Catherine Bickley

The applicant employer sought to revoke a Review Officer's Order that reinstated the respondent employee and compensated her for lost wages.

The respondent alleged that her hours were reduced and her employment subsequently terminated as a reprisal for receiving pay equity downpayments, contrary to section 9(2) of the Pay Equity Act.

The Pay Equity Hearing Tribunal found that the employer failed to discharge its burden of proving that its decisions were not tainted by anti-pay equity animus, given the negative comments and actions of the Executive Director and Board President regarding pay equity.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent reinstated to her full-time position with compensation for lost wages and interest.

The Applicant challenged a Review Officer's Order requiring it to include the job class of 'Provider' in its pay equity plan.

In this preliminary decision, the Tribunal determined the dates and location of the hearing, granted party status to two non-complainant Providers, and ruled that the relevant date for determining whether Providers are a job class of employees is January 1, 1988.

The Tribunal also ordered the disclosure of various documents, including tax returns, contracts, and attendance registers.

The applicant City moved to strike out the relief sought by the respondent in her response to the City's application to revoke a Review Officer's order.

The respondent sought to have her positions evaluated at a higher band than ordered by the Review Officer, along with additional compensation.

The Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal held that a response is not the appropriate pleading to seek independent relief or a variation of the Review Officer's order.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to file a separate application if she wished to pursue the additional relief, which would then be consolidated with the City's application.

The applicants and the respondent advised the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal that the matters had been settled and requested an adjournment sine die.

The Tribunal granted the request on consent, adjourning the matters sine die and noting they would be terminated in one year unless brought on for hearing.

The applicant groups of employees and the respondent Crown reached a settlement regarding pay equity complaints.

The parties jointly requested an adjournment of the proceedings.

The Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal adjourned the matters sine die on consent, noting they would be terminated in one year unless brought on for hearing.

The complainant, a single mother receiving social assistance, alleged that the respondent landlord discriminated against her by refusing her rental application because she was on welfare.

The respondent claimed the application was incomplete because it lacked a start date.

The Board of Inquiry accepted the complainant's evidence, finding that the respondent explicitly stated he would not rent to someone on mothers' allowance.

The Board concluded that the respondent violated section 2(1) of the Human Rights Code and ordered him to pay $2,000 in general damages and implement a non-discrimination policy.

The respondents brought preliminary motions to dismiss four human rights complaints alleging discrimination in tenancy based on the requirement to pay 'key money'.

The respondents argued the complaints should be dismissed due to unreasonable delay, failure to disclose allegations, prior rent review proceedings, and lack of corporate liability.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the complaint against one individual respondent for lack of evidence but rejected the other motions.

The Board found the delay did not cause serious prejudice, the disclosure was sufficient, the rent review proceedings did not address discrimination, and the corporate respondent could be liable for its employee's actions.

The Board also declined to separate the complaints or exclude similar fact evidence at the preliminary stage.

The complainant, a registered nurse, was denied family benefits for her same-sex conjugal partner under her employer's group benefit plan.

The Board of Inquiry found that the denial of benefits to same-sex couples constituted discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to the Human Rights Code.

The Board held that the exemption in section 25(2) of the Code for benefit plans discriminating on the basis of marital status did not apply to discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The respondent was ordered to pay $4,000 in compensation for loss of dignity and to amend its benefit plans to provide coverage for same-sex couples.

Three employees filed human rights complaints alleging sexual harassment by the new general manager of a hotel.

The Board of Inquiry banned the publication of the complainants' names to protect their privacy.

The Board dismissed the complaints of two employees, finding that while the manager's sexual stories and comments were inappropriate, they did not meet the threshold for sexual harassment.

However, the Board upheld the complaint of the third employee, finding that the manager's persistent and untrue statements about her sexual activities created a poisoned work environment.

The corporate respondent was held vicariously liable as the manager was a directing mind.

The successful complainant was awarded $4,500 for lost wages and $2,000 in general damages.

The respondents, the Ontario Hospital Association and Gord Cunningham, brought a preliminary motion to dismiss the human rights complaint against them, arguing that the agreed statement of facts showed they did not administer the employee benefits plan at issue.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission argued it was premature to dismiss the complaint before hearing evidence.

The Board of Inquiry declined to dismiss the complaint, noting that the Commission might have other evidence implicating the respondents.

However, the Board found it would be an abuse of process to proceed without the respondents knowing the case against them, and ordered the Commission to provide appropriate disclosure within thirty days.

The complainant, a group insurance underwriter, alleged that she was denied permanent employment and subsequently discharged because of her sexual orientation.

The Board of Inquiry found that while the initial delay in offering full-time employment could not be directly attributed to the respondents due to the death of the responsible manager, the decision to terminate her employment was tainted by discrimination.

Although the employer's requirement to transfer the complainant's partner to avoid a conflict of interest was reasonable, the precipitous withdrawal of the job offer and immediate discharge were influenced by the complainant's open homosexuality and the homophobic attitudes of senior management.

The respondents were ordered to pay special and general damages.

The respondents brought a motion for costs under s. 41(4) of the Human Rights Code after the complainant's sexual harassment complaint was dismissed due to her failure to testify.

The respondents argued the complaint was trivial, vexatious, made in bad faith, and caused undue hardship.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding that the complaint was not trivial or vexatious, the related criminal acquittal did not establish bad faith, and the respondents failed to prove undue hardship resulting from the human rights process.

The complainant alleged sexual harassment against the respondents.

After several adjournments and scheduling issues, the complainant failed to attend the scheduled hearing and left the country without providing contact information or a return date.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission requested an adjournment sine die, as it could not call evidence without the complainant.

The Board of Inquiry denied the adjournment and dismissed the complaint, noting the respondent had waited over five years for a resolution and the Board had jurisdiction to proceed in the complainant's absence under section 7 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The respondents in a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation brought a preliminary motion seeking access to the notes made by the Commission's investigating officer.

The respondents argued that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Stinchcombe required full disclosure.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, holding that Stinchcombe does not apply directly to human rights proceedings, which are civil rather than criminal in nature.

The Board emphasized the need to protect the confidentiality of witnesses who participate in human rights investigations to prevent potential reprisal and ensure the efficacy of the investigative process.