Adam Little

The defendant brought a Charter s. 11(b) motion challenging unreasonable delay in his prosecution for operating a motor vehicle with excessive blood alcohol concentration and speeding.

The defendant was arrested on May 18, 2012, released on a Promise to Appear, and the Information was sworn on June 7, 2012.

The trial was not scheduled until September 3, 2013—nearly 15 months later.

The court found that approximately 10 months of delay was attributable to institutional factors and a further 2 months to Crown conduct.

The defendant suffered actual prejudice to his security interests, including anxiety, depression, and medical intervention.

The court concluded that the delay exceeded permissible guidelines for simple cases and granted a stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of failing or refusing to comply with a demand for breath samples under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had accepted the defence of officially induced error based in part on the police advising that the accused “may” be charged if she refused to provide a breath sample.

On appeal, the court held that the use of the word “may” was not erroneous because police retain discretion whether to lay charges.

The court further found that the accused’s own testimony demonstrated she did not rely on any police advice in deciding to refuse the demand.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and the matter remitted for a new trial before a different judge.

The defendant was stopped at a RIDE program and charged with driving with excess alcohol.

The Crown sought to prove the defendant's blood-alcohol level exceeded 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant challenged the legality of the ASD demand, the maintenance of the ASD device, and the lawfulness of his detention.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 10(b) of the Charter regarding the ASD demand and device maintenance.

However, the court found a breach of section 9 of the Charter due to arbitrary detention, as the officers failed to explicitly consider factors other than the elevated breath readings when deciding to detain the defendant.

The court convicted the defendant but did not impose a stay of proceedings, finding that a reduced sentence was the appropriate remedy for the Charter breach.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving over 80 milligrams percent.

He brought an application for a judicial stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The case was approximately 15 months old at the scheduled trial date.

The court found that the combined institutional and Crown-attributable delay exceeded 12 months, which was well in excess of what is constitutionally tolerable.

Although the allegations were serious and created heightened public interest, the excessive delay, combined with significant prejudice to the accused's security of the person, warranted a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving 'over 80'.

The central issue was whether an unexplained 18-minute delay at the police station before the arresting officer contacted duty counsel meant the breath samples were not taken 'as soon as practicable' under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The summary conviction appeal judge found that the trial judge erred in relying on the officer's general booking duties to explain the delay, as the officer testified those duties only took a couple of minutes.

Because the Crown failed to explain the remaining 18 minutes, it could not rely on the presumption of identity.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The accused was charged with driving while having over 80mg of alcohol in 100ml of blood following a R.I.D.E. program stop.

The central issue was whether the accused's Charter rights under section 10(b) were violated when police failed to wait a reasonable amount of time for the accused's chosen counsel to call back before directing the accused to speak with duty counsel and subsequently requiring a breath sample.

The court found a breach of section 10(b) and, applying the section 24(2) analysis, excluded the breathalyser results.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application challenging delay in a summary conviction impaired driving prosecution.

The information was sworn on April 13, 2011, and the trial was scheduled to commence on January 30, 2013, representing a delay of 24 months and 19 days.

The court found that systemic delay to the third trial date of November 16, 2012 amounted to 12 months and 5 days, which exceeded the Morin guidelines of 8 to 10 months for summary conviction proceedings.

The court granted the application and stayed the charge, finding that the defendant's right to trial within a reasonable period of time had been infringed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after a trial judge found a breach of s. 8 of the Charter and excluded breathalyzer evidence obtained following an Approved Screening Device (ASD) fail.

The trial judge concluded the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds because he was unfamiliar with certain ASD error codes.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge applied the wrong legal test by failing to properly assess the objective component of reasonable and probable grounds and by speculating about the reliability of the device without supporting evidence.

The court held that an officer may reasonably rely on an ASD fail where the officer reasonably believes the device is functioning properly and there is no evidence of unreliability.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new trial.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appeal challenged the characterization of several periods of delay, including the interval between arrest and first appearance, the period from set date to trial, and the delay between trial dates when the trial did not conclude in one day.

The court held that the six‑week intake period between arrest and first appearance was reasonable and neutral.

Although the trial judge erred in attributing the entire period from set date to trial as institutional delay, the appellate court re‑assessed the delay and found that much of it reflected inherent case requirements.

The remaining delay did not reach a constitutionally unacceptable level, and the trial judge’s brief misstatement of the legal test did not undermine the correctness of the decision.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted after the trial judge found a breach of the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in an impaired driving prosecution.

The appeal court held that the trial judge mischaracterized certain periods of delay as institutional rather than neutral and erred in inferring prejudice to the accused.

Recalculating the delay reduced the unreasonable delay to approximately 11¾ months, which was insufficient to justify an inference of prejudice in the absence of evidence of actual prejudice.

The court found no error in the balancing of societal interests and Charter rights but concluded the stay was improperly granted.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The trial proceeded with a blended Charter application challenging the validity of the breath sample evidence.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: (1) the demand under s. 254(2) Criminal Code was not made "forthwith" as required, with a 22-minute delay from formation of suspicion to commencement of testing; (2) the accused's s. 10(a)(b) Charter rights were not provided immediately after the roadside test failure.

Under s. 24(2) Charter analysis, the court excluded the Certificate of Analysis evidence as the breaches were multiple, protracted, and contrary to the officer's training, warranting disassociation by the justice system.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for a stay based on breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay from charge to completion of trial was approximately 26 months.

The court reviewed the characterization of various periods of delay and concluded that institutional and Crown delay totalled approximately 12 months and 9 days, close to the trial judge’s calculation.

The court held that the trial judge properly characterized the delays and reasonably concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated prejudice caused by delay.

Balancing the societal interest in adjudicating serious impaired driving charges with the appellant’s Charter rights, the court found no error and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving and argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Superior Court reanalyzed the delay and found that several periods had been mischaracterized by the trial judge, including delay attributable to the Crown’s failure to disclose an expert toxicology report and institutional delays related to scheduling and transcript availability.

The court concluded that approximately 15 months and 10 days of delay were attributable to the Crown or institutional causes, exceeding the guideline for provincial court trials.

The appellant demonstrated both actual and inferred prejudice from the delay.

The conviction was therefore stayed for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for care or control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge had admitted breath test evidence despite finding breaches of the appellant’s ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights and attempted to remedy the breach by reducing the fine.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) analysis by unreasonably characterizing serious police misconduct as minimal and by admitting evidence obtained following unlawful trespass, arbitrary detention, and fabricated explanations by police.

The court further found a violation of the informational component of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) because police failed to take additional steps where the detainee’s understanding was uncertain.

The evidence should have been excluded and, without it, the Crown had no case.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge failed to properly consider the objective component of the reasonable suspicion standard required for an approved screening device demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal court held that it was not necessary for the trial judge to explicitly articulate the legal test so long as the reasons demonstrated that the relevant factors were objectively weighed.

The evidence, including the odour of alcohol from the driver’s breath, the accused being the sole occupant of the vehicle, unusual behaviour during the stop, and the officer’s experience, provided sufficient grounds to support the demand.

The conviction was upheld.

The Crown appealed an Ontario Court of Justice decision quashing an information charging refusal to provide a roadside breath sample and impaired driving on the basis that a justice of the peace had not confirmed process under s. 508 of the Criminal Code for a replacement information.

The Superior Court held that confirmation of process was unnecessary for the duplicate refusal count because s. 523(1.1) applies where a new information charges the same offence as an earlier information for which process was already confirmed.

The court further held that even if there had been a defect in process, such defects do not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction once the accused appears and attorns.

Preferring the line of authority exemplified by R. v. Oliveira over R. v. Gougeon, the court concluded that deficiencies in process do not invalidate the information or bar prosecution.

The order quashing the information was set aside and a new trial directed.