Lorna Lynn Bolton

The Crown brought a motion to bifurcate its sentence appeal from the respondent's conviction appeal.

The respondent had been convicted of sexual assault of a child and sentenced to a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence as demonstrably unfit and argued that if the appeals were heard together, the delay would render the sentence appeal redundant, as the respondent would have served a significant portion of the conditional sentence by the hearing date.

The motion judge accepted the Crown's submission, finding that the anticipated delay constituted a compelling reason for bifurcation and that the issues on the two appeals were discrete.

The motion was granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for serious sexual offences committed in 1986 against two women.

The Crown's similar-fact application was granted at trial.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings regarding lost evidence, arguing that the loss of the Murdock investigative file constituted unacceptable negligence and that the trial judge failed to adequately address the integrity of the justice system regarding conceded negligent loss of evidence in the English file.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the governing legal framework, made findings supported by the record, and exercised her remedial discretion judiciously.

The court held that the trial judge's conclusion that the purging of the Murdock brief in accordance with retention policy was not unacceptable negligence was reasonable, and that even if error existed, it was harmless as the trial judge proceeded to a full remedial analysis.

Regarding the English file, the court found the trial judge adequately addressed the integrity issue and that proportionate alternatives to a stay of proceedings were appropriate.

The accused, Loic Simeu, was charged with unlawful confinement, obtaining sexual services for consideration, assault police, and uttering threats.

He pleaded guilty to obtaining sexual services for consideration but contested the other charges.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of the complainant (AP), a friend (MM), police officers, and the accused.

The court found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the Crown's witness testimonies, particularly regarding the complainant's prior dishonesty with police and failure to provide crucial information during a 911 call.

The court also scrutinized the police officers' accounts of the accused's arrest and behaviour, noting their perceptions were colored by initial misinformation.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove the charges of threatening, unlawful confinement, and assault police beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to their dismissal.

The respondent was acquitted of sexual assault and sexual interference charges at trial.

The Crown appealed, arguing that the trial judge's reasons for acquittal were inadequate and that the judge applied a higher degree of scrutiny to the Crown's evidence than to the respondent's.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons met the legal requirement of adequacy, explaining the factual and credibility determinations and the basis for reasonable doubt.

The court also found that the Crown failed to meet the high burden of showing that the credibility determinations were the result of a legally erroneous application of different standards of scrutiny, upholding the deference owed to the trial judge on credibility issues.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence during the cross-examination of a Crown witness in a criminal trial.

The defence sought to ask questions, which the Crown objected to on grounds of relevance and offending section 276 of the Criminal Code.

The court found section 276 applicable, adopting reasoning from R. v. Amdurski and R. v. Barton, and ruled on which specific questions could be asked, balancing relevance with the protective purposes of section 276.

The appellant, a former fashion photographer, appealed his convictions for six counts of sexual assault and one count of sexual exploitation involving four young women, and his subsequent 51-month imprisonment sentence.

The appeal raised four grounds: the application judge's refusal to sever charges, the trial judge's decision to admit cross-count similar fact evidence, alleged errors in the jury charge, and the fitness of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the lower court's decisions regarding severance, similar fact evidence admissibility, or jury instructions, and concluding the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range for the offences committed.

The appellant was convicted of offences related to a home invasion robbery and appealed on the grounds of multiple alleged errors in the trial judge's instructions and charge to the jury.

The primary submissions concerned whether the Crown improperly invited jury speculation regarding a firearm discharge and whether an impermissible inference was drawn regarding the appellant's origin.

The Court of Appeal found the jury was properly instructed, the Crown's remarks were not improper, and the verdict was available on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a hybrid disposition ordered by the Ontario Review Board that imposed a detention order requiring detention on the Secure Forensic Unit with discretion to transfer to the General Forensic Unit.

The sole ground of appeal was that the Board failed to consider the appellant's liberty interest when imposing this condition rather than ordering immediate transfer to the General Forensic Unit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's reasons, read as a whole, were faithful to the requirements established in Pinet v. St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital.

The appellant and his common law spouse were both sentenced and given conditions prohibiting communication with each other while in custody.

The spouse received a six-year sentence while the appellant received nine years, eleven months and fifteen days.

The appellant sought a variation of the communication prohibition to allow contact with his spouse after her release while he remained in custody.

The trial judge had anticipated the possibility of future adjustment to this term.

The Court of Appeal granted the variation, allowing the appellant to communicate with his spouse if she initiates contact after her release.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to 5.5 years in custody with a restitution order of $799,600.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds challenging the custodial term and one ground challenging the restitution amount.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the sentence was neither manifestly excessive nor demonstrably unfit, that mental illness was not established as a mitigating factor at the time of the offences, that the remand into custody was justified despite procedural concerns, and that the full restitution order was appropriate given the nature of the fraud and the paramount consideration of victims' claims.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered on May 27, 2016, raising multiple grounds of appeal including claims of trial judge bias, involuntary or uninformed guilty plea, ineffective assistance of counsel, breach of solicitor-client privilege, and alleged Crown breach of an agreement regarding the reading of facts into the record.

The Court of Appeal found no basis in the record to support any of these claims and determined that the record amply supported the conviction and that the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and fully informed.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder of his wife following a judge alone trial and sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for twelve years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of material misapprehension of evidence, specifically regarding a police demonstration video concerning the time required for a wheelchair-bound person to reach an alarm keypad.

The appellant also raised arguments regarding DNA cross-contamination and alternate explanations for gunshot residue.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in stating no video recording existed, this error did not constitute material misapprehension warranting intervention, as the trial judge had fully considered the demonstration evidence and concluded it did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence.

Duty counsel raised three issues: that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding who instigated the dispute, erred in finding excessive force was used in the jail cell context, and erred in assessing Officer Chen's observations of the altercation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's factual determinations and dismissed the conviction appeal.

The court also found the sentence, imposed for a serious aggravated assault in the context of interference with a justice system participant, to be entirely fit and dismissed the sentence appeal.

Two appellants, T.F. and M.W., appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the execution-style killing of their friend Tyrone Bracken.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, based on text messages, video surveillance, and post-offence conduct.

The trial judge found that the appellants participated in a pre-arranged plan to murder the victim.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in using post-offence conduct to infer their participation and intent, committed a Villaroman error by reversing the burden of proof, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly used the appellants' failure to express shock or horror at the killing as circumstantial evidence of their knowledge and participation in a planned murder.

The applicant sought an order under section 684 of the Criminal Code appointing counsel to represent him on his appeal of a second-degree murder conviction and life sentence with 12-year parole ineligibility.

The applicant was denied legal aid based on failing to meet financial eligibility criteria.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had sufficient means to fund his appeal, having savings of approximately $12,000 and monthly income of $900, and that it was not in the interests of justice to appoint counsel given the availability of duty counsel assistance through the Ontario Inmate Appeal Duty Counsel Program.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment of a former girlfriend and his sentence of 14 months imprisonment plus three years' probation.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in her credibility analysis and failed to stay the charges due to alleged Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law or misapprehension of fact in the trial judge's reasons and determined that the sentence was not unfit and disclosed no error in principle.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted after a jury trial of driving while disqualified and failing to stop for police.

He was sentenced to 2½ years in custody on each offence, to be served concurrently.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal rejected the conviction appeal on three grounds: the trial judge's failure to direct the jury on the prohibited use of silence, the direction on prior inconsistent statements, and the adverse inference regarding alibi evidence.

However, the Court allowed the sentencing appeal, finding the trial judge failed to apply the principle of totality, did not adequately consider the hardship of segregated custody, and failed to properly analyze evidence regarding mental health and rehabilitative efforts.

The sentence was set aside and replaced with time served.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference with a person under the age of 14 years.

The victim alleged that the appellant touched her vagina while she was sleeping on a mattress in the appellant's living room.

The appellant denied the allegations, and his son testified in support of his father.

On appeal, duty counsel raised grounds challenging the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, and alleging that the trial judge mischaracterized evidence and reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered both credibility and reliability, fairly characterized the evidence, and was entitled to make the credibility findings as made.

The respondent was charged with abduction and violent sexual assault of two women in 1986.

He fled Canada in violation of bail conditions and assumed a false identity in the United States, where he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 52 years imprisonment.

Following his deportation to Canada in 2015, he was charged and sought a stay of proceedings alleging violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The trial judge granted the stay, characterizing the delay as Crown delay.

The Crown appealed, arguing that the delay caused by the respondent's flight should be treated as defence delay and deducted from the total delay calculation.

The appellant, a dangerous offender, appealed his sentence of 10 years imprisonment followed by 10 years long-term supervision.

He argued that the custodial portion was unfit because the hearing judge improperly determined its length based on the time needed for rehabilitative programming rather than applying traditional sentencing principles of proportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in dangerous offender proceedings under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code, hearing judges may impose fixed-term sentences exceeding the normal range for the predicate offence to ensure access to necessary treatment programs in a penitentiary, subject to three constraints: the statutory maximum for the predicate offence, applicable sentencing principles, and evidence-based nexus to public protection.