Sunita Malik

The accused was charged with three counts of sexual assault and one count each of assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm, alleged to have occurred between March 1, 2018 and January 31, 2020, against his spouse.

The charges involved allegations of forced vaginal intercourse, non-consensual anal intercourse on two occasions, assault with a jar of Vaseline, and assault causing a broken toe.

The trial proceeded on the basis of conflicting testimony between the complainant and the accused, with credibility being the central issue.

The court found the accused not guilty on all five counts, citing concerns regarding the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, inconsistencies in her testimony, and the timing of her allegations to police.

The court sentenced William Gallerno for aggravated assault under section 268 of the Criminal Code.

The unprovoked attack caused significant injuries to the victim, Ms. Assenza.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the severity and randomness of the assault and Gallerno’s criminal history, as well as mitigating factors including his Indigenous heritage, addiction, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of one year and six months, after credit for pre-sentence custody, and recommended placement in a treatment facility.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons ban, DNA order, and a non-contact order with the victim and her family.

The court considered whether the mandatory minimum sentence for robbery with a firearm under s. 344(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, recently upheld as constitutional in R. v. Hilbach, would violate the Charter rights of Mr. Dennis, who had already served a sentence for possession of the same firearm.

The court found that the total sentence was not grossly disproportionate and that the circumstances did not warrant a constitutional exemption or a finding of double punishment.

The mandatory minimum was imposed.

The accused, William Gallerno, was tried for aggravated assault under section 268 of the Criminal Code.

The main issue was identification, as the victim, Ms. Assenza, could not identify her assailant.

The court considered the authenticity and chain of custody of a surveillance video showing the assault, as well as corroborating evidence from police, the victim’s husband, and subsequent police interactions with Mr. Gallerno.

Despite gaps in the chain of custody and the victim’s inability to identify the accused, the court found the video authentic and the identification evidence overwhelming, concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Gallerno was the assailant.

A finding of guilt was entered.

The applicant brought a s. 11(b) Charter motion alleging unreasonable delay in his criminal trial for shooting-related offences.

The total delay was 43 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan presumptive ceiling.

The court analyzed periods of defence delay and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The primary factual dispute was whether the initial trial adjournment was due to Crown/police disclosure delays or the pandemic.

The court found the adjournment was due to the Covid-19 pandemic, deducting the associated delay.

The resulting net delay was well below the presumptive ceiling, and the applicant failed to demonstrate that the delay was "markedly longer than it reasonably should have" or that the defence took "meaningful steps" to expedite proceedings, particularly regarding a questionable s. 8 Charter motion.

The 82-year-old accused was found guilty of manslaughter for the domestic homicide of his wife.

At the time of the offence, the accused was experiencing a major depressive episode and subsequently entered a catatonic state.

The court weighed the gravity of domestic homicide against the accused's age, mental illness, lack of prior record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions exacerbated by the global pandemic.

The accused was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment, reduced to 14 months and 26 days after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and lockdowns, followed by 3 years of probation.

The accused was tried on three counts of indecent assault under the former Criminal Code arising from alleged sexual touching of his niece in 1966.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework, accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and substantially consistent on material points, and found the accused's memory too frail and unreliable to raise a reasonable doubt.

The court also accepted evidence of a 1980 confrontation as amounting to a partial admission that some sexual misconduct had occurred.

The Crown proved the first two counts beyond a reasonable doubt, while the third count was withdrawn by the Crown during final argument.

The Crown appealed a 5.5-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for the sexual assault of an intoxicated, sleeping complainant.

The trial judge had imposed the conditional sentence largely to avoid collateral immigration consequences that would trigger the respondent's deportation.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by failing to properly weigh deterrence and denunciation, and by using immigration consequences to impose a sentence outside the appropriate range.

The sentence was varied to 5.5 months of incarceration, though the respondent was not required to serve further time as the conditional sentence had already been completed.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent for impaired driving and over 80, which was based on a violation of the respondent's s.11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The trial judge found a total Crown and institutional delay of thirteen months and one week to the end of trial.

The Superior Court, applying the new framework from R. v. Jordan and R. v. Williamson, re-evaluated the periods of delay, correcting several characterizations made by the trial judge regarding Crown, institutional, and inherent delay.

The court found the total institutional/Crown delay to be below the Jordan presumptive ceiling and that no actual or inferred prejudice was established.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, B.P. (YOA), appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's errors regarding the admissibility and reliability of the complainant's hearsay statement, the weight given to the complainant's mother's evidence despite misidentification, the failure to properly analyze the appellant's evidence against the burden of proof, and impermissible speculation about the complainant's knowledge of sexual activity.

The Superior Court of Justice found multiple errors in the trial judge's approach to hearsay reliability, assessment of witness credibility, and application of the burden of proof.

The appeal was granted, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Jungmin Lee, appealed his convictions and sentence for careless driving and failing to comply with a recognizance, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

He alleged his counsel failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea and did not seek a conditional discharge.

The court found that while counsel's omissions regarding immigration consequences constituted ineffective assistance, no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The original conviction and suspended sentence were deemed warranted, and a conditional discharge would have been contrary to public interest given the serious nature of the breach of recognizance.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's evidence of consuming alcohol after driving but before breath tests, citing a lack of corroboration.

The appellate court found that this imposed an unwarranted obligation on the appellant, as there was no onus on him to prove post-driving consumption.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving an 11-year-old complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework, misapprehended evidence, rendered an unreasonable verdict, provided insufficient reasons, and imposed a harsh sentence.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of legal principles.

The consecutive sentences totaling ten months were upheld as fit, considering the totality principle and the aggravating factor of the victim's age.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the test for impairment and failed to consider evidence consistent with non-impairment.

The appellant had been pulled over for driving 138 km/h in a 90 km/h zone, had bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors in assessing the evidence and that any degree of impairment is sufficient for a conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the trial judge erred in relying on the complainant's inconsistent testimony, misapprehended the video surveillance evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of credibility was supported by the video evidence, which was virtually determinative of the outcome.

The court held that the inferences drawn from the video were reasonable and the evidence was capable of supporting the conviction.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle following a single-car accident.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the statutory presumption of care or control and in her interpretation of the 'risk of danger' element from Boudreault.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly concluded the appellant had not rebutted the presumption of care or control, as he was found in the driver's seat with the engine running and failed to prove a change in his intention to drive.

The court also affirmed that the Boudreault risk of danger analysis is subsumed when the Crown successfully relies on the statutory presumption.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and robbery, sought a bail review after being detained by a justice of the peace.

He argued the justice of the peace erred in law and that a new plan of release constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court found no procedural unfairness or error of law in the initial hearing, noting the strong Crown case on the tertiary ground.

The court also rejected the new plan of release, finding the proposed sureties unsuitable due to evasiveness and inability to properly supervise the accused.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The Crown applied to designate the respondent a dangerous offender following his convictions for two separate, unprovoked, and brutal attempted murders of vulnerable women working alone in retail stores.

The court found that the predicate offences were serious personal injury offences and that the respondent's conduct demonstrated a pattern of repetitive, persistent, and aggressive behaviour with a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences.

Psychiatric evidence indicated a moderate to high risk of violent re-offending and a lack of insight into the triggers for his violence.

Concluding that there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public, the court designated the respondent a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

At his new trial for manslaughter, the accused sought to adduce evidence of two prior violent attacks by the deceased against him to support his claim of self-defence.

The Crown did not oppose this but sought to adduce reply evidence of the accused's prior convictions for violence.

The court ruled that the accused could adduce the evidence of the deceased's prior violence, but doing so would open the door for the Crown to adduce evidence of the accused's disposition for violence to ensure the jury had a balanced picture of the parties' respective dispositions for aggression.