Tribunal found that the variance maintained the intent of the Official Plan and Zoning By-law, was minor, and was desirable for the appropriate development of the land.

The appeal was allowed in part, authorizing the variance subject to conditions limiting the driveway's width and requiring a turn-around.