Colin J. Bondy

A dispute arose between a seller of an endodontics practice and the proposed purchaser regarding the sale of the practice.

The parties executed a Letter of Intent that contained conditions precedent to closing, including the negotiation of a new lease on terms satisfactory to the purchaser and the purchaser's satisfaction with due diligence investigations.

The purchaser terminated the Letter of Intent after learning of key employee departures and difficulties in finalizing the lease agreement.

The seller alleged breach of good faith and honest performance.

The court found no breach, holding that the purchaser exercised his contractual discretion reasonably and in good faith, and was entitled to terminate the transaction when conditions precedent were not met.

The court considered whether to depart from the statutory prejudgment interest (PJI) rate under the Courts of Justice Act in favour of a higher rate, following a breach of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The plaintiff sought a higher PJI rate based on market returns and the circumstances of the case.

The court found that the statutory rate undercompensated the plaintiff and, after reviewing the relevant statutory factors and case law, exercised its discretion to award a higher average rate of 3.17%.

The court considered whether an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a residential property between Kevin Curridor and Millstone Homes Inc. was valid and enforceable, and determined the appropriate quantum of damages.

The APS was found to be valid and enforceable under the "indoor management rule" of the Business Corporations Act, as there was no evidence that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of any internal irregularities or fraud.

The court awarded damages based on the difference between the agreed purchase price and the market value, with certain deductions.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order lifting a stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and amending a default judgment to declare the debt non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) BIA, on the basis that it arose from misappropriation or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

The underlying action involved breach of statutory trust under the Construction Act for unpaid construction materials.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the refusal to admit extrinsic evidence contradicting deemed admissions from the default judgment, nor in considering the appellants' non-compliance with enforcement orders.

The court upheld the finding that the judgment debt arose from misappropriation or defalcation, emphasizing that the deemed admissions, including an award of punitive damages, demonstrated intentional wrongdoing and conduct markedly departing from ordinary standards of decent behaviour, satisfying the "moral turpitude or dishonesty" threshold for s. 178(1)(d) BIA.

The plaintiff brought a motion to declare that a default judgment debt owed by the defendant survived his assignment into bankruptcy pursuant to s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The underlying action involved a breach of trust under the Construction Act for failing to pay for construction materials.

The court held that the defendant's extrinsic evidence attempting to explain the breach of trust was inadmissible on a Rule 59.06(2) motion.

The court found that the deemed admissions from the default judgment established misappropriation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, and therefore the debt survived the bankruptcy.

This appeal concerned a dispute between a real estate developer (appellant) and a home builder (respondent) arising from an agreement for the sale of land.

The appellant sought interest on the unpaid purchase price, alleging the respondent breached provisions related to commencing construction and failing to close the transaction by a stipulated outside date.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's dismissal of both claims.

The court found no evidence to support the appellant's claim regarding permit availability for construction delays and determined that the appellant's own breach in installing sanitary sewers prevented it from relying on the respondent's alleged delay.

The claim for 12% interest for delayed closing was also rejected due to a lack of proof of damages and the appellant's prior breach.

The applicant municipality brought an application for an injunction to restrain the respondent from growing cannabis on his property in contravention of municipal by-laws.

The respondent brought a motion to stay the application, arguing that the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether his cannabis cultivation was a 'normal farm practice'.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the Board's jurisdiction is limited to issues of disturbance and does not extend to broad land-use planning and zoning by-law compliance, which form the core of the municipality's application.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the successful plaintiff sought costs of $11,000.

The Condominium defendants argued that costs should not be awarded due to pleading deficiencies or should be in the cause.

The court found that this case fell within the exceptional class of cases where costs in the cause is warranted, as the merits were yet to be adjudicated and the motion materials would be useful at trial.

Costs were ordered in the cause.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing and timetable, while the defendants brought a cross-motion to dismiss the 2013 action for delay.

The plaintiffs' former counsel, who were suspended by the Law Society, caused significant delay and misled the plaintiffs.

The court found the plaintiffs had an acceptable explanation for the delay.

However, the court found the defendants would suffer non-compensable prejudice because the plaintiffs' former counsel lost the majority of the relevant documents, making complete documentary disclosure impossible.

The action was dismissed for delay.

The landlord appealed a trial decision finding that the tenant properly terminated a residential lease and that the landlord was not entitled to charge administrative fees as part of common area and maintenance (CAM) expenses under a commercial lease.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the tenant provided notice in the manner required by the written terms of the lease, and that there was no express or implied term authorizing the landlord to unilaterally charge administrative fees.

The trial judge's interpretation of the lease was subject to deference and revealed no palpable and overriding error.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment granted by the motion judge in favour of the respondent.

The motion judge determined that the appellants' shareholder loan outstanding as of February 6, 2014 was $219,315 and that the outstanding balance at the time of the company's bankruptcy was at least $161,724.75.

The appellants argued that partial summary judgment was inappropriate and that the motion judge erred in making factual determinations without evidence rebutting their assertions regarding payments made on behalf of the bankrupt company.

The Court of Appeal upheld the partial summary judgment, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the matter was essentially an accounting exercise determinable on documentary evidence and that the appellants' evidence did not support their claims.

The plaintiff, acting under an assignment from a trustee in bankruptcy, brought a partial summary judgment motion against the defendants for amounts allegedly owing on a shareholder loan account to the bankrupt company.

The defendants argued the loan was offset by payments made to creditors and unpaid wages.

The court rejected most of the defendants' evidence as lacking documentary support and found that payments made after bankruptcy could not be credited.

The court granted partial summary judgment for $161,724.75, finding no genuine issue for trial on that amount, while leaving the remaining $57,590.25 for trial.

The Attorney General of Ontario applied for civil forfeiture of $18,550 CAD and $930 USD seized from the respondent during a traffic stop.

The respondent, who was driving his uncle's vehicle, was found in possession of a small amount of marijuana and a large quantity of bundled cash.

The court admitted the expert evidence of one police officer regarding drug trafficking indicia despite a missing Form 53 affidavit, but excluded another officer's evidence.

The court rejected the respondent's explanation that the cash was savings for a music business, finding the currency was likely the proceeds and instrument of drug trafficking.

The forfeiture application was granted, and the respondent was ordered to pay $2,000 in costs.