Mark Geiger

The self-represented applicant requested an adjournment of the scheduled hearing due to medical issues and an inability to secure legal representation.

The applicant provided a medical note confirming his health concerns, and the respondent took no position on the request.

The Tribunal granted the adjournment to accommodate the applicant's medical condition, subject to the applicant providing updated medical information by a specified date.

The Tribunal noted that lack of counsel alone is not a valid reason for an adjournment.

The applicant's additional request for an order for production of documents was denied as premature in light of the adjournment.

A private elector brought a motion for an interim and interlocutory injunction restraining a municipal councillor from attending or voting at city council meetings pending an application challenging the validity of the councillor’s election on residency grounds.

The court applied the three‑part test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR‑MacDonald and found that although there was a serious question to be tried, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

The court also held that the balance of convenience favoured allowing the councillor to continue performing his duties, particularly given the public interest in municipal governance.

The requested injunction would effectively grant the ultimate relief sought prior to adjudication on the merits.

The applicant sought an interim and interlocutory injunction restraining a municipal councillor from attending or voting at meetings of a city council.

The motion arose in the context of a dispute involving the councillor’s participation in municipal governance.

The court declined to grant the requested equitable relief.

The motion for injunctive relief was dismissed, with directions for the parties to provide written submissions on costs.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, claiming the respondent failed to accommodate his return to work following a workplace injury.

The respondent sought to dismiss the application on preliminary grounds, arguing it was filed outside the one-year limitation period and that the WSIB had already appropriately dealt with the substance of the application.

The Tribunal found the application was timely, as a second return-to-work meeting held within the one-year period had a different purpose (considering retraining) than the first meeting, constituting a separate incident in a series.

The Tribunal declined to dismiss the application under section 45.1 at this stage, finding further evidence was required.

The corporate respondent requested an adjournment of the hearing to obtain instructions from its insurer and gather documents.

The applicant opposed the request, noting the late stage of the proceedings and the significant costs of travelling from overseas.

The Tribunal denied the adjournment, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify the late request.

The Tribunal also directed both parties to comply with their pre-hearing disclosure obligations, including the provision of detailed witness statements.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging employment discrimination on the basis of disability.

The applicant's union had also filed grievances on her behalf, one of which was referred to arbitration.

The Tribunal considered whether to defer the application pending the completion of the grievance process.

Finding that the grievance and the application were based on the same facts and issues, the Tribunal deferred the application in accordance with its general practice.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment and termination, having previously commenced a civil action for wrongful dismissal.

The Tribunal considered whether the application was barred under s. 34(11) of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found the application was not barred because the civil action did not seek a remedy for a Code infringement.

However, the Tribunal ordered the application deferred pending the outcome of the civil action to avoid concurrent proceedings and inconsistent decisions.

The corporate respondent requested an order requiring the Peel Regional Police to produce original digital versions of photographs showing the complainant's alleged injuries.

The complainant opposed the request, arguing the copies already provided were adequate.

The Tribunal found the digital photographs were arguably relevant to the dispute over whether the complainant's wounds were caused by biting during the alleged assault.

The Tribunal ordered the production of the digital photographs at the corporate respondent's expense.

The Tribunal also granted the Ontario Human Rights Commission's request to withdraw from the proceeding without conditions.

The corporate respondent brought a Request for Order During Proceedings seeking production of original digital photographs from the police, clinical notes from the complainant's doctors, and an order preventing any future motion to remove its counsel for conflict of interest.

The Tribunal dismissed the request for photographs because the police were not served.

The request for medical records was deemed premature as the complainant was already complying.

The Tribunal also refused to restrict the rights of the Commission or complainant to bring future motions regarding counsel's potential conflict of interest.

The Board heard a displacement application for certification and an unfair labour practice complaint in the construction industry.

The parties reached an agreement that three specific individuals were not entitled to vote as they were not at work on the application date.

Due to scheduling conflicts, the hearing for the remaining unfair labour practice complaint was adjourned to March 2002.

The Board directed the employer to post a notice reminding employees of their rights under the Labour Relations Act, 1995, pending the continuation of the hearing.

The applicant filed a reprisal complaint under section 50 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act against BBS Building Services Inc. During the hearings, it became clear that The Hudson Bay Company had an interest in the matter and could face liability.

The Board directed the applicant to file an amended application with sufficient particulars and serve it on both BBS and The Bay, adding The Bay as a responding party.

The Board also ordered that the evidence presented thus far be expunged and the case commence afresh.

The applicant union referred a grievance to the Board under section 133 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The parties had reached an agreement in principle to resolve the dispute over remittances and wages, but disagreed over the details.

The applicant sought an order directing the production of relevant records to verify the amounts owed.

The responding party did not oppose the request.

The Board directed the responding party to produce payroll and time records for the period ending November 1999.

The Board remained seized of the matter should the parties be unable to agree on the amounts or if the applicant sought production for a period beyond November 1999.

The applicant referred a grievance to the Board under section 133 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The responding party raised preliminary motions seeking particulars and requesting dismissal for abuse of process.

The Board directed the applicant to provide specific particulars of the grievance within twenty working days.

Given the need for particulars, pending document production from a related proceeding, and ongoing judicial proceedings, the Board adjourned the matter sine die for up to one year, setting out a schedule for the exchange of material facts should the matter be relisted.

The applicants filed an application for termination of bargaining rights under section 63(2) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

A representation vote was held and the ballot box was initially sealed.

At the hearing, the intervenor and applicants moved to count the ballots, which the responding party opposed.

The Board directed the ballots be counted, finding no serious prejudice to the responding party.

As not more than fifty percent of the ballots were cast in opposition to the responding party, the application was dismissed.

The Labourers' union brought a motion arguing that a prior Board decision (the Surdykowski decision) had finally determined that crew leaders in the residential roofing industry are employers, and that this finding was binding in the current proceedings under the doctrine of res judicata.

The Carpenters opposed the motion.

The Board dismissed the motion, finding that the prior determination regarding crew leaders generally was not fundamental to the substantive decision in that case, and that there was no identity of parties or privies between the Carpenters and the parties in the prior proceeding.

The Board also declined to apply the doctrine strictly for policy reasons, ensuring the Carpenters' right to a hearing on the merits regarding the employee status of crew leaders.

The applicants sought a declaration under section 61 of the Labour Relations Act that the Canadian Union of Shinglers & Allied Workers (CUSAW) no longer represented employees in certain bargaining units.

During the hearing, after the CUSAW closed its case, the applicants brought a nonsuit motion arguing that the CUSAW failed to establish it was a trade union.

The Board allowed the nonsuit motion without putting the applicants to their election, finding that the CUSAW was an organization formed and operated by employers (crew leaders) rather than an organization of employees.

Consequently, the Board declared that the CUSAW was not a trade union and held no valid collective agreements.

The union filed multiple applications for certification for different bargaining units of the employer.

The employer argued that the union was abusing the process to impose a statutory freeze on terms and conditions of employment, and requested that the Board impose a bar on further applications or order a representation vote.

The Board found no evidence of duplicitous conduct by the union, noting that the appropriate bargaining unit was genuinely in dispute.

The Board declined to impose a bar or order a vote, granted leave to withdraw the earlier applications, and issued a certificate to the union for the agreed-upon bargaining unit.

The applicant union brought an application under section 73.1 of the Labour Relations Act regarding a strike of counter attendants and car jockeys.

The responding party employer challenged whether the strike vote met the statutory requirements for ample opportunity to vote and secrecy of the ballot.

The Board found that the notice provided was sufficient and that the voting arrangements, while not perfect, provided a secret ballot process that employees could opt out of, satisfying the requirements of the Act.

As the strike had ended, the matter was terminated.

The complainant, a store manager, was terminated from her employment after taking a several-month medical leave for deep vein thrombosis.

She filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of handicap and reprisal.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the complaint, finding that deep vein thrombosis is a temporary illness and does not constitute a handicap within the meaning of the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The Board also found that the respondents did not discriminate based on a perceived handicap, as a temporary illness cannot be perceived as a handicap under the Code.

The reprisal allegation was also dismissed for lack of supporting evidence.

The appellant company closed its plant and terminated group insurance benefits for retired workers following the expiration of the collective agreement.

The union grieved the termination of benefits.

The company objected to the arbitrator's jurisdiction on the basis that the collective agreement had expired.

The arbitrator found the matter arbitrable.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the arbitrator's decision on jurisdiction must be correct, applying a pragmatic and functional approach.

The Court further held that retirement benefits can vest and survive the expiration of a collective agreement, allowing the grievance to proceed.