Martha A. Cook

The plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action brought a motion seeking court-ordered finalization of a discovery plan after the parties failed to agree.

The court reviewed the history of the parties' negotiations and the general principles applicable to discovery plans under Rule 29.1.

The court finalized the discovery plan, incorporating specific reservations from the defendant regarding the scope of documentary discovery, and set deadlines for productions and oral examinations.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the plaintiff.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants were substantially successful on the quantum of damages.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The court fixed costs at $27,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be paid by the respondent to the appellants, emphasizing that the amount should be fair and reasonable rather than an exact measure of actual costs.

This is a second appeal concerning the assessment of damages in a dispute between pig farmers (appellants) and a supplier (respondent) over the delivery of diseased animals.

The appellants argued for a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and errors in the damages assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the bias claim and the arguments regarding the date of damages assessment and the consideration of hindsight evidence.

However, the Court found that the trial judge erred in calculating lost profits for a specific period by misapprehending an expert report, leading to an incorrect deduction.

The appeal was allowed in part, correcting the damages award in favour of the appellants.

This appeal arose from a decision granting partial summary judgment in a construction lien dispute.

The appellants (Larson Properties Partnership Group and Kevin Gary Larson) challenged the motion judge's finding of no genuine issue requiring a trial and the appropriateness of partial summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the determination that a genuine issue did not exist and that the partial summary judgment was appropriate given subsequent resolutions of other aspects of the litigation.

The appeal was dismissed.

Libro Credit Union Limited appealed a motion judge's order that dismissed its motion for a declaration of priority over funds held by the Sheriff in garnishment proceedings.

The motion judge had incorrectly concluded that a prior order by Gorman J. had determined the priority issue, thus deeming the appellant's motion a collateral attack.

The Court of Appeal found that Gorman J. had not made such a determination and explicitly left the priority dispute open.

The appeal was allowed, the motion judge's order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a hearing on the merits of the priority dispute.

The applicant sought partition and sale of a jointly owned property and equal division of net proceeds.

The respondent counterclaimed for transfer of the property into her name alone based on unjust enrichment and constructive/resulting trust, citing her significant financial contributions to renovations.

The court found no unjust enrichment regarding the property, as the applicant's equity did not increase, and the parties' reasonable expectation was 50/50 ownership.

However, the court found unjust enrichment regarding a Harley-Davidson motorcycle, ordering the applicant to pay the respondent 85% of its separation value.

The court ordered the property to be sold with net proceeds divided equally, subject to an adjustment payment from the applicant to the respondent for the motorcycle and shared debts.

The applicant sought declarations of her mother's incapacity to manage property, personal care, and instruct counsel, and an order for a new capacity assessment, as well as removal of her mother's s. 3 counsel.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding that previous assessments of incapacity for property and personal care were sufficient and that a further assessment for capacity to instruct counsel was unnecessary and intrusive.

The court affirmed the role of s. 3 counsel and the principle that counsel determines their client's capacity to instruct, absent strong evidence to the contrary.