Other Tribunals

An applicant sought an order permitting him to obtain a transcript of proceedings in a pre-enquete hearing.

The Crown argued that jurisdiction to review pre-enquete proceedings rests solely with the Superior Court of Justice.

The court found that it retained jurisdiction to hear the application but determined that the application should be brought before the Justice of the Peace who presided over the original hearing, as she is best situated to determine the merits and exercise control over her court's process and any restrictions on use of the transcript.

This endorsement addresses multiple cross-motions following a prior order by Price J. The respondent sought a contempt order against the applicant for failing to sell her interest in the matrimonial home.

The applicant sought a stay of the sale provision, lifting of a stay on equalization payment enforcement, dismissal of the respondent's Small Claims Court action, directions on communication, permission for email service, and a restriction on the respondent initiating further proceedings.

The court dismissed the contempt motion, granted the stay of the sale provision, and granted the communication and email service requests.

It dismissed the request to lift the stay on equalization payment and to dismiss the Small Claims Court action due to lack of jurisdiction.

The request to restrict further proceedings was also dismissed.

The issue of household contents was referred back to Price J.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order making permanent a temporary sealing order relating to psychometric testing documents that had been marked as exhibits during a 2012 personal injury trial.

The respondents sought to make the temporary sealing order permanent to protect the integrity of test procedures and materials.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in two respects: first, by attempting to seal documents that were no longer in the court's possession as of December 2017, and second, by failing to properly apply the Sierra Club/Dagenais/Mentuk test for confidentiality orders.

The court emphasized that the motion judge should have examined the specific documents and considered whether they were already in the public domain through trial evidence and reasons, and should have weighed the public interest in access to materials facilitating cross-examination of expert witnesses.

The appellant appealed her conviction under the Building Code Act and sought to have her husband Denis Van Decker appear as her agent on appeal.

The trial Justice of the Peace had barred Van Decker from appearing as agent during the trial due to disruptive conduct and contempt of court.

The appeal court upheld the bar, finding that Van Decker was incompetent to represent the appellant and that his disruptive behavior over three days of trial warranted the exclusion.

The court noted that the appellant was capable of self-representation and that Van Decker had demonstrated a pattern of disruption across multiple proceedings.

The corporate appellants moved to have their appeal restored to the hearing list and heard on the merits together with Sonia LaFontaine's appeal.

The appellants' appeal had been "unperfected" by court staff when non-lawyer representation was refused, despite the appeal having been previously perfected.

The motion judge found that the unperfecting lacked clear authority and that it would be more efficient and just to restore the corporate appellants' appeal and hear it together with LaFontaine's appeal.

The motion was granted with costs awarded to the corporate appellants.

The appellants sought a stay of a writ of seizure and sale pending an appeal of a vexatious litigants order, along with requests for six months to arrange financing and to lift a Certificate of Pending Litigation.

The appellants were self-represented and had previously had their pleadings struck for non-compliance with court orders.

The court identified three procedural problems: the appellants lacked leave from a Superior Court judge to bring the motion, no appeal had been brought from the underlying costs order, and the appellants had not sought leave to appeal a default judgment of which they were unaware.

The court granted a limited stay of execution of the writ of seizure and sale until thirty days after the appeal of the vexatious litigants order was heard, and encouraged the appellants to retain legal counsel or seek pro bono assistance.

The court addressed an ex parte communication from an unrepresented accused who objected to the pre-trial process and requested a further judicial pre-trial meeting.

The accused had failed to attend the Trial Co-ordinator's office following a judicial pre-trial conference and subsequently sent an unsigned letter to the court raising procedural objections.

The court rejected the accused's objections, finding the pre-trial process was properly conducted and that trial dates could be set.

The court reminded the accused that ex parte communications with the judge are prohibited and that all future communications must occur in open court on the record.

The appellants brought a motion seeking to appoint the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee as litigation guardian for one appellant, to require a mental examination, to remove counsel, to extend time to perfect the appeal, and to seal evidence concerning mental health.

The motion judge addressed the sealing and confidentiality issues under the two-part test from Sierra Club v. Canada (Minister of Finance).

The court ordered redaction of solicitor-client communications and certain historical medical information as reasonable alternatives to confidentiality orders.

However, the court declined to grant a confidentiality order for current observations of the appellant's mental state, finding insufficient evidence of necessity under the Sierra Club test.

References to a non-party's health information were also redacted as unnecessary and irrelevant.

The appellant, a self-represented litigant with extensive litigation experience, sought to review a decision by Justice Nordheimer declining to set aside the Registrar's order dismissing his appeals for failure to perfect.

The appellant had filed seven appeals in response to a single order and failed to provide adequate reasons for the delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to review, finding no error in Nordheimer J.A.'s discretionary decision.

The court also denied the appellant's last-minute request for an adjournment based on medical grounds and Charter arguments.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant sought a review of a decision by Justice MacPherson denying an extension of bail.

The appellant moved for appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code and for an adjournment of the review, citing medical evidence of unfitness to self-represent.

The court found the review moot because the appellant had been released from custody by the Vanier Institute.

The court dismissed the application and imposed restrictions on the appellant's ability to bring further motions without written permission, finding her conduct vexatious and an excessive drain on judicial resources.

The respondent father repeatedly filed motions seeking to challenge final court decisions regarding crown wardship of two children.

After his initial status review application regarding one child was dismissed and his motion for leave to bring a status review application regarding the second child was denied, the father filed numerous repetitive motions attempting to circumvent the court's decisions and statutory time limits.

The court found this conduct constituted an abuse of process and issued orders prohibiting the father from filing further motions or applications regarding either child until the expiration of the six-month statutory period prescribed by the Child and Family Services Act.

The appellants sought extension of time to appeal provincial offence convictions for a parking violation and a red light infraction.

This was the fourth application for extension of time.

The appellants had repeatedly failed to appear at trial dates, appeal dates, and subsequent proceedings.

Previous applications had been dismissed as abandoned, and a prior judge had ordered that no further applications be filed without judicial leave.

The appellants did not comply with this order.

The court found the repeated filings to be frivolous and an abuse of process, and dismissed both applications with an order prohibiting further applications without prior written leave from a judge.

The accused pleaded guilty to theft under $5000 and failing to comply with a probation order, receiving a suspended sentence and probation.

The court issued a ruling on the use of restraints in the courtroom, addressing the practice of keeping all in-custody accused in handcuffs.

The judge ordered the removal of handcuffs and clarified that there is a presumption that accused persons should appear in court unrestrained unless the Crown establishes reasonable grounds for their use.

The Crown brought an ex parte, in camera application mid-trial seeking an order to exclude the public from the courtroom pursuant to section 486 of the Criminal Code due to an alleged security breach.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear an ex parte application during trial and concluded that such hearings are permissible in certain circumstances where they do not prejudice the accused's ability to defend himself or have knowledge of matters affecting his vital interests.

The court found that the application concerned court security rather than the substantive trial and therefore proceeded ex parte.

Evidence of a security breach was accepted, and an order excluding members of the public from the courtroom was granted, with specified exceptions for accredited press, court staff, Law Society members, and other designated persons.

The accused was charged with two driving-related offences and required a Korean interpreter.

The defence challenged the competency of the proposed interpreter, Mr. Hu-Kal Kim, who held only conditional accreditation, having failed to achieve the passing grade of 70% on two of three accreditation tests.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the interpreter was competent to provide forensic interpretation services.

The court applied the five-part test from R. v. Tran and found that despite partial accreditation, the interpreter possessed sufficient competency based on his extensive experience in forensic interpretation since 1981, prior successful qualification voir dires, and specific expertise in drinking and driving trials.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether Ms. Kathleen Hao, a conditionally accredited Tagalog interpreter, was qualified to provide interpretation assistance for the defendant's trial on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Crown sought to qualify Ms. Hao for simultaneous interpretation, alternatively for consecutive interpretation.

The defence opposed qualification on both grounds, arguing that her conditional accreditation status and occasional use of English words rendered her unqualified.

The court found Ms. Hao not qualified for simultaneous interpretation but qualified for consecutive interpretation, based on her passing score in consecutive interpretation on the MAG test, combined with her background, training, and courtroom experience.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 and required a Tigrigna interpreter for trial.

A voir dire was held to determine whether a conditionally accredited interpreter was qualified to provide interpretation services.

The court found that the interpreter, despite being bilingual and having seven years of court experience, was not qualified to interpret for the trial based on his performance on the Ministry of the Attorney General's accreditation test.

The court emphasized that bilingualism alone does not equate to interpretation competence and that objectively valid skills testing is the most reliable way to assess interpreter qualifications for complex trials.

A voir dire was held to determine whether Edward Liu, a conditionally accredited Mandarin interpreter, was qualified to interpret for two Mandarin-speaking complainant witnesses at a preliminary hearing.

The Crown sought to have Liu qualified despite his conditional accreditation status from the Ministry of the Attorney General.

The defence opposed qualification, arguing that conditionally accredited interpreters should only be used for less complex proceedings.

The court found Liu competent and capable of interpreting and qualified him to serve as interpreter at the preliminary hearing.