Adam Little

The Crown appealed an acquittal of Kevin Davis for impaired driving, arguing the summary conviction appeal judge erred in upholding the trial judge's decision to exclude breath samples due to a s. 10(b) Charter informational breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding that the "obtained in a manner" issue was not properly raised, and that the appeal judge's findings on the seriousness and impact of the breach were reasonable and owed deference.

The court emphasized that the "fresh start" doctrine should be applied cautiously to informational breaches, especially when the subsequent compliance does not fully dispel the initial breach's effects.

Sean Rosenthal, charged with impaired driving, brought multiple motions seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and a declaration that the Information was a nullity due to breaches of s. 505 and s. 485 of the Criminal Code, arguing violations of his s. 7 and 11(d) Charter rights.

The court dismissed all motions, finding that the net delay was below the Jordan ceiling and that the procedural errors in laying the Information did not invalidate it or result in a loss of jurisdiction over the offence, nor did they constitute Charter violations or an abuse of process.

The accused, Mikhail Koralov, faced charges of impaired driving and having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg within two hours of operating a conveyance.

He brought several Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including delayed and insufficient communication of the right to counsel, denial of access to counsel from the police car, unreasonable handcuffing at the police division, and failure to obtain breath samples as soon as practicable.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the seriousness and impact of the breaches outweighed society's interest in the evidence's admission, leading to the exclusion of the breath sample readings and the dismissal of the blood alcohol charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He raised six grounds of appeal, including challenges to the admission of hearsay evidence regarding the breathalyzer's calibration, the application of the repealed presumption of identity, the reasonableness of the delay in taking breath samples, the officer's grounds for arrest, and the Crown's failure to disclose the analyst's certificate.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed all grounds, finding no errors in the trial judge's application of the law or assessment of the evidence.

The appellant appealed the administrative suspension of his driver's licence under s. 48.3.1 of the Highway Traffic Act, which was imposed after a Drug Recognition Evaluation (DRE) concluded his ability to drive was impaired by drugs.

The appellant argued that his poor performance on the physical tests was due to diabetic neuropathy, not impairment from his prescribed medications (morphine, Percocet, pregabalin).

The Licence Appeal Tribunal accepted the medical evidence from the appellant's family doctor confirming his neuropathy and chronic opioid use, and found the appellant's testimony credible.

The Tribunal concluded that the appellant's ability to drive was not impaired by a drug and that his medical condition impaired his performance on the evaluation.

The suspension was set aside.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol, challenging the trial judge's decision to admit breath test evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter and the admissibility of a qualified technician's certificate.

The appellant argued errors in assessing the seriousness and impact of Charter breaches (s.8, 9, 10(b), and a newly raised s.10(a) issue) and in balancing the factors for exclusion.

She also argued that the certificate contained inadmissible hearsay regarding the alcohol standard solution.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's s.24(2) analysis, finding no error in the assessment of the seriousness or impact of the breaches, nor in the balancing of factors.

The court refused to allow the appellant to raise the s.10(a) and hearsay issues for the first time on appeal, citing an insufficient evidentiary record, presumed tactical omission, and no resulting miscarriage of justice.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and over 80 contrary to the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 10(a) and 10(b), seeking exclusion of breath samples and police observations under section 24(2).

The court found minor breaches of both sections: a 45-second delay in informing the defendant of the reason for detention (s. 10(a)) and a six-minute delay in providing rights to counsel (s. 10(b)).

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the breaches were of low to moderate seriousness and had low impact on the defendant's Charter rights, while society's interest in adjudication on the merits favored admission of the reliable evidence.

Consequently, no evidence was excluded.

The court also found that the Crown proved the technical requirements for breath samples under sections 258(1)(c)(iii) and 320.31(1)(a) of the Code.

The defendant was convicted on both impaired operation and over 80 charges.

The appellant's driver's licence was suspended for 90 days under the Highway Traffic Act following an impaired driving investigation.

The appellant filed an appeal after the 90-day suspension period had expired.

The Registrar brought a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal was not commenced while the suspension was in effect.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, interpreting section 50.1(1) of the Act to mean that a person whose licence 'has been suspended' may appeal, and finding no statutory time limit for commencing such an appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The offence occurred before the enactment of Bill C-46, but the trial took place after the amendments came into effect.

The appellant argued that the presumption of identity in former s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code was no longer available in transitional cases and that the Crown was required to present expert evidence relating the breath test results back to the time of driving.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, following binding precedent that the presumption of identity remains available in transitional cases.

This is a mid-trial ruling on the admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial for impaired operation and over 80.

The court addressed two issues: the admissibility of a Certificate of Analyst and a printout from an approved instrument.

The court ruled that the Certificate of Analyst could not be marked as an exhibit due to the Crown's failure to provide prior notice as required by s. 320.32(2) of the Criminal Code, though its content could still be introduced through viva voce evidence.

Conversely, the court found that a printout from an approved instrument, even if produced by an external printer, was admissible as an exhibit under s. 320.33 of the Criminal Code, provided it was certified by a qualified technician.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and "exceed 79".

The trial focused on whether a qualified technician's certificate, stating that an alcohol standard was certified by an analyst, was sufficient proof for the presumption of accuracy under section 320.31 of the Criminal Code, or if direct analyst evidence was required.

The court also addressed the principle of stare decisis, specifically whether a lower court could revisit a settled legal issue based on a new interpretation or analysis from a non-binding higher court decision.

The court found that it was bound by existing Ontario Superior Court precedents and that a new interpretation alone does not permit departure from binding authority.

The defendant was found guilty.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.

The trial judge had delivered a brief oral acquittal and later provided comprehensive written reasons after inviting further submissions on a new appellate decision.

The parties agreed that under R. v. Teskey, the appellate court could not consider the written reasons, and under R. v. Sheppard, the oral reasons were insufficient for appellate review.

The summary conviction appeal court accepted the joint submission, set aside the acquittal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg/100 mL.

He argued that his breath samples were not taken 'as soon as practicable', that the Crown could not rely on the repealed 'presumption of identity' provision, and that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when he was denied a second call to his own lawyer after speaking with duty counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the breath tests were conducted within a reasonable time, that the presumption of identity continued to apply to pre-amendment offences, and that the appellant's dissatisfaction with duty counsel did not trigger a right to a second consultation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving and 'over 80', arguing that the Crown's cross-examination of its own police witness during a blended trial and voir dire resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and that his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated when he was not permitted to contact his father to arrange counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the procedural irregularity did not render the trial unfair and that the trial judge's factual finding that the appellant sought to contact his father for emotional support rather than to retain counsel was entitled to deference.

The appeal against sentence was allowed to the extent of setting aside the victim fine surcharge.

Three appellants were convicted at trial of assault causing bodily harm, with two also convicted of unlawful confinement.

Following the trial judge's reasons, the appellants moved for a stay of proceedings on the basis that their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, but the Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, finding the net delay was below the Jordan ceiling.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal in the result and leaving several s. 11(b) legal issues — including treatment of multiple accused and post-conviction applications — to be resolved in a future case.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired and while his blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit, with offences dating to September 1, 2017.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application to stay the charges for violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The trial was scheduled for November 23-24, 2020.

The court found that the net delay of 567 days (18 months and 17 days) exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court rejected the Crown's "but-for" analysis in favor of a "common sense" approach to scheduling delays and found no exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The charges were stayed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights due to the police's failure to provide a Tamil interpreter.

The trial judge found no "special circumstances" requiring an interpreter, a decision upheld on appeal.

The Superior Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, which considered the appellant's 30 years of residency in Canada, employment, ability to converse in English, and his actions indicating understanding of his rights, including attempting to contact duty counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Rory Coutts, appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found Charter breaches regarding the roadside Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand not being made forthwith and a delay in providing reasons for detention, but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the court considered whether the breathalyzer demand under s. 254(3) was lawful, given the unlawful ASD demand.

The court found that the unlawful ASD demand rendered the "fail" result inadmissible to establish reasonable grounds for the s. 254(3) breathalyzer demand, thus making the latter demand unlawful.

Consequently, the appellant was under no legal obligation to comply, and his refusal was not a criminal offence.

The conviction was quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against three accused (Pauls, Jamal Yusuf, and Jamis Yusuf) for assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement, citing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge had attributed most of the 35-month delay to the Crown's inaccurate time estimate and mishandling of a defence disclosure request.

The Court of Appeal re-evaluated the delay, finding that while the Crown was initially responsible for the misestimate, all parties and the court shared responsibility once the trial progressed.

The defence's disclosure request was deemed unnecessary and inappropriate, contributing to delay.

After further deductions for defence-caused delay (counsel unavailability, Pauls' illness) and joint responsibility for misestimates, the net delay for all respondents fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Court also rejected the respondents' challenges to their guilt findings.

The accused brought a motion for a finding that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached, and sought a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" and impaired driving on October 7, 2017, with the information laid on October 17, 2017.

The third trial date was scheduled for March 4, 2020, representing a total delay of 29 months.

The court calculated the net delay at 21 months after deducting defence delay and exceptional circumstances, which exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found a breach of s. 11(b) and granted a stay of proceedings.