Alana Page

The court granted the Charter application of Malamin Marong, excluding evidence of a loaded prohibited firearm and cocaine found during a vehicle search.

The court found that the police lacked grounds for the initial traffic stop and subsequent search under the Cannabis Control Act, and that the officer's evidence was unreliable and contradicted by other evidence.

The breaches of Charter sections 8 and 9 were serious, and the exclusion of the evidence was necessary to maintain the integrity of the justice system, despite the reliability and importance of the evidence to the Crown's case.

The Crown sought a recognizance under s. 810.2 of the Criminal Code against Steven Noel Wice, alleging fear on reasonable grounds that he would commit a serious personal injury offence.

The court reviewed Wice's extensive criminal history, including a prior dangerous offender designation, psychiatric assessments diagnosing antisocial personality disorder and high risk of violent recidivism, and his consistent failure to engage in anger management treatment.

Despite some positive conduct, the court found the Crown's fear objectively reasonable due to Wice's past behaviour and lack of progress in addressing his anger issues.

The court imposed an 8-month recognizance with specific conditions, including reporting, weapons prohibition, substance abstinence (except cannabis), disclosure of intimate relationships, and mandatory anger management treatment.

The accused, Mark Thompson, faced charges for possession of Schedule 1 and 3 substances for trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He challenged his warrantless arrest and subsequent search, arguing violations of his s. 8 and s. 9 Charter rights.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, as the confidential informant's tip was vague and insufficiently corroborated by surveillance.

The police notes were found to be misleading, exacerbating the seriousness of the Charter breach.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the significant impact on the accused's liberty outweighed society's interest in the admission of the evidence, leading to its exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, filed a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of his warrantless arrest and search, which were based on confidential informant (CI) information.

The Crown invoked Step 6 of the Garofoli procedure to allow the court to consider redacted CI information, provided a sufficient judicial summary was disclosed to the defence.

The court assessed the sufficiency of the judicial summary, considering defence concerns regarding the recency of information, the CI's criminal record, the reliability of previous CI information, and the specificity of personal identifying information and modus operandi details.

The court found the updated judicial summary sufficient to enable the accused to challenge the grounds for his arrest while protecting the CI's identity.

The accused, Agyei De Roche, was charged with sexual assault following a sexual touching of the complainant, R.D., after a recording session.

The defence argued mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The court examined the interactions between the accused and the complainant, both online and during the podcast recording, and found that the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The court determined that the accused relied on ambiguous conduct and ignored explicit rejections, making the defence of mistaken belief in consent unavailable.

Consequently, the accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The applicant, charged with manslaughter, brought a pre-trial motion for a stay of proceedings alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 48 months.

After deducting defence delay and delay caused by the co-accused's counsel's unavailability, the net delay was approximately 34.38 months, slightly above the presumptive ceiling.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness due to exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the unexpected illness of a key Crown witness and assigned Crown counsel, and the complexity of the joint trial.

The accused was stopped for speeding.

The police officer smelled burnt marijuana and questioned the accused about cannabis, eventually searching the accused's vehicle and satchel under the Cannabis Control Act, finding cocaine.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his ss. 7, 8, and 10(b) rights.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the search, rendering it unlawful under s. 8, and that there was an unreasonable delay in providing access to counsel under s. 10(b).

The court also found the officer gave misleading testimony.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) and dismissed the charge.

This ruling addresses a renewed severance application brought by David Obregon Castro, who, along with co-accused Sarai Lopez-Iglesias, is charged with First Degree Murder.

Both accused intend to present "cut-throat" defences, blaming the other for the victim's death.

The application for severance was renewed after a prior ruling allowed Ms. Lopez-Iglesias to admit evidence of Mr. Obregon Castro's prior discreditable conduct.

The court dismissed the severance application, reaffirming the presumption that jointly charged accused should be tried together, especially when antagonistic defences are present.

The judge found that a single trial would promote efficiency, the truth-seeking function, and reduce the risk of inconsistent verdicts, relying on the jury's ability to follow limiting instructions regarding the use of prior discreditable conduct evidence.

This ruling addresses applications by co-accused David Obregon Castro and Sarai Lopez-Iglesias in a first-degree murder trial to adduce evidence of each other's prior discreditable conduct, given their "cutthroat" defences.

The court applies the balancing test for admissibility of co-accused bad character evidence, which is less stringent than for Crown-led evidence.

Ms. Lopez-Iglesias was permitted to introduce evidence relevant to her state of mind (fear of Obregon Castro), his propensity to commit the crime, and his credibility, including details of the "Z Bar Incident" (shooting), the assault on "Chips" (stabbing), various assaults she suffered from Obregon Castro, and his alleged gang membership (limited to her state of mind).

However, evidence of Obregon Castro's past arson/attempted murder charge (acquitted), claims of torturing "snitches," sexual assault, threats regarding Kyle Watts, a plan to shoot a pawn shop owner, and preliminary inquiry observers was deemed inadmissible due to low probative value outweighed by prejudicial effect.

Mr. Obregon Castro was also allowed to adduce evidence of Ms. Lopez-Iglesias's violence towards him, drug use, and participation in bank frauds to challenge her credibility, but not evidence of trafficking sex workers.

The judge emphasized the necessity of detailed limiting instructions to the jury regarding the use of such evidence.

Mark Anthony Thompson was charged with two counts of failing to comply with a release order, specifically being out of his residence without a surety.

The defense raised the *de minimis non curat lex* argument and challenged the *mens rea* for recklessness.

The court acquitted Thompson on the second count, finding the Crown failed to prove recklessness beyond a reasonable doubt, as Thompson was acting under the direction of his surety.

However, for the first count, the court rejected the *de minimis* defense, considering the seriousness of the underlying manslaughter charge, the strictness of the bail conditions, and Thompson's deliberate, albeit well-intentioned, decision to breach the order.

Thompson was convicted on the first count.

David Obregon Castro and Sarai Lopez-Iglesias, accused of first-degree murder, applied to deliver an opening address to the jury immediately after the Crown.

The court dismissed the application, affirming that such a request is a matter of judicial discretion, not a constitutional right, and should only be granted in special or unusual circumstances.

The court found no such circumstances present, citing concerns about the defence's ability to commit to evidence not yet determined and the risk of the opening address straying into argument.

The applicant brought a s. 11(b) Charter motion alleging unreasonable delay in his criminal trial for shooting-related offences.

The total delay was 43 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan presumptive ceiling.

The court analyzed periods of defence delay and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The primary factual dispute was whether the initial trial adjournment was due to Crown/police disclosure delays or the pandemic.

The court found the adjournment was due to the Covid-19 pandemic, deducting the associated delay.

The resulting net delay was well below the presumptive ceiling, and the applicant failed to demonstrate that the delay was "markedly longer than it reasonably should have" or that the defence took "meaningful steps" to expedite proceedings, particularly regarding a questionable s. 8 Charter motion.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and related offences.

The court considered the offender's extensive criminal record, including prior firearms convictions, as well as mitigating factors such as systemic racism and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

A global sentence of 9 years was imposed, with 64 months of credit granted for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions, leaving 44 months to serve.

The accused was convicted by a jury of substantive charges including possession of a firearm and cocaine.

The failure to comply (FTC) charges were severed by a consent order to be tried by judge alone, with the evidence from the jury trial to apply.

At the FTC trial, the Crown argued the judge was bound by the jury's factual findings, while the defence argued the judge could independently assess the evidence.

The court found the severance order was unclear and the parties were not ad idem.

To avoid inconsistent verdicts or unfairness, the court ordered a mistrial of the FTC charges, directing them to be tried before a different judge with new evidence.

The offender was convicted of possession of a prohibited firearm and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The firearm, a loaded .45 calibre handgun, was found hidden under a bedsheet on a couch in the offender's apartment.

The offender claimed he was holding it for a friend.

The court sentenced the offender to 36 months for the firearm offence and 8 months consecutive for the breach of the prohibition order, for a total of 44 months.

After applying a 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody and an additional 90 days for harsh conditions due to institutional lockdowns, the sentence was reduced to time served plus one day.

The defendants brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude evidence seized from an apartment pursuant to a search warrant, alleging breaches of their s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found that while a police officer's warrantless entry to 'freeze' the apartment violated s. 8, the breach was committed in good faith and did not warrant exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

After reviewing the Information to Obtain (ITO) and making necessary excisions, the court concluded that the redacted ITO, amplified by a judicial summary of confidential informant information, provided sufficient reliable evidence for the issuing justice to grant the warrant.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant was arrested for possession of a firearm after a loaded gun was found in an apartment she shared with her son.

At the police station, she was subjected to a Level 3 strip search, which included the removal of her underwire bra.

She brought a Charter application arguing the search violated her s. 8 rights.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the strip search, as it was conducted as a matter of routine policy rather than on a case-by-case basis.

Given the serious and systemic nature of the police misconduct in disregarding established law on strip searches, the court concluded that a stay of proceedings was the only appropriate remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter to preserve the integrity of the justice system.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude drug evidence found on his person during an arrest.

The police officers claimed they detained the accused because he was walking in a manner that suggested he was concealing a firearm.

The court found the officers' testimony lacked credibility and concluded the accused was targeted due to his perceived gang affiliation.

The court held that the detention, arrest, and subsequent search were unlawful, violating the accused's rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Charter.

The officers also used excessive force and lied to the accused about the reason for his detention.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, citing the officers' bad faith and deliberate disregard for the accused's Charter rights.

The three accused were charged with firearms and drug offences following a vehicle stop.

They brought Charter applications alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The Crown argued the stop was a valid dual-purpose stop under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found the officers' testimony lacked credibility and that the HTA rationale was a pretext for an unlawful criminal investigation.

The court concluded the accused were arbitrarily detained and subjected to unreasonable searches.

Given the seriousness of the breaches and the finding that the officers misled the court, the evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in acquittals.

The accused, Damion Lewis, faced charges including uttering threats, using a firearm while threatening, theft of mail, and various firearm possession offences.

The trial proceeded in two phases, with the Crown reopening its case to prove the accused's date of birth for firearm authorization purposes.

The court assessed the complainant's credibility, finding her evidence generally unreliable due to inconsistencies and fear.

Consequently, Lewis was acquitted of the threat and firearm-related threat charges (Counts 1, 2, 3).

However, he was found guilty of theft of mail (Count 4), possession of a loaded prohibited firearm (Count 5), possession of a prohibited firearm without a license and registration certificate (Count 6), and carrying a concealed weapon (Count 8).

Count 7, which was a lesser included offence of Count 6, was found guilty but stayed under the Kineapple principle.

The court also ruled on the admissibility of the accused's statement regarding his date of birth, finding it voluntary and not in violation of his Charter rights.