Lorna Lynn Bolton

The applicant sought an order under section 684 of the Criminal Code appointing counsel to represent him on his appeal of a second-degree murder conviction and life sentence with 12-year parole ineligibility.

The applicant was denied legal aid based on failing to meet financial eligibility criteria.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had sufficient means to fund his appeal, having savings of approximately $12,000 and monthly income of $900, and that it was not in the interests of justice to appoint counsel given the availability of duty counsel assistance through the Ontario Inmate Appeal Duty Counsel Program.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment of a former girlfriend and his sentence of 14 months imprisonment plus three years' probation.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in her credibility analysis and failed to stay the charges due to alleged Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law or misapprehension of fact in the trial judge's reasons and determined that the sentence was not unfit and disclosed no error in principle.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted after a jury trial of driving while disqualified and failing to stop for police.

He was sentenced to 2½ years in custody on each offence, to be served concurrently.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal rejected the conviction appeal on three grounds: the trial judge's failure to direct the jury on the prohibited use of silence, the direction on prior inconsistent statements, and the adverse inference regarding alibi evidence.

However, the Court allowed the sentencing appeal, finding the trial judge failed to apply the principle of totality, did not adequately consider the hardship of segregated custody, and failed to properly analyze evidence regarding mental health and rehabilitative efforts.

The sentence was set aside and replaced with time served.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference with a person under the age of 14 years.

The victim alleged that the appellant touched her vagina while she was sleeping on a mattress in the appellant's living room.

The appellant denied the allegations, and his son testified in support of his father.

On appeal, duty counsel raised grounds challenging the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, and alleging that the trial judge mischaracterized evidence and reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered both credibility and reliability, fairly characterized the evidence, and was entitled to make the credibility findings as made.

The respondent was charged with abduction and violent sexual assault of two women in 1986.

He fled Canada in violation of bail conditions and assumed a false identity in the United States, where he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 52 years imprisonment.

Following his deportation to Canada in 2015, he was charged and sought a stay of proceedings alleging violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The trial judge granted the stay, characterizing the delay as Crown delay.

The Crown appealed, arguing that the delay caused by the respondent's flight should be treated as defence delay and deducted from the total delay calculation.

The appellant, a dangerous offender, appealed his sentence of 10 years imprisonment followed by 10 years long-term supervision.

He argued that the custodial portion was unfit because the hearing judge improperly determined its length based on the time needed for rehabilitative programming rather than applying traditional sentencing principles of proportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in dangerous offender proceedings under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code, hearing judges may impose fixed-term sentences exceeding the normal range for the predicate offence to ensure access to necessary treatment programs in a penitentiary, subject to three constraints: the statutory maximum for the predicate offence, applicable sentencing principles, and evidence-based nexus to public protection.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15 years for attempted murder, along with 1.5 years consecutive on two counts of failure to comply with probation.

The appellant had repeatedly harassed a female acquaintance, was convicted of criminal harassment, and subsequently appeared at her home armed with weapons and homemade bombs.

During a confrontation, he stabbed a family member multiple times, inflicting serious injuries.

The Court of Appeal upheld the attempted murder sentence as appropriate and within the sentencing range for such offences, but allowed the appeal in part by making the failure to comply sentences concurrent rather than consecutive, reducing the overall sentence from 16.5 years to 16 years before credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a trial before a judge sitting without a jury.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to robbery and aggravated assault but contested the sexual assault conviction.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to consider inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, including the absence of disclosed injuries to the back of her head despite claims of repeated head impacts, inconsistency regarding the number of times she was punched in the face, and her failure to identify the appellant in a photo lineup.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of sexual assault based on the complainant's testimony that the appellant tugged on her pants attempting to pull them down and made demands for money or for her to remove her clothing.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly addressed the weaknesses in the complainant's evidence and that his credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his sentence for criminal harassment, careless use of a firearm, threatening to cause bodily harm, and two breaches of weapons prohibition orders.

The sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of two years and six months, reduced by 18 months to reflect 12 months actual pre-sentence custody.

The appellant challenged the sentencing decision on multiple grounds, including the failure to give additional credit for interim release conditions, the characterization of the firearm use, and post-sentence rehabilitative efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's discretionary decisions.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment, breach of recognizance, and breach of probation.

He sought to strike his guilty pleas, arguing they were not voluntary.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to strike the pleas, noting that the appellant was represented by counsel, personally entered his guilty pleas, addressed the court before sentencing, and was actively involved in the proceedings.

The court held that the appellant's dissatisfaction with the sentence did not undermine the voluntariness of his pleas.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual offences against his wife's granddaughter.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal and proceeded only with the sentence appeal.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of six years' imprisonment.

The appellant argued the sentence was outside the appropriate range, citing the gap between his last conviction and the recent offences, and invoking the jump principle given his longest previous sentence was two years less a day.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding it was fit and that the trial judge properly balanced the relevant factors, particularly the appellant's extensive record for sexual offences and the principles of denunciation and general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered on October 17, 2013 by Justice Hugh McLean of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury.

The appellant made brief submissions on the conviction appeal and tendered fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant's submissions did not call into question the validity of the convictions and that the fresh evidence was inadmissible.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The Court dismissed the appeal and held that an Ontario Court of Justice judge had jurisdiction to conduct a joint trial of provincial offences and summary conviction criminal offences arising from the same events.

The majority applied a functional joinder approach and found a sufficient factual nexus, no statutory prohibition, and no prejudice.

A dissent would have found no jurisdiction based on legislative intent behind the Provincial Offences Act and would have ordered new trials.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 5 years and 1 month (34.5 months to serve after credit) imposed for six counts of robbery, assault, and sexual assault committed against three women in a random attack lasting minutes.

The appellant challenged three aspects of the sentencing: the trial judge's treatment of lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, the minimal credit given for the guilty plea, and the calculation of pre-disposition custody credit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the third ground only, finding the trial judge erred by failing to account for 50 days of pre-disposition custody served between the sentencing hearing and judgment delivery, reducing the sentence to 32 months.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The conviction was based on the appellant's assault of a bar patron with a pool cue, causing serious and permanent injuries.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's acceptance of the bar owner's identification evidence and the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant admitted to the assault.

The appellant also challenged the dangerous offender designation, arguing that the two incidents relied upon did not constitute a sufficient pattern of repetitive or persistent aggressive behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's findings of fact or application of law.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm and possession of a restricted firearm.

He raised two grounds of appeal: (1) that the trial judge erred in finding his statement voluntary, arguing police threatened to charge his girlfriend with possession of the gun in exchange for his cooperation; and (2) that the trial judge erred in refusing to exclude evidence resulting from a section 8 Charter breach under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the voluntariness of the statement and found no error in the trial judge's balanced application of the three-prong test from R. v. Grant in determining admissibility of the evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and touching a minor for sexual purpose, as well as the sentence imposed.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in findings of fact and credibility and should have acquitted him.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach to assessing witness evidence and credibility.

The appellant did not pursue the sentence appeal in oral argument.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, Elizabeth Gayle and Fedrick Gayle, appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the death of Tiffany Gayle, a 15-year-old who was beaten to death in their home.

The appellants challenged various evidentiary rulings and jury instructions made at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's admission of evidence regarding prior discreditable conduct, the baseball bat, or the jury instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct and the modes of participation in the homicide.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence but died prior to the release of the decision.

The Court of Appeal considered whether to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal despite the general rule of abatement upon death.

Finding no issue of general importance or special circumstances, the court held that the appeal abated and dismissed it.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and assault, and sought leave to appeal his sentence of three years' imprisonment.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who suffers from Asperger's Syndrome, had a lengthy criminal record but had never previously received a penitentiary sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the three-year sentence offended the proportionality principle and the "step" principle.

The court granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, and substituted a sentence of time served plus one day, as the appellant had already served over 27 months.