Donald F. McLeod

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm arising from a bar altercation in which a bouncer was struck with a brick.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence, particularly because the trial judge rejected portions of eyewitness testimony and relied heavily on a brief surveillance video.

The appellate court reviewed the video evidence and the trial judge’s reasoning, including the finding that the footage established a chain of events leading from the blow to the victim immediately pinning the accused to the ground.

Applying the principles governing convictions based on video evidence, the court held the verdict was one that a properly instructed trier of fact could reasonably reach.

The conviction was therefore upheld.

The accused sought review of a bail decision denying release on the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code following charges arising from an alleged armed home invasion and assault.

The reviewing judge considered whether the justice of the peace erred in law and whether continued detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

Although the prosecution's case appeared strong and the offences were serious, the court held that the required “something more” justifying detention on the tertiary ground was absent.

Balancing the circumstances, including the accused’s lack of criminal record and a strengthened surety package, the court concluded that a properly informed member of the public would not view continued detention as necessary.

Bail was granted subject to strict house-arrest conditions and supervision by sureties.

Following a jury conviction for second-degree murder, the court determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

The offender participated in a planned ambush in which the victim was lured to a vacant apartment, forcibly confined, beaten, and shot multiple times.

The jury recommended the minimum ten-year period, while the Crown sought fifteen years.

Considering the offender’s criminal record, the firearm-related nature of the murder, the offender’s participation while on probation and under a weapons prohibition, and the possibility of rehabilitation, the court increased the parole ineligibility period to twelve years.

The accused brought a motion requesting a judicial inquiry into jury deliberations following a conviction for second-degree murder.

The motion relied on an affidavit from a juror alleging coercion and improper comments during deliberations.

The court held that after a verdict is received and the jury discharged, the trial judge is generally functus officio and lacks authority to revisit the verdict, subject to limited exceptions such as errors in recording the verdict.

Applying the jury secrecy rule under s. 649 of the Criminal Code and the principles articulated in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court concluded that the allegations related to intrinsic aspects of jury deliberations rather than extrinsic information capable of impeaching the verdict.

As the affidavit did not demonstrate the introduction of extrinsic evidence, the court declined to conduct an inquiry and held that any challenge to the verdict must proceed on appeal.