Lorna Lynn Bolton

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent for sexually assaulting his stepdaughter when she was a child.

The sentencing judge had imposed the conditional sentence primarily due to the collateral consequences incarceration would have on the respondent's dependent adult son.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentence demonstrably unfit given the high moral culpability of the offender and the gravity of the offence.

The Court substituted a three-year custodial sentence, noting that collateral consequences cannot overwhelm other sentencing principles such as denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts of sexual assault, one count of invitation to sexual touching, and one count of indecent exposure to a person under 16.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in the collusion instruction by failing to direct the jury that the instruction did not apply to him, and by failing to caution the jury that rejection of his family members' evidence on the basis of collusion could not be used to infer that the appellant was less credible or guilty.

The Court of Appeal found that there was no evidentiary basis to include the appellant in the collusion instruction, as he had not been cross-examined about participating in any family discussions of the allegations.

The failure to provide limiting instructions left the jury inadequately instructed on fundamental credibility issues.

The curative proviso was not applied because credibility was the central issue in the trial and the errors were not harmless or trivial.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown brought a motion to bifurcate its sentence appeal from the respondent's conviction appeal.

The respondent had been convicted of sexual assault of a child and sentenced to a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence as demonstrably unfit and argued that if the appeals were heard together, the delay would render the sentence appeal redundant, as the respondent would have served a significant portion of the conditional sentence by the hearing date.

The motion judge accepted the Crown's submission, finding that the anticipated delay constituted a compelling reason for bifurcation and that the issues on the two appeals were discrete.

The motion was granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for serious sexual offences committed in 1986 against two women.

The Crown's similar-fact application was granted at trial.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings regarding lost evidence, arguing that the loss of the Murdock investigative file constituted unacceptable negligence and that the trial judge failed to adequately address the integrity of the justice system regarding conceded negligent loss of evidence in the English file.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the governing legal framework, made findings supported by the record, and exercised her remedial discretion judiciously.

The court held that the trial judge's conclusion that the purging of the Murdock brief in accordance with retention policy was not unacceptable negligence was reasonable, and that even if error existed, it was harmless as the trial judge proceeded to a full remedial analysis.

Regarding the English file, the court found the trial judge adequately addressed the integrity issue and that proportionate alternatives to a stay of proceedings were appropriate.

The appellant was convicted of six counts of sexual assault involving six complainants who worked at his adult massage parlour.

The trial judge dismissed the Crown's similar act evidence application but failed to instruct the jury against propensity reasoning and the cross-count application of evidence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that these limiting instructions were mandatory to prevent the jury from improperly using the evidence across counts.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding that even if the similar act evidence should have been admitted, the lack of proper jury instructions meant there was a reasonable possibility the verdicts would have been different.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused, Loic Simeu, was charged with unlawful confinement, obtaining sexual services for consideration, assault police, and uttering threats.

He pleaded guilty to obtaining sexual services for consideration but contested the other charges.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of the complainant (AP), a friend (MM), police officers, and the accused.

The court found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the Crown's witness testimonies, particularly regarding the complainant's prior dishonesty with police and failure to provide crucial information during a 911 call.

The court also scrutinized the police officers' accounts of the accused's arrest and behaviour, noting their perceptions were colored by initial misinformation.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove the charges of threatening, unlawful confinement, and assault police beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to their dismissal.

The respondent was acquitted of sexual assault and sexual interference charges at trial.

The Crown appealed, arguing that the trial judge's reasons for acquittal were inadequate and that the judge applied a higher degree of scrutiny to the Crown's evidence than to the respondent's.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons met the legal requirement of adequacy, explaining the factual and credibility determinations and the basis for reasonable doubt.

The court also found that the Crown failed to meet the high burden of showing that the credibility determinations were the result of a legally erroneous application of different standards of scrutiny, upholding the deference owed to the trial judge on credibility issues.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence during the cross-examination of a Crown witness in a criminal trial.

The defence sought to ask questions, which the Crown objected to on grounds of relevance and offending section 276 of the Criminal Code.

The court found section 276 applicable, adopting reasoning from R. v. Amdurski and R. v. Barton, and ruled on which specific questions could be asked, balancing relevance with the protective purposes of section 276.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping for ransom and conspiracy to kidnap.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the 33-month delay between his arrest and the completion of his trial violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the application judge made errors in calculating the delay, the recalculated delay still fell within the Morin guidelines and was justified under the transitional exceptional circumstance set out in Jordan.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for sexual assault, alleging that improper Crown submissions during closing argument and inadequate corrective instructions deprived him of a fair trial.

He also argued the trial judge improperly limited the jury’s ability to rely on the absence of evidence when responding to a deliberation question about blood‑alcohol testing.

The Court of Appeal held the Crown’s submissions did not misstate the law or invite an improper credibility contest and that the jury was properly instructed using the W.(D.) framework.

The trial judge’s response to the jury correctly distinguished between drawing reasonable doubt from evidentiary gaps and speculating about uncalled evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of kidnapping, pointing a firearm, and assault causing bodily harm, brought an application for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for his appeal.

The court found that the appellant advanced arguable grounds of appeal, lacked the capability to effectively argue them without assistance, and demonstrated a lack of financial means to retain counsel privately.

The application for government-funded counsel was granted.

The appellant, a former fashion photographer, appealed his convictions for six counts of sexual assault and one count of sexual exploitation involving four young women, and his subsequent 51-month imprisonment sentence.

The appeal raised four grounds: the application judge's refusal to sever charges, the trial judge's decision to admit cross-count similar fact evidence, alleged errors in the jury charge, and the fitness of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the lower court's decisions regarding severance, similar fact evidence admissibility, or jury instructions, and concluding the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range for the offences committed.

The appellant was convicted of offences related to a home invasion robbery and appealed on the grounds of multiple alleged errors in the trial judge's instructions and charge to the jury.

The primary submissions concerned whether the Crown improperly invited jury speculation regarding a firearm discharge and whether an impermissible inference was drawn regarding the appellant's origin.

The Court of Appeal found the jury was properly instructed, the Crown's remarks were not improper, and the verdict was available on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a hybrid disposition ordered by the Ontario Review Board that imposed a detention order requiring detention on the Secure Forensic Unit with discretion to transfer to the General Forensic Unit.

The sole ground of appeal was that the Board failed to consider the appellant's liberty interest when imposing this condition rather than ordering immediate transfer to the General Forensic Unit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's reasons, read as a whole, were faithful to the requirements established in Pinet v. St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital.

The appellant and his common law spouse were both sentenced and given conditions prohibiting communication with each other while in custody.

The spouse received a six-year sentence while the appellant received nine years, eleven months and fifteen days.

The appellant sought a variation of the communication prohibition to allow contact with his spouse after her release while he remained in custody.

The trial judge had anticipated the possibility of future adjustment to this term.

The Court of Appeal granted the variation, allowing the appellant to communicate with his spouse if she initiates contact after her release.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to 5.5 years in custody with a restitution order of $799,600.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds challenging the custodial term and one ground challenging the restitution amount.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the sentence was neither manifestly excessive nor demonstrably unfit, that mental illness was not established as a mitigating factor at the time of the offences, that the remand into custody was justified despite procedural concerns, and that the full restitution order was appropriate given the nature of the fraud and the paramount consideration of victims' claims.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered on May 27, 2016, raising multiple grounds of appeal including claims of trial judge bias, involuntary or uninformed guilty plea, ineffective assistance of counsel, breach of solicitor-client privilege, and alleged Crown breach of an agreement regarding the reading of facts into the record.

The Court of Appeal found no basis in the record to support any of these claims and determined that the record amply supported the conviction and that the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and fully informed.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder of his wife following a judge alone trial and sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for twelve years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of material misapprehension of evidence, specifically regarding a police demonstration video concerning the time required for a wheelchair-bound person to reach an alarm keypad.

The appellant also raised arguments regarding DNA cross-contamination and alternate explanations for gunshot residue.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in stating no video recording existed, this error did not constitute material misapprehension warranting intervention, as the trial judge had fully considered the demonstration evidence and concluded it did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence.

Duty counsel raised three issues: that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding who instigated the dispute, erred in finding excessive force was used in the jail cell context, and erred in assessing Officer Chen's observations of the altercation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's factual determinations and dismissed the conviction appeal.

The court also found the sentence, imposed for a serious aggravated assault in the context of interference with a justice system participant, to be entirely fit and dismissed the sentence appeal.

Two appellants, T.F. and M.W., appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the execution-style killing of their friend Tyrone Bracken.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, based on text messages, video surveillance, and post-offence conduct.

The trial judge found that the appellants participated in a pre-arranged plan to murder the victim.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in using post-offence conduct to infer their participation and intent, committed a Villaroman error by reversing the burden of proof, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly used the appellants' failure to express shock or horror at the killing as circumstantial evidence of their knowledge and participation in a planned murder.