Matthew Furrow

In an estates application, a sibling sought to pass over all named executors and appoint a neutral estate trustee due to prolonged, high-conflict litigation, deadlock, and allegations of re-litigation of previously determined matters.

The court held that although testamentary choice is to be respected, clear necessity existed because entrenched animosity and mistrust risked compromising proper administration of the estate.

The court found the majority-rule clause did not resolve repeated 2-2 deadlocks, and also found a genuine conflict concern arising from substantial unpaid costs awards to be offset against certain beneficiaries’ shares.

The court ordered all four siblings passed over and appointed a professional trustee without bond, directed that the trustee need not pursue already adjudicated litigation issues, declined to determine standing objections in a separate passing-of-accounts proceeding, and gave directions regarding implementation and holdback of costs awards.

Costs were reserved pending written submissions.

The respondent brought a motion to stay an application for dependent's support under the Succession Law Reform Act, arguing that the Ontario Superior Court lacks jurisdiction.

The applicants sought support from the estate of a deceased individual who was domiciled in Costa Rica at the time of death.

The court found that the deceased had established Costa Rica as his permanent domicile and that the presumptive connecting factors (existence of personal property and insurance trusts in Ontario) were insufficient to establish a real and substantial connection between the dispute and Ontario.

The application was permanently stayed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicants brought an unopposed application for a declaration that the deceased's will met the formalities of execution under s. 4(2) of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The witnesses had initialed or signed every page except the last page and did not sign the attestation clause.

The court held that initials suffice as a subscription and that the witnesses' subscriptions do not need to be placed at the end of the will.

The application was granted and the will was declared valid.

The applicant sought to validate his deceased mother's will under section 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The will, drafted by a lawyer, was improperly executed due to a missing witness signature by the lawyer, despite the deceased believing all formalities were met.

The respondent, the deceased's sister and co-beneficiary, did not oppose the application.

The court found the will clearly expressed the deceased's testamentary intentions and was authentic, representing a textbook case for the application of the new curative provision.

The court ordered the will to be valid and fully effective as if it had been properly executed.

The applicants brought an application to resolve issues regarding the administration of the deceased's estate, specifically whether certain inter vivos payments made by the deceased to her children and grandchildren should be treated as advances on their inheritances.

The respondents, acting as estate trustees, argued the payments were advances based on ademption by advancement or a resulting trust.

The court held that the doctrine of ademption by advancement likely no longer applies in Ontario and was inapplicable on the facts.

Furthermore, the presumption of a resulting trust was rebutted by evidence of the deceased's intentions.

The court also found that a loan made to one of the applicants had been fully repaid and was statute-barred.

The plaintiff moved to set aside the registrar’s automatic dismissal of an action alleging misappropriation of investment funds and to transfer the place of trial from Toronto to St. Catharines.

The dismissal was set aside on consent, as the motion had been brought before the dismissal order was issued and procedural steps had continued.

Applying Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court weighed convenience, trial scheduling, and access to justice considerations.

Despite several defendants and counsel being located in Toronto, the court found the plaintiff’s health issues and limited financial means were significant factors favouring transfer.

The action was therefore ordered transferred to St. Catharines in the Central South judicial district.

A public transit agency sought a declaration that a gas utility was contractually responsible for the cost of relocating pipelines where they crossed a rail corridor.

The pipelines had been installed pursuant to historical crossing agreements between the utility’s predecessor and a railway company, which were assigned to the transit agency when it purchased the rail corridor.

The utility argued the agreements did not apply where the pipelines ran along municipal road allowances and further contended the payment obligations were tied to federal railway regulation that did not apply to the transit agency.

The court held the crossing agreements were valid contractual obligations assigned to the transit agency and enforceable regardless of the regulatory status of the parties.

The utility was ordered to reimburse the transit agency for relocation costs exceeding $2.3 million plus interest.

Following an earlier endorsement enforcing a settlement agreement for the purchase of shares, the court addressed costs and pre‑judgment interest.

The successful moving parties sought partial indemnity costs and opposed the respondent’s request for pre‑judgment interest on the settlement amount.

The court held that the settlement concerned an exchange of money for shares rather than payment of a debt, and therefore the rationale for pre‑judgment interest did not apply.

Because both sides had retained the benefit of their respective property—funds on one side and shares on the other—no interest award was warranted.

Costs were awarded to the successful moving parties.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to enforce a settlement agreement reached in 2005 but never implemented.

The responding party, acting through a litigation guardian, argued the settlement should not be enforced because the party lacked mental capacity at the time and the agreement was unfair.

The court found insufficient evidence that the party was under a disability in 2005 and held that Rule 7.08 did not apply because no litigation guardian existed at the time of settlement.

The court also found no persuasive evidence that the settlement was substantively unfair, noting the involvement of legal and accounting advice during negotiations.

The settlement was enforced and an order issued implementing its terms.

Two applications were brought to determine the beneficiary of approximately $264,000 in segregated funds and a RIF annuity (the Disputed Funds) left by the deceased.

The deceased had designated a charitable foundation as the beneficiary of the funds, but later executed a will containing a general insurance clause leaving all insurance proceeds to her nephew.

The charitable foundation sought to rectify the will or interpret it to exclude the Disputed Funds, arguing the deceased intended the funds to go to charity.

The court held that the Disputed Funds were insurance policies governed by the Insurance Act, and the will's insurance clause effectively re-designated the beneficiary to the nephew.

Applying Robinson Estate v. Robinson, the court refused to admit third-party extrinsic evidence to contradict the clear language of the will, which the deceased had reviewed and approved.

Two applications were brought to determine the beneficiary of approximately $264,000 in segregated funds and a RIF annuity (the Disputed Funds) left by the deceased.

The deceased had designated a charitable foundation as the beneficiary of the funds, but later executed a will containing a general insurance clause leaving all insurance proceeds to her nephew.

The charitable foundation sought to rectify the will or interpret it to exclude the Disputed Funds, arguing the deceased intended the funds to go to charity.

The court held that the Disputed Funds were insurance policies governed by the Insurance Act, and the will's insurance clause effectively re-designated the beneficiary to the nephew.

Applying Robinson Estate v. Robinson, the court refused to admit third-party extrinsic evidence to contradict the clear language of the will, which the deceased had reviewed and approved.