Meghan A. Cowan

The applicants sought judicial review of a municipal council's decision not to change the name of a private road named 'Swastika Trail'.

The applicants argued that the council unlawfully sub-delegated its decision-making power and fettered its discretion by relying on a vote held by a local cottagers' association.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the council retained its decision-making authority, considered multiple factors beyond the association's vote, and did not unlawfully sub-delegate or fetter its discretion.

The court also noted that it lacked jurisdiction to review the reasonableness of the council's decision under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The plaintiff, an employment staffing agency, sought an interlocutory injunction against a former Director of Branch Operations and his new employer for alleged breaches of non-solicitation and confidentiality covenants.

The court found the Proprietary Information, Developments Non-Competition and Non-Solicitation Agreement to be valid and binding, rejecting the argument of lack of fresh consideration as the agreement was a condition of employment and presented on the first day.

A strong prima facie case was established for the former employee's solicitation of a major client (Cisco) and misuse of proprietary information (knowledge of a former colleague's value to Cisco).

However, no strong prima facie case was found for solicitation of another client (Bank of Montréal) or employee inducement.

The court determined that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm from loss of goodwill and market share, which would be difficult to quantify in damages.

The balance of convenience favored granting the injunction.

The respondent was found in civil contempt for continuing to operate a parking lot in contravention of a zoning by-law and a court injunction.

The contempt was subsequently purged when the parking lot was shut down.

The court accepted a joint submission from the parties and ordered the respondent to pay a $25,000 fine, which removed any profit gained from the contemptuous operation of the lot.

The appellant operated a commercial parking lot that was not in compliance with the applicable Zoning By-Law.

The appellant sought to establish that the property constituted a legal non-conforming use by demonstrating continuous operation of a commercial parking lot since the By-Law's passage in 1993.

The application judge found that the lot had been used as an accessory lot rather than a stand-alone commercial parking lot from 1993 through 1996, and therefore fell out of compliance when its use changed.

The application judge granted declaratory relief and an injunction restraining operation of the parking lot.

On appeal, the appellant failed to establish a palpable and overriding error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The Applicants sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully obtaining a statutory injunction and declaratory relief against the Respondent for contravening a municipal zoning by-law.

The court denied substantial indemnity costs, finding the Respondent's conduct did not meet the "reprehensible" or "egregious" threshold required for such an award.

The court also rejected the argument that the public interest nature of by-law enforcement warranted higher costs.

Instead, the court awarded partial indemnity costs, fixing fees and disbursements based on the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, considering the complexity and importance of the matter.

The applicants sought a statutory injunction under section 380 of the City of Toronto Act to restrain the respondent from operating a commercial parking lot in contravention of a zoning by-law.

The respondent conceded the non-compliance but argued the parking lot was a legal non-conforming use.

The court found the applicants had standing as taxpayers and established a clear breach of the by-law.

The respondent failed to prove continuous use as a commercial parking lot since the by-law's passage, as the property was previously used as an accessory lot.

Finding no exceptional circumstances, the court granted the statutory injunction and related declaratory relief.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to quash a municipal bylaw designating their property as a heritage building.

The appellants argued the bylaw was void ab initio due to a defect in the notice of intention to designate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the application, brought under s. 273 of the Municipal Act, 2001, was barred by the one-year limitation period in s. 273(5), as the appellants had actual notice of the designation years before commencing the proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a convenience store clerk, sold cigarettes to a 17-year-old test shopper after misreading the birth year on the shopper's identification due to 'human error'.

She was convicted of selling tobacco to a minor under the Smoke-Free Ontario Act, but the summary conviction appeal court overturned the conviction, finding her honest mistake satisfied the statutory defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the statutory due diligence defence requires a reasonable belief formed after exercising reasonable care in reviewing the identification, which a mere unexplained human error does not satisfy.

Metrolinx purchased a railway corridor from CN and requested that Enbridge relocate six gas pipelines crossing under the railway.

A dispute arose over who should bear the relocation costs.

The application judge found that under the historical agreements, Enbridge was responsible for the costs, and that CN had assigned these rights to Metrolinx.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Enbridge's appeal, holding that the application judge made no palpable and overriding error in interpreting the complex commercial agreements.

A public transit agency sought a declaration that a gas utility was contractually responsible for the cost of relocating pipelines where they crossed a rail corridor.

The pipelines had been installed pursuant to historical crossing agreements between the utility’s predecessor and a railway company, which were assigned to the transit agency when it purchased the rail corridor.

The utility argued the agreements did not apply where the pipelines ran along municipal road allowances and further contended the payment obligations were tied to federal railway regulation that did not apply to the transit agency.

The court held the crossing agreements were valid contractual obligations assigned to the transit agency and enforceable regardless of the regulatory status of the parties.

The utility was ordered to reimburse the transit agency for relocation costs exceeding $2.3 million plus interest.