Adam Little

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a motor vehicle accident on Highway 400.

A police constable administered an approved screening device (ASD) test which the accused failed, leading to arrest and subsequent breathalyzer tests showing a blood alcohol content well over the legal limit.

The accused challenged the validity of the ASD test on Charter grounds, arguing that the device had not been properly calibrated within the required 15-day interval and that the officer lacked objective grounds for reliance on the test result.

The court found a section 8 Charter violation, excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while blood alcohol content exceeded 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case depended entirely on the results of an Approved Screening Device test and subsequent breath samples.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to rely on the ASD results because he could not establish the device had been calibrated within the required timeframe, resulting in an unlawful arrest and arbitrary detention.

The court also found a breach of the right to counsel, as the officer failed to inform the accused of his right to search for counsel of choice, controlled all means of contacting counsel, and withheld information that the accused's father had called with a lawyer's name.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample after being found asleep in his vehicle on the shoulder of the 401 highway.

The Crown alleged the accused was impaired by alcohol based on observations at the roadside.

The accused testified he pulled over to take a nap due to fatigue and made good faith efforts to provide a breath sample but was unable to do so.

The court found three Charter breaches: loss of rough notes (section 7), failure to advise of reason for detention (section 10(a)), and placement in a cell without considering less restrictive alternatives (section 9).

Under section 24(2), the evidence was admitted.

The court acquitted on impaired driving due to reasonable doubt but convicted on refusing to provide a breath sample, finding the accused intentionally failed to blow into the Intoxilyzer despite multiple opportunities.

The accused was charged with over 80 (impaired driving) following a RIDE stop.

The Crown sought to introduce breath sample evidence.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused's Charter rights were breached in three respects: (1) the manner of detention in the police cruiser for the roadside screening test was not reasonably necessary; (2) the accused was not adequately facilitated in her right to consult with counsel of her choice, as the police policy effectively channeled her toward duty counsel; and (3) the accused was subjected to an unjustified strip search.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence based on the cumulative effect of these breaches and the serious impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the accused was feigning to blow and did not provide a suitable sample despite being given seven opportunities.

The accused brought Charter arguments under sections 8 and 9 to exclude evidence of his refusal.

The court found violations of both sections 8 and 9 but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) after balancing the Grant factors.

On the substantive charge, the court found the accused intentionally failed to provide a suitable sample and convicted him as charged.

The accused was stopped by police ostensibly for speeding and running red lights, but the officer's actual purpose was to investigate impaired driving.

The officer failed to immediately advise the accused of the true reason for the detention, conducted an unjustified pat-down search, and unlawfully detained the accused in the back of a police cruiser before administering a roadside screening device.

Although the officer made reasonable efforts to facilitate contact with counsel of choice, the court found violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The breath sample evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle over the legal limit contrary to the Criminal Code of Canada.

The Crown proved the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defence raised three Charter-based issues: two alleged breaches of section 9 (arbitrary detention) relating to placement in the police cruiser and overholding at the station, and one alleged breach of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) relating to a pat-down search.

The court found that placing the accused in the cruiser was reasonable and necessary for administering the ASD test.

The pat-down search was found to be unlawful and a breach of section 8, but evidence was not excluded under section 24(2) as the breach was not serious enough.

The court assumed a breach of section 9 regarding overholding for approximately three hours but declined to grant a stay of proceedings.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and having a blood alcohol content over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a single motor vehicle collision on February 29, 2015.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused brought multiple Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 11(d), arguing that statements made to police prior to arrest were compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and that he was detained without being informed of his rights.

The court rejected these arguments, finding that the accused was not detained during the initial police encounter, which was a preliminary investigation of the accident scene.

The court found the accused's statements were voluntary and not compelled.

The breath samples were properly obtained and admissible.

The court convicted the accused on the impaired driving charge and entered a conditional stay on the over 80 charge.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on delay.

The Information was sworn 15 months prior, and this was the third trial date.

The court applied the Jordan framework and found that while the net delay of 15 months fell below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for the Ontario Court of Justice, the defence had demonstrated both a sustained effort to expedite proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it should have.

The Crown failed to take reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings, particularly when the assigned Crown was unavailable at the scheduled trial start time, resulting in the trial not being completed as scheduled.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent for impaired driving and over 80, which was based on a violation of the respondent's s.11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The trial judge found a total Crown and institutional delay of thirteen months and one week to the end of trial.

The Superior Court, applying the new framework from R. v. Jordan and R. v. Williamson, re-evaluated the periods of delay, correcting several characterizations made by the trial judge regarding Crown, institutional, and inherent delay.

The court found the total institutional/Crown delay to be below the Jordan presumptive ceiling and that no actual or inferred prejudice was established.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant was arrested for impaired driving and subjected to a strip search at 32 Division without reasonable and probable grounds.

Although both counsel agreed the police violated the defendant's section 8 Charter rights, they disagreed on the appropriate remedy.

The Crown sought a sentence reduction while the defence sought a stay of proceedings.

The court found systemic and ongoing constitutional violations at 32 Division regarding strip searches, with evidence that officers routinely conducted unconstitutional searches while mislabeling them as Level 2 searches.

The court granted a stay of proceedings, finding this was one of the clearest cases warranting such a remedy to preserve the integrity of the justice system.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that affirmed the accused's acquittal.

The Crown argued the case raised important questions about a detainee's obligation of diligence under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the police officer failed to afford the detainee a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel of his choice or facilitate that contact, and thus the proposed questions were not raised on the facts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol after being stopped leaving a licensed establishment in Markham in the early morning hours of October 23, 2014.

The accused failed a roadside screening device test and subsequently provided breath samples at the police station showing readings of 153 and 139 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test evidence on Charter grounds, arguing breaches of section 10(b) (right to counsel) and section 9 (protection against arbitrary detention).

The court rejected both Charter applications and found the accused guilty of the offence.

The applicant brought a Charter application under Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with driving with excess alcohol on October 23, 2014, and the trial was not completed until December 11, 2015—a total of 13 months and 19 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin, considering the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

The court found that while the delay exceeded Morin guidelines by approximately 10 months and 19 days (after accounting for neutral intake and preparation time), the actual and inferred prejudice was insufficient to establish a Charter breach.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with Over 80 mgs. contrary to s.253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He brought a pre-trial Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, seeking exclusion of breath samples and statements obtained following his detention and arrest.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of the s.8 argument and particulars of the alleged s.7 and s.8 breaches.

The court dismissed both the Crown's application for summary dismissal and its request for particulars, finding that where a warrantless seizure is alleged, the Crown bears the burden of establishing lawful preconditions, and the defendant need not provide detailed particulars beyond putting the Crown on notice of the issue.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with over 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 mls of blood.

He brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 7 and 11(b) due to unreasonable delay.

The trial was scheduled approximately 14 months after arrest.

The court applied the Morin framework to assess the reasonableness of the delay, considering the length of delay, waivers, reasons for delay (including actions of the accused, crown, and institutional resources), and prejudice to the accused.

The court found that the accused's Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated and granted the stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit after breath sample evidence had been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found a breach of the respondent’s right to counsel under s. 10(b) because police failed to give a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel of choice, defaulted quickly to duty counsel, and failed to facilitate contact beyond leaving a single voicemail.

The appellate court held that the informational and implementational components of s. 10(b) were breached where the accused reasonably believed he had no option but to speak with duty counsel rather than wait for his chosen lawyer.

Despite the reliability and minimally intrusive nature of breath evidence, the seriousness of the Charter breach justified exclusion to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The Crown’s appeal from the acquittal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and "drive over 80" following his arrest on January 20, 2014.

The accused brought an application for relief pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The trial proceeded on March 18-19, 2015, and continued on June 19, 2015.

The total delay from arrest to the continuation date was 17 months.

The court found that the Crown's failure to provide readily available disclosure, particularly the cell video, caused substantial delay.

The court granted the application and stayed the proceedings.

The appellants were convicted in absentia of Highway Traffic Act offences after failing to appear for trial.

The certificates of offence contained discrepancies between the short-form description of the offence and the section number.

The appeal judge upheld the convictions, finding the certificates complete and regular on their face.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Crown conceded that the certificates were not regular on their face as required by ss. 9(2) and 9.1(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeals, and quashed the certificates of offence.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the Crown had established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused provided breath samples directly into an approved instrument, which is a precondition to relying on the presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on the Breathalyzer Printout and circumstantial evidence, but the court found that neither was sufficient to meet the requisite standard of proof.

The court acquitted the accused.