Owen D. Thomas

The Estate Trustees sought the court's advice and direction regarding the sale of a family cottage to pay estate debts, as two beneficiaries (also respondents) made a higher offer after an arm's length offer was accepted.

The court found the Estate Trustees acted in good faith and fairly, and directed them to accept the higher offer from the beneficiaries.

The court also declined to order a full accounting of the deceased's pre-death financial affairs.

This application concerned a dispute over the administration of an estate, specifically the sale of the deceased's home to one of the estate trustees and a $40,000 cheque cashed by another trustee after the deceased's death.

The court found that the trustees breached their fiduciary duties by selling the home below fair market value and that the $40,000 cheque was not a valid gift as it was cashed after the donor's death.

The court ordered the trustee who purchased the home to reimburse the estate for the undervaluation and the trustee who cashed the cheque to return the funds.

The court declined to remove the trustees or nullify the home sale.

The appellant appealed the removal of her notice of objection to a will's validity and a substantial indemnity costs award from the lower court.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant lacked standing to appeal the will's validity after withdrawing her objection and failing to provide supporting evidence.

However, the court found a palpable and overriding error in the application judge's costs award, as not all delays were solely attributable to the appellant.

The substantial indemnity costs were set aside and reduced to a partial indemnity amount.

This motion concerned an application for security for costs brought by the Estate Trustee against an appellant who had previously objected to the probate of a will and then withdrew her objection, but subsequently appealed the validity of the will.

The court found that the appeal appeared devoid of merit and vexatious, noting the appellant's lack of evidentiary support for her claims and her non-residency in Ontario with insufficient assets.

The motion for security for costs was granted, requiring the appellant to deposit $20,000, and costs of the motion were awarded to the Estate Trustee.

The court issued a costs endorsement following a settlement of a commercial lease dispute, which included an injunction and a dispute over additional rent.

The court awarded costs to Calibur Tool and Mold Inc. on a partial indemnity basis for the injunction application, finding it was a necessary step due to the respondents' improper actions in blocking access to the leased premises.

No costs were awarded to either party for the additional rent dispute, as the settlement reflected a mixed success and it was not possible to determine who fared better.

The respondent consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the order of Carey J. dated July 24, 2018 was made without jurisdiction, as an order under Rule 31.10 cannot be made without a proceeding having been undertaken in Ontario.

The order was set aside.

The respondent undertook not to enforce the order of Bondy J. dated July 17, 2018.

Costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment granted by the motion judge in favour of the respondent.

The motion judge determined that the appellants' shareholder loan outstanding as of February 6, 2014 was $219,315 and that the outstanding balance at the time of the company's bankruptcy was at least $161,724.75.

The appellants argued that partial summary judgment was inappropriate and that the motion judge erred in making factual determinations without evidence rebutting their assertions regarding payments made on behalf of the bankrupt company.

The Court of Appeal upheld the partial summary judgment, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the matter was essentially an accounting exercise determinable on documentary evidence and that the appellants' evidence did not support their claims.

A landlord leased land to a tenant for construction and operation of a driving range.

Upon the tenant's default in rent payments, the landlord terminated the lease and prevented the tenant from removing trade fixtures and chattels from the premises.

The tenant sued for damages for unlawful distraint and conversion.

The trial judge found the assets were trade fixtures and awarded compensatory and exemplary damages.

On appeal, the court upheld the finding of liability for conversion but set aside the exemplary damages award, finding it resulted in double recovery for the tenant.

The plaintiff, acting under an assignment from a trustee in bankruptcy, brought a partial summary judgment motion against the defendants for amounts allegedly owing on a shareholder loan account to the bankrupt company.

The defendants argued the loan was offset by payments made to creditors and unpaid wages.

The court rejected most of the defendants' evidence as lacking documentary support and found that payments made after bankruptcy could not be credited.

The court granted partial summary judgment for $161,724.75, finding no genuine issue for trial on that amount, while leaving the remaining $57,590.25 for trial.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a protracted action where the defendants were found to have improperly distrained and illegally used the plaintiffs' trade fixtures for eight years, resulting in an award of over $100,000 in damages and $80,000 in exemplary damages.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $95,000 for costs, plus HST and disbursements of $10,491.42, applying partial indemnity up to an August 11, 2015 offer and substantial indemnity thereafter, guided by the principle that costs awards should be fair and reasonable.

The plaintiffs operated a driving range on the defendants' golf course as tenants at will.

After a dispute, the defendants terminated the lease and prevented the plaintiffs from removing their equipment and structures, continuing to use them for eight years.

The court found the items were trade fixtures, which are exempt from distress when a lease is terminated.

The defendants were found liable for the tort of conversion and ordered to pay the market value of the fixtures plus exemplary damages for their continued use.

The defendant, Plasponics Inc., brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from Brampton to Windsor, Ontario, pursuant to Rule 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, Concept Plastics Ltd., opposed the transfer.

The court applied a holistic approach to the enumerated factors, requiring the moving party to demonstrate that the proposed venue was "significantly better" than the plaintiff's chosen venue.

The court found that the defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence, particularly regarding judicial resource availability in the receiving region, to establish that a transfer was desirable in the interests of justice.

The motion to transfer was dismissed.

Following dismissal of an estate-related claim by the applicant alleging undue influence over a will, the successful respondents sought approximately $92,000 in costs after a summary judgment motion.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including proportionality and the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

The court found the hours claimed by counsel were disproportionate to the relatively straightforward issues and modest value of the estate.

The court also considered the unsuccessful party’s limited financial circumstances as a relevant factor under rule 57.01.

Costs were reduced substantially and fixed at a modest amount inclusive of disbursements.

The respondents brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an application challenging a will on the basis of undue influence and seeking dependant’s relief under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The applicant alleged that the deceased had been improperly influenced by the sole beneficiary when executing the will and alternatively claimed he was a dependant entitled to support from the estate.

The court found the allegations of undue influence were unsupported and lacked corroboration as required under s. 13 of the Evidence Act.

The court further concluded there was no evidence the applicant was financially dependent on the deceased at the time of death or otherwise qualified as a dependant under s. 57 of the SLRA.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims.

Two applications were brought to determine the beneficiary of approximately $264,000 in segregated funds and a RIF annuity (the Disputed Funds) left by the deceased.

The deceased had designated a charitable foundation as the beneficiary of the funds, but later executed a will containing a general insurance clause leaving all insurance proceeds to her nephew.

The charitable foundation sought to rectify the will or interpret it to exclude the Disputed Funds, arguing the deceased intended the funds to go to charity.

The court held that the Disputed Funds were insurance policies governed by the Insurance Act, and the will's insurance clause effectively re-designated the beneficiary to the nephew.

Applying Robinson Estate v. Robinson, the court refused to admit third-party extrinsic evidence to contradict the clear language of the will, which the deceased had reviewed and approved.

Two applications were brought to determine the beneficiary of approximately $264,000 in segregated funds and a RIF annuity (the Disputed Funds) left by the deceased.

The deceased had designated a charitable foundation as the beneficiary of the funds, but later executed a will containing a general insurance clause leaving all insurance proceeds to her nephew.

The charitable foundation sought to rectify the will or interpret it to exclude the Disputed Funds, arguing the deceased intended the funds to go to charity.

The court held that the Disputed Funds were insurance policies governed by the Insurance Act, and the will's insurance clause effectively re-designated the beneficiary to the nephew.

Applying Robinson Estate v. Robinson, the court refused to admit third-party extrinsic evidence to contradict the clear language of the will, which the deceased had reviewed and approved.

Following dismissal of an application alleging that a municipality and its mayor and councillors conspired in bad faith to block a bridge expansion project through heritage and demolition control by-laws, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found the allegations of conspiracy, illegality, and bad faith against the municipal defendants to be entirely without merit and emphasized that unsubstantiated allegations of dishonesty justify elevated costs.

Applying the principles in s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded substantial full indemnity costs to the successful municipal respondents and individual councillors, subject to proportionality considerations reflecting differing levels of participation.

The court held that both the applicants and the Canadian Transit Company—though formally a respondent but aligned with the applicants—were jointly and severally responsible for the costs award.