W. Gunther Plaut

The complainant, a store manager, was terminated from her employment after taking a several-month medical leave for deep vein thrombosis.

She filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of handicap and reprisal.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the complaint, finding that deep vein thrombosis is a temporary illness and does not constitute a handicap within the meaning of the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The Board also found that the respondents did not discriminate based on a perceived handicap, as a temporary illness cannot be perceived as a handicap under the Code.

The reprisal allegation was also dismissed for lack of supporting evidence.

The complainant, a single mother, responded to an advertisement for a basement apartment.

When she arrived to view the apartment with her three-year-old child, the respondents refused to rent to her because they did not want a child living in the home.

The respondents later offered to rent the apartment if the complainant paid an additional $70 per month for utilities, which she refused.

The Board of Inquiry found that the initial refusal constituted prima facie discrimination on the basis of family status under the Human Rights Code.

The respondents failed to establish that the apartment was unsafe for a child or that the shared facilities exception applied.

The Board dismissed the claim for special damages but awarded $2,000 in general damages for mental suffering.

The complainant alleged that the respondent, her employer, sexually harassed her through inappropriate comments, physical proximity, and a late-night phone call asking what she was wearing.

The respondent denied the allegations and moved to dismiss the complaint due to a six-year delay by the Commission.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding no prejudice.

On the merits, the Board found the complainant's testimony credible and consistent with the respondent's acknowledged behaviour.

The Board concluded the respondent sexually harassed the complainant, violating the Human Rights Code, and awarded $1,705 in special damages and $3,000 in general damages for mental anguish.

The complainant, a group insurance underwriter, alleged that she was denied permanent employment and subsequently discharged because of her sexual orientation.

The Board of Inquiry found that while the initial delay in offering full-time employment could not be directly attributed to the respondents due to the death of the responsible manager, the decision to terminate her employment was tainted by discrimination.

Although the employer's requirement to transfer the complainant's partner to avoid a conflict of interest was reasonable, the precipitous withdrawal of the job offer and immediate discharge were influenced by the complainant's open homosexuality and the homophobic attitudes of senior management.

The respondents were ordered to pay special and general damages.

The complainant, who was diagnosed as HIV-positive shortly after commencing employment, was denied long-term disability benefits due to a pre-existing condition exclusion clause in the employer's group insurance policy.

The clause excluded coverage for disabilities arising from conditions for which the employee received medical care during the 90-day probationary period.

The Board of Inquiry found that while the clause was prima facie discriminatory, it was saved by section 25(3)(a) of the Human Rights Code as a reasonable and bona fide distinction based on a pre-existing handicap that substantially increases risk.

The Board applied the Supreme Court's test from Zurich Insurance, concluding the clause was a sound and accepted insurance practice for small groups to prevent adverse selection, and that no practical alternative existed.

The respondents in a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation brought a preliminary motion seeking access to the notes made by the Commission's investigating officer.

The respondents argued that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Stinchcombe required full disclosure.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, holding that Stinchcombe does not apply directly to human rights proceedings, which are civil rather than criminal in nature.

The Board emphasized the need to protect the confidentiality of witnesses who participate in human rights investigations to prevent potential reprisal and ensure the efficacy of the investigative process.

The complainant brought a motion requesting that the respondent produce internal financial documents and records on which it relied to summarize its experience with long-term disability plans.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing the information was proprietary and the request was a belated attempt at discovery.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding that the request was speculative and would cause unwarranted delay in a proceeding that had already lasted ten months.

The Board noted it would determine what weight to give the respondent's summary evidence in its final decision.

In an interim decision, the Board of Inquiry granted a motion on consent to add First North American Insurance Company as a respondent to the human rights complaint.

The added party was a wholly owned subsidiary of the respondent North American Life Assurance Company and was the actual contracting party with the complainant for the group benefits policy at issue.

The respondent insurance company brought a motion to restrict the evidence in a human rights complaint to the specific illness of the complainant (AIDS), arguing that evidence regarding the impact of an exclusion clause on persons with other disabilities was irrelevant and hypothetical.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, ruling that because the exclusion clause itself was alleged to be discriminatory, evidence of its broader impact was necessary and admissible to determine its validity.

The respondent insurance company brought preliminary motions seeking an order to prevent the Commission from initiating complaints against other insurers, to grant use immunity to witnesses, and to add the complainant's employer as a respondent.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the first two motions, finding it lacked jurisdiction to restrict the Commission's statutory duties and that witness immunity could only be determined at a subsequent proceeding.

The Board granted the motion to add the employer as a respondent, finding that the employer could not escape responsibility for the terms of the employee benefit plan.

The complainant, a gay man, filed a human rights complaint against his employer, the Government of Ontario, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation for denying employment benefits to his same-sex partner.

Great West Life Assurance Company, the insurer for the health and dental plans, brought a motion to be added as a party or granted intervenor status.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion to add Great West Life as a party, finding it was not alleged to have infringed the right and its addition would unduly delay the proceedings.

However, the Board granted Great West Life intervenor status as a friend of the court to provide written argument on the complex legal and public policy issues.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission requested an order compelling the respondent to produce mechanical aptitude test scores of ten female employees prior to the hearing.

The Board of Inquiry held that it lacked jurisdiction under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act to order pre-hearing document production, noting that a subpoena duces tecum must be requested at the hearing itself.

The Board further cautioned that a subpoena should not be used to cure deficiencies in the Commission's earlier investigation.

However, given the respondent's previous refusal to provide the documents and the significant delay in the case, the Board invited the respondent to produce the documents voluntarily and indicated it would look sympathetically upon a subpoena request at the hearing.

The complainants, a Khalsa Sikh teacher and the Ontario Human Rights Commission, alleged that the respondent school board's policy prohibiting the wearing of kirpans on school property discriminated on the basis of creed.

The Board of Inquiry found that the policy, which classified the kirpan as a weapon, had an adverse impact on Khalsa Sikhs who are religiously mandated to wear it at all times.

The respondent failed to prove that accommodating the wearing of kirpans would cause undue hardship regarding school safety, especially given the lack of any incidents involving kirpans in Canadian schools and the respondent's willingness to accommodate proven violent students.

The Board ordered that Khalsa Sikhs be permitted to wear kirpans of reasonable size, worn under clothing and properly secured.

The complainant, a woman of Chinese ancestry, alleged that she was denied a promotion to a front-of-house restaurant position because of her race, and that she was subjected to a racially poisoned work environment.

The Board of Inquiry found that the failure to promote her was based on legitimate economic reasons, as she was an excellent baker and hard to replace.

However, the Board found that the workplace was tainted by frequent racial slurs from supervisory staff, which the general manager failed to adequately address.

The Board concluded that this poisoned atmosphere constituted indirect discrimination and contributed to the complainant's resignation.

The corporate respondent and the general manager were ordered to pay damages for lost wages and interest, and the corporate respondent was ordered to implement remedial measures including a staff seminar on human rights.

The complainants alleged that they were subjected to constant verbal and physical sexual harassment by the co-owner of the respondent company during their employment.

The respondent denied the allegations, claiming they were fabricated to extract money.

The Board of Inquiry accepted the evidence of the complainants and their witnesses, including similar fact evidence from other female employees, finding that the respondent engaged in a course of vexatious sexual conduct.

The Board held both the individual respondent and the corporate respondent liable, as the individual was the directing mind of the company.

The respondents were ordered to pay compensation for lost wages, general damages for mental anguish, and interest, and to comply with monitoring requirements.

The complainant, a probationary health care aide, was terminated from her employment.

The employer cited her work performance, absenteeism, and her pre-employment medical record, which noted obesity and hypertension.

The Board of Inquiry found that hypertension constitutes a handicap under the Ontario Human Rights Code.

Because the complainant's medical condition was a proximate cause of her termination, the employer breached the Code.

The respondents were ordered to pay special damages for lost wages, general damages for mental distress and humiliation, and interest.