Angela Ruffo

The appellant was convicted of two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and various firearms offences following a traffic stop.

During the stop, police discovered a restricted firearm, ammunition, and an extended magazine in a satchel in the appellant's vehicle, as well as cocaine and oxycodone tablets in the centre console.

The trial judge found that while the appellant's s. 9 Charter rights were not breached, his s. 8 rights were violated when the satchel was searched without legal authority.

However, the trial judge exercised discretion under s. 24(2) of the Charter to admit the evidence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis despite a minor misstatement regarding the Grant factors, and finding the sentence not manifestly unfit.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and related offences based primarily on eyewitness identification by the complainant, who recognized the appellant as a former hotel guest.

The trial judge found the identification was corroborated by the appellant's possession of stolen sunglasses and the presence of a co-conspirator during his arrest.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the corroborative evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge did misapprehend the evidence regarding the co-conspirator's presence, this error did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The remaining corroborative evidence—the appellant's possession of the stolen sunglasses two days after the robbery—strongly supported the identification.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court addressed the test for fitness to stand trial under s. 2 of the Criminal Code and held that fitness requires capacity to make and communicate reality-based defence decisions, not capacity to make decisions in one’s best interests.

Applying that standard, the majority found no basis to disturb findings that the accused was fit despite fluctuating psychotic symptoms, because the record showed sustained reality-based participation and intelligible communication.

The majority also dismissed fresh and new evidence motions concerning post-trial psychiatric evidence and later judicial findings about the Crown expert’s practices, concluding the proposed evidence could not reasonably have affected the verdict.

A dissent would have admitted the fresh evidence, found a miscarriage of justice, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed the termination of a conditional sentence for breach of conditions, specifically contacting a prohibited person and engaging in drug trafficking.

The appeal also sought credit for a 13-month delay during which the sentence was suspended but conditions remained.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence for the breach and no exceptional circumstances to grant credit for the delay, as most of the delay was attributable to the appellant.

John William Fisher sought leave to appeal his sentence for aggravated assault, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and carrying a concealed weapon without authorization.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge failed to consider the impact on his family and erred in finding the attack unprovoked.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge was aware of collateral impacts and that the finding of an unprovoked attack was supported by surveillance video evidence.

The court reiterated that its role is not to reweigh aggravating and mitigating factors.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted for delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The application judge found a delay exceeding the presumptive Jordan ceiling.

The Crown argued three errors: mischaracterizing preliminary inquiry delay, failing to deduct judicial deliberation time for committal reasons, and failing to account for defence's untimely s. 11(b) concerns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the first point.

For the second point, the court clarified that judicial deliberation time for interlocutory matters is generally included within the Jordan ceilings.

The third point was not considered due to an insufficient factual record.

The offender, who was 18 years old at the time of the offences, was sentenced for attempted murder, conspiracy to commit forcible confinement, unauthorized possession of a loaded firearm, possession of a firearm while prohibited, and trafficking in a controlled substance.

The court considered the offender's cognitive impairments, background of poverty, and harsh presentence custody conditions as mitigating factors against the serious aggravating factors of the offences, which included a home invasion and the use of a firearm.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of 14 years, which was reduced to 8 years and 3 months after applying credit for presentence custody.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearm and driving offences, including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, dangerous driving, and assaulting a peace officer.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable doubt standard regarding mens rea for dangerous driving and assaulting a police officer, and that the firearm verdicts were unreasonable due to a lack of knowledge regarding the weapon's characteristics.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of mens rea or credibility of witnesses.

The court concluded there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish the appellant's possession and knowledge of the firearm's loaded and restricted nature, noting that modifications to the weapon suggested intent for it to be operable.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The accused, Joseph Gingras, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and arson causing damage to property.

The charges stemmed from an incident where, while intoxicated, he poured gasoline on himself and the victim, Thomas Boissoneau, in an attempt to dissuade Boissoneau from suicidal ideations, leading to a fire that severely burned Boissoneau and destroyed a residence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the severe impact on victims and the inherently dangerous conduct, alongside mitigating factors such as the guilty plea, remorse, and the accused's Indigenous background, which necessitated the application of Gladue principles.

The court imposed a global sentence of six-and-a-half years imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while acknowledging rehabilitation efforts.

The appellant, who suffered from schizophrenia and represented himself at trial, appealed his first-degree murder conviction.

He argued he was unfit to stand trial and urged the Court of Appeal to overturn or modify the 'limited cognitive capacity' test from R. v. Taylor to require that an accused be capable of making rational decisions in their best interests.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Taylor test, clarifying that while an accused must have a reality-based understanding of their legal predicament and the ability to make decisions, they need not possess 'analytic capacity' to make decisions in their own best interests.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the voluntariness of statements made to a Crown psychiatrist and refused to admit fresh psychiatric evidence to substitute a verdict of not criminally responsible.

The applicant, charged with manslaughter, brought a pre-trial motion for a stay of proceedings alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 48 months.

After deducting defence delay and delay caused by the co-accused's counsel's unavailability, the net delay was approximately 34.38 months, slightly above the presumptive ceiling.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness due to exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the unexpected illness of a key Crown witness and assigned Crown counsel, and the complexity of the joint trial.

The appellant, Trae Worrie, appealed his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted murder, arguing he was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder.

Two forensic psychiatrists unanimously opined he was NCR, but the trial judge rejected this defense, finding him guilty.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge materially misapprehended expert evidence, particularly concerning a psychologist's testimony, and misused the appellant's after-the-fact conduct.

The court concluded there was no rational basis to reject the unanimous expert opinion that the appellant was NCR.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a verdict of NCR was substituted.

The appellants, Saidi Olufeko and Tajudeen Fanikayode, appealed their convictions related to the importation and trafficking of heroin.

Olufeko also appealed his 16-year sentence.

The appeals raised issues including the admissibility and caution for in-court identification, the adequacy of W.(D.) jury instructions, alleged improper criticism of counsel's closing address, and the reasonableness of the verdict and sentence parity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals against conviction and Olufeko's appeal against sentence, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings or the sentence imposed.

The appellant, Timothy Massey-Patel, appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable, that she erred in assessing witness evidence, and that she relied on impermissible stereotypes and applied uneven scrutiny.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable, her assessment of evidence sound, and that she did not rely on stereotypes or apply uneven scrutiny.

The court affirmed that a reasonable doubt on one aspect of the alleged assault (penile penetration) did not invalidate the conviction for other sexual touching and digital penetration, as the doubt arose from reliability concerns, not credibility of the complainant.

The appellant, Todd Howley, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, challenging the trial judge's admission of internet search evidence ("nail gun" searches) and the appropriateness of the Crown's closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction.

The court found the internet search evidence relevant to planning and deliberation, and that the trial judge's timely curative instructions adequately addressed any impropriety in the Crown's closing, thus not warranting a mistrial or a stay of proceedings for abuse of process.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The appeal challenged the admissibility of his in-court statements, the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence and provocation with the jury, and the 17-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding the statements were not protected, not analogous to an aborted guilty plea, and the appellant had an operating mind.

It also upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no air of reality to self-defence or provocation.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was deemed fit given the brutality of the murder.

The appellant, Alexander Sangster, appealed convictions for multiple firearm and assault offences, and a global sentence of seven years and seven months.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings regarding the reasonable expectation of privacy for a guest and the validity of consent to search, and finding no material misapprehension of evidence.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal based on fresh evidence demonstrating the appellant's significant rehabilitative progress while in custody and on bail, substituting the sentence to time served.

During a re-trial for second-degree murder, the accused brothers sought to have the partial defence of provocation left to the jury.

The principal shooter, John, argued he was provoked by the victim's threats.

The court found an air of reality to John's claim, despite evidence of prior threats and preparation.

However, the court ruled that provocation is not available in law to an aider, Mato, as it only applies to the person who committed the murder.

Furthermore, there was no air of reality to provocation for Mato based on the evidence.

In a pre-trial ruling for a second-degree murder case, the court determined the appropriate jury selection procedure following the enactment of Bill C-75, which abolished peremptory challenges.

The defence proposed combining the challenge for cause and stand-aside inquiries.

The court rejected a combined approach but permitted a limited expansion of the challenge for cause questions.

The court established a procedure where, after the challenge for cause, a specific question is asked to assess juror competence, allowing counsel to make submissions on whether the judge should exercise the enhanced stand-aside power under s. 633 of the Criminal Code to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Crown brought an application regarding the jury selection procedure for a second-degree murder trial during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown proposed that the Sheriff divide the jury panels into smaller groups in the absence of the accused, arguing the proposed 'B.C. Model' violated the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that dividing the panels in the absence of the accused would violate their right to be present at trial under section 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court adopted the B.C. Model, which allows for random selection and identification of jurors in open court with the accused present, while accommodating physical distancing requirements.