Owen M. Rees

The Law Society sought judicial review of a disclosure order made by the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division during an interlocutory suspension proceeding.

By the time the judicial review was heard, the Law Society had complied with the disclosure order and the interlocutory suspension had been imposed, rendering the disclosure issue moot.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issue, finding that the matter should have proceeded through the Tribunal's internal appeal process and that the Tribunal should be allowed time for its jurisprudence to evolve.

The applicants, several humane societies, challenged the governance model of the respondent provincial animal welfare society.

After the respondent successfully resisted the application following a membership vote, the parties sought costs.

The applicants argued they should be shielded from costs as public interest litigants.

The court rejected this argument, finding the dispute was primarily about internal governance and control rather than a matter of public importance.

The court apportioned costs based on the stages of litigation and ordered the applicants (excluding one that withdrew) to pay $100,000 in costs to the respondent.

The Court dismissed the appeal and held that an Ontario Court of Justice judge had jurisdiction to conduct a joint trial of provincial offences and summary conviction criminal offences arising from the same events.

The majority applied a functional joinder approach and found a sufficient factual nexus, no statutory prohibition, and no prejudice.

A dissent would have found no jurisdiction based on legislative intent behind the Provincial Offences Act and would have ordered new trials.

A private elector brought a motion for an interim and interlocutory injunction restraining a municipal councillor from attending or voting at city council meetings pending an application challenging the validity of the councillor’s election on residency grounds.

The court applied the three‑part test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR‑MacDonald and found that although there was a serious question to be tried, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

The court also held that the balance of convenience favoured allowing the councillor to continue performing his duties, particularly given the public interest in municipal governance.

The requested injunction would effectively grant the ultimate relief sought prior to adjudication on the merits.

The applicant sought an interim and interlocutory injunction restraining a municipal councillor from attending or voting at meetings of a city council.

The motion arose in the context of a dispute involving the councillor’s participation in municipal governance.

The court declined to grant the requested equitable relief.

The motion for injunctive relief was dismissed, with directions for the parties to provide written submissions on costs.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision that found a reasonable apprehension of bias regarding the adjudicator appointed for a police disciplinary hearing.

After leave to appeal was granted, the respondent officer retired, which by operation of the Police Services Act ended the disciplinary proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case because the substratum of the dispute had disappeared and the issues did not raise questions of broad public importance.

Eight police officers sought judicial review of decisions by the Toronto Police Services Board allowing the Chief of Police to delay serving Notices of Hearing for public complaints arising from the G20 summit.

The respondents moved to dismiss the application for prematurity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify judicial review of an interlocutory administrative decision.

The court noted the officers had an adequate alternative remedy to raise the issue of prejudice caused by delay through an abuse of process motion before the hearing officer.

The applicant, a lawyer, filed a human rights application alleging that the Law Society's investigation into his professional conduct constituted racial profiling and reprisal.

The applicant sought to amend his application to add new allegations and respondents, while the Law Society requested that the Tribunal defer the application pending the outcome of its disciplinary proceedings.

The Tribunal allowed the amendment in part, refusing to add new respondents against whom no Code violations were alleged.

The Tribunal granted the request to defer, finding that the Law Society Hearing Panel has the jurisdiction to consider human rights issues and that deferral would avoid unnecessary duplication and inconsistent decisions.

The applicant filed a human rights application against the Law Society of Upper Canada and Zeynep Onen, alleging discrimination based on race and colour, and reprisal, after the Law Society closed his complaints against two lawyers.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding no evidence to support a link between the respondents' conduct and a prohibited ground of discrimination.

CI Financial Corp. applied for a hearing and review of decisions by the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) requiring CI to submit a resolution ratifying the continuation of its Shareholder Rights Plan to a two-tiered vote of all shareholders and independent shareholders.

CI argued the TSX lacked jurisdiction to impose conditions on the mid-term vote.

The Ontario Securities Commission found that the mid-term ratification was not a 'transaction' involving the issuance or potential issuance of securities under the TSX Manual.

Therefore, the TSX lacked jurisdiction to impose conditions on the vote.

The TSX decisions were set aside, allowing only independent shareholders to vote on the plan's continuation.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination by the Law Society of Upper Canada and a Complaints Resolution Commissioner in their handling and dismissal of her complaint against her former criminal defence lawyer.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

Finding that the applicant provided only bare allegations and no evidence linking the respondents' actions to a prohibited ground of discrimination, the Tribunal dismissed the application.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Law Society Hearing Panel dismissing her motion for a permanent stay of disciplinary proceedings.

She alleged procedural fairness violations because the panel considered public documents not entered in evidence, and raised language rights issues regarding the delayed translation of the reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify fragmenting the administrative process.

The court held that both the procedural fairness and language rights issues should be raised before the Law Society Appeal Panel after a final decision.

The appellant, a former executive and minority shareholder, sued the respondents in Ontario for wrongful dismissal, unpaid wages, and oppression.

The motions judge denied the appellant's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the respondents' motion to stay the action based on an exclusive forum selection clause in a Shareholders' Agreement favouring England.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the denial of summary judgment but set aside the stay.

The Court found that the motions judge erred by ignoring a non-exclusive Ontario forum selection clause in the appellant's Service Agreement and by failing to consider that the respondents had attorned to Ontario's jurisdiction by defending the action on the merits and counterclaiming before invoking the English forum selection clause.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Racing Commission, which upheld a private racetrack's decision to suspend the applicant owner's racing and stabling privileges following the death of a 13-year-old racehorse during training.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission had jurisdiction to determine whether the public interest warranted interfering with the racetrack's private property rights.

The Court held that the Commission's decision was procedurally fair and reasonable, as the evidence supported the finding that the applicant failed to take reasonable precautions regarding the horse's fitness.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Law Society Hearing Panel refusing to permanently stay disciplinary proceedings against her.

She alleged breaches of procedural fairness and language rights, noting the Panel released its reasons in English and provided a French translation six weeks later despite the hearing being in French.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify fragmenting the administrative process.

The Court held that the applicant could raise both the procedural fairness and language rights issues before the Law Society Appeal Panel at the conclusion of the proceedings.

The applicants sought to extend a stay of a 12-month license suspension imposed by the Executive Director of the Ontario Racing Commission pending a judicial review.

The respondent argued the judicial review was premature as the applicants had not exhausted their right of appeal to the Commission.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried regarding the lack of reasons for the suspension, irreparable harm to the applicant's racing operation, and the balance of convenience favouring the applicant.

The motion was granted and the stay was extended to allow the judicial review to be heard alongside a related application.

The applicant, a police officer, brought an application for judicial review to prohibit a retired superintendent from continuing as an adjudicator in a disciplinary proceeding against him.

The adjudicator had previously presided over two other disciplinary hearings involving the applicant and had expressed opinions regarding his character.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that an informed person would conclude there was a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the adjudicator's pre-existing knowledge of the applicant's disciplinary history.

The applicant police officer sought a stay of his disciplinary proceedings pending an application for judicial review.

The judicial review application alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias against the adjudicator, who had previously presided over other hearings involving the applicant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that while there was a serious issue to be determined, the applicant failed to establish sufficient irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favoured the public interest in proceeding with the hearings without further delay.

The appellant transferred property to her brother in 1990 and later brought an action claiming its return.

The trial judge rejected her claim of a resulting trust.

On appeal, the appellant abandoned the resulting trust claim and instead argued the existence of an intervening oral agreement reduced to writing in 2002.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the new argument and holding that it could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Racing Commission decision suspending his racing licenses for ten years and imposing a $20,000 fine for administering a performance-enhancing drug (EPO) to a horse.

The applicant argued his confession to investigators was involuntary and obtained in violation of his Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the statement was admissible under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and statutory compulsion, and that the common law confession rule and section 7 of the Charter did not apply to these administrative proceedings.

The court also upheld the penalty as reasonable given the need for general deterrence in the horse racing industry.