Adam Little

The appellant was found in the driver's seat of an inoperable vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

He was acquitted at trial on the basis that the vehicle's inoperability rebutted the presumption of operation under s. 320.35 of the Criminal Code.

The summary conviction appeal judge overturned the acquittal, holding that the presumption could only be rebutted by proving the accused did not occupy the seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the plain text of s. 320.35 provides only one method of rebutting the presumption, and inoperability or lack of realistic risk of danger does not suffice.

The applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought post-104 week income replacement benefits (IRBs) and interest.

The respondent denied the benefits, arguing the applicant could maintain employment.

The Tribunal found the applicant suffered a concussion and mild traumatic brain injury, leading to significant physical and psychological impairments.

Preferring the evidence of the applicant's experts over the respondent's, the Tribunal concluded the applicant demonstrated a complete inability to engage in any employment for which she is reasonably suited by education, training, or experience.

The applicant was awarded IRBs of $168.59 per week from August 24, 2023, to date, plus interest.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mgs following a motor vehicle collision.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including an unlawful delay in making a roadside screening demand and a deliberate subversion by police of the accused's right to consult her counsel of choice.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the dismissal of the over 80 charge.

The court also found the remaining evidence insufficient to prove even a slight degree of impairment under the Stellato test, and acquitted the accused of impaired driving.

The applicant sought post-104 week income replacement benefits (IRBs) after a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer argued the application was time-barred, relying on a denial issued before the 104-week mark when the applicant had temporarily returned to work.

The Tribunal found that the initial denial was premature regarding post-104 week IRBs, as entitlement to those benefits was not yet discoverable.

The Tribunal held the application was filed within the two-year limitation period triggered by a subsequent valid denial.

In the alternative, the Tribunal granted an extension of the limitation period under section 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, finding minimal prejudice to the insurer and sufficient merit to the claim.

The appellant was convicted of "80 plus" after being approached by police while drinking in a parked car in a plaza parking lot.

The officer detained him to check his sobriety, waited 15 minutes due to potential mouth alcohol, and then demanded an ASD sample once the device arrived.

The trial judge admitted the breath readings, finding the stop was authorized at common law, the demand met statutory immediacy requirements, and the admission of evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute despite an 11-minute delay in providing the right to counsel upon arrest.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, holding that the police have common law authority to conduct random sobriety stops in public parking lots, that an informal immediate demand satisfied the Criminal Code, and that the trial judge's findings on exclusion of evidence and care and control were reasonable.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's dismissal of impaired operation and "over 80" charges against the respondent.

The trial judge found the certificate of qualified technician (CQT) inadmissible because the Crown failed to prove that the respondent was "given" a copy of the certificate as required by section 320.32(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by requiring proof beyond merely showing the document to the accused.

The appellate court dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding was a question of fact, not law, and that "given" requires permanent transfer of the document to the accused, not merely temporary display.

The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with a breath demand under section 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code.

The trial involved a directed verdict application and a Charter application alleging violations under sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that while the directed verdict application was dismissed, the defendant's refusal to provide a breath sample was provisional only, pending access to counsel.

The police failed to meet the reasonable diligence standard by denying the defendant's repeated requests for access to the internet to find private counsel.

The court found no actus reus for the refusal offence and acquitted the defendant.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered three appeals arising from two convictions and an order for a new trial in impaired driving cases.

The central issue was whether, under the amended Criminal Code, the Crown must adduce direct evidence from an analyst or the analyst’s certificate to prove the alcohol standard used to calibrate an Approved Instrument, or whether the certificate or testimony of a qualified technician is sufficient.

The court followed the Yukon Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. MacDonald, holding that the qualified technician’s certificate is evidence of the facts alleged in it, including that the alcohol standard was certified by an analyst.

The appeals were dismissed.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits for medical cannabis and nutritionist services following a 2015 motor vehicle accident.

The respondent insurer denied the treatment plans.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that either treatment plan was reasonable and necessary.

The Tribunal preferred the evidence of the respondent's section 44 examiners, who concluded that medical cannabis was contraindicated and unsupported by guidelines, and that nutritionist services were unnecessary given the applicant's stable weight.

This is an appeal of a summary conviction where the appellant was convicted of failing or refusing to comply with a breath demand, having been acquitted of impaired operation.

The appellant challenged the conviction on two main grounds: an alleged violation of his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel and errors in the trial judge's analysis of the refusal offence, specifically regarding the unequivocal nature of the refusal and the onus of proof for reasonable excuse.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to dismiss the Charter application, as the appellant was not reasonably diligent in seeking a second consultation with counsel and no changed circumstances warranted it.

The court also found that the trial judge's finding of a "simple refusal" implicitly included a determination that the refusal was unequivocal, given the context of the Charter application findings.

An alleged error regarding the onus of proof for reasonable excuse was deemed immaterial as it was not a live issue at trial.

This Crown appeal addresses the timeframe within which an initial refusal to provide a roadside breath sample (ASD demand) can be retracted before constituting a criminal offence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reconciled the "same transaction" principle from R. v. Domik with the "immediately" requirement of the Criminal Code s. 320.27(1)(b).

The court held that Domik applies to ASD demands, but the "same transaction" window is limited by the time police can lawfully obtain a sample "immediately" considering operational time and unusual circumstances, as interpreted by R. v. Breault.

The trial and summary conviction appeal judges erred in law by not properly applying these constraints.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This is an appeal of a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The appellant alleged multiple Charter breaches, including an invalid Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand due to the officer not having the device present, delays in informing and facilitating the right to counsel, and a privacy breach during washroom use at the police station.

The appeal court, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Breault, found the ASD demand invalid, leading to cascading Charter breaches (sections 8, 9, 10(b)).

Despite these breaches, which were deemed unintentional and situational, the court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the highly reliable breathalyzer evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, given the strong societal interest in prosecuting impaired driving.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired care and control.

The trial judge found reasonable doubt that the accused drove the vehicle and acquitted based on the vehicle being inoperable and posing no public danger, thus rebutting the s. 320.35 presumption.

The Superior Court held that inoperability does not rebut the presumption, which only requires the accused to prove they did not occupy the driver's seat to set the vehicle in motion.

The court found the trial judge erred in law by not applying the presumption and remitted the matter for a new trial.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on "over 80" charges, where the trial judge excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a s. 8 breach due to police delay in taking samples "as soon as practicable." The Superior Court found the trial judge erred in law by holding that s. 320.28(1) of the Criminal Code imposes a Charter-protected requirement for samples to be taken "as soon as practicable." The court clarified that this phrase relates to an evidentiary shortcut, not a Charter right.

Even if such a requirement existed, the police complied.

The court also found the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis insufficient and incorrect, concluding that the seriousness of the state conduct was low, the impact on the accused's Charter rights was minimal, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favored admission.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered for the "over 80" charge.

The appellant, Can Imer, appealed his conviction for "80 and over" (driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood).

The appeal raised three grounds related to alleged breaches of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel: failure to immediately ask if he wished to contact counsel, insufficient efforts by police to contact his counsel of choice, and being "funneled" to duty counsel.

The court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the s. 10(b) rights were not breached, distinguishing the facts from cases where breaches were found due to police steering or insufficient efforts.

In the alternative, the court held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence (breath samples) would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, given the moderate seriousness of any misconduct, low impact on the accused's rights, and society's vital interest in combatting drinking and driving.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction upheld.

The moving party, convicted of impaired driving, sought to re-open his application for leave to appeal, arguing that due to an administrative error, the panel was not provided with all the material filed.

The moving party had relied on arguments from factums in two other related applications.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the panel had in fact obtained and reviewed the related factums before determining the original application.

The moving party failed to establish a clear and compelling case that a miscarriage of justice would likely occur absent a re-opening.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an impaired driving charge, which resulted from the trial judge's exclusion of breath test evidence.

The trial judge found two Charter breaches: arbitrary detention (s. 9) when the respondent was placed in a police vehicle for an ASD test without reasonable necessity, and unreasonable search/seizure (s. 7 and s. 8) due to video monitoring and recording of the respondent using the toilet in her cell, where the provided privacy gown was ineffective.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings of Charter violations, affirming that the increased restriction on liberty required reasonable necessity and that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists even in police cell toilets.

The court also upheld the exclusion of the breath test evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a sufficient connection between the breaches and the evidence, and that the seriousness of the s. 8 breach warranted exclusion.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that a 'deficient sample' registered by the approved instrument constituted a 'sample' under s. 320.31(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, thereby requiring a new system calibration check before the next sample.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal, holding that a deficient sample is not a 'sample' within the meaning of the provision and that there is no implied requirement for a calibration check immediately before each sample.

The court also rejected the respondent's argument that the certificate of qualified technician was inadmissible hearsay, finding itself bound by horizontal stare decisis.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a preliminary issue decision which found she was not involved in an accident.

The applicant argued the Tribunal violated procedural fairness, made errors of law, and failed to properly apply the legal test for an accident.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding the applicant was attempting to re-litigate her case and that no errors of law or procedural fairness violations occurred.

The Tribunal confirmed its previous finding that the applicant's impairments arose from the aftermath of the accident, not the use or operation of an automobile.

The defendant, Timothy Tafilica, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 785 days (25.8 months).

The court calculated defence delay, attributing 57 days for a cancelled Crown Pre-Trial (CPT) and 105 days for defence unavailability for trial dates.

The net delay was 623 days (20.8 months), exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The Crown argued for a deduction due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but the court found no evidence that the pandemic specifically caused the delay in this case, noting that local resource issues predated and contributed to delay.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.